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The Recent Ban On Irrational FDCs: History Repeats Itself

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The recent regulatory ban on a large number of irrational Fixed Dose Combination (FDC) drugs is not a new incident in India. A similar mega ban was announced even before, about nine years ago. Intriguingly, the saga continues, for various reasons, without any tangible outcome for the patients on the ground.

On March 11, 2016, the latest ban, again on a large number of irrational FDCs, was notified. It caused a flutter and an immediate sharp adrenaline rush to the impacted drug companies and was soon followed by an interim stay order, again by an honorable High Court of the country.

Thus, when I connect the past dots with the latest one, on mega ban of irrational FDCs in India, a similar sequence of events gets unfolded, following each of such ban notifications of the Government.

Looking back, 294 FDCs were banned by the DCGI in 2007. At that time too, the important issue of patients’ health, safety and economical interest, got converted into a legal quagmire. Many adversely affected FDC drug players chose to go to the court of law to protect their business interest, and also successfully managed to obtain a ‘Stay’ order from the Madras High Court.

Consequently, those 294 irrational FDCs, banned by the Union Ministry of Health on health and safety grounds, continued to be promoted, prescribed and sold to patients across India, without any hindrance, whatsoever.

The matter continues to remain sub judice, as we deliberate the issue here. Thus, whether the recent gazette notification on the ban of irrational FDCs would immediately be implemented, unlike the past ban, or the history would repeat itself, is indeed a big question mark, at this juncture.

Would this ban have similar outcome?  

As discussed, close to a decade after the serious legal fall-out of the ban of 294 irrational FDCs in 2007, another mega ban of 344 irrational FDCs has been announced by the Government, through a Gazette Notification dated March 11, 2016. Some well known brands, such as, Corex, Phensedyl, Crocin Cold and Flu, D-Cold Total, Nasivion and Vicks Action 500 Extra, among others, reportedly come under this ban now. Here is the complete list of 344 banned FDCs.

According to the Government, the reason for banning these drugs is that ‘they involve risk to humans and safer alternatives were available.’

Nevertheless, manufacturers of some of these mega brands have again obtained an interim injunction on the ban for their respective products, from the Delhi High Court.

Sometime during the day, i.e. on March 21, 2016, the honorable Delhi High Court is expected to take up this patient-centric issue. It apparently smacks a blatant self-serving interest of the concerned irrational FDC manufacturers, that defeats the core purpose and value of pharma products for their users.

Like most other issues, the Court directive on this issue, as well, would ultimately prevail, without any shade of doubt.

Is it a ‘bolt from the blue’ for the pharma industry? 

Many industry watchers feel that this recent ban has not come as a ‘bolt from the blue’ for the pharma players, at all, as is being claimed by a section of the pharma industry. Even the Union Ministry of Health has, reportedly, clarified the following points on the recent notification:

  • “We have tried to bring objectivity to the issue by roping in the best of scientists to study the effects of these FDCs.”
  • “Show cause notices were also issued to more than 344 companies and they were given time to make further representations after the expert committee gave their recommendations. Some of them did not even care to respond. Everybody was given ample opportunity. After that, the move was initiated. It was done after much examination.”
  • “It is necessary and expedient in the public interest to regulate by way of prohibition of manufacture for sale, sale and distribution for human use, of the said drugs in the country.”

It is worth noting, at least, one of these well known pharma brands was, reportedly, banned in one of our neighboring countries – Sri Lanka, in 2012, for wide-spread drug misuse, long after its marketing approval in the country.

Some key events leading to the recent ban: 

Besides the above articulation by the Union Ministry of Health, it is worth noting, especially, the following key developments to ascertain, whether this ban came suddenly to the irrational FDC manufacturers, and without any prior warning or appropriate communication:

  • The issue of manufacturing licenses being granted by some states for FDCs without prior approval of Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), was first discussed by the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB) in the year 2000, though without any major tangible outcome till 2007. 
  • In 2007, Government banned 294 FDCs, and the consequent court proceedings had ‘Stayed’ this ban.
  • Expressing huge concern on pharma malpractices related to irrational FDCs, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare in its 59th report (2012) also had flagged this issue. The lawmakers observed in the report that manufacturing licenses for large numbers FDCs were being issued by the State Drug Authorities, without prior approval of the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), in violation of rules. The committee also noted that multiple FDCs, which are available in India had been rejected by the drug regulators in Europe, North America, and Australia, while for many others never had marketing approval applications submitted outside India (Section 7 of [6]).
  • Subsequently, in June 2013, CDSCO  announced the “Policy Guidelines for Approval of Fixed Dose Combinations (FDCs) In India.”
  • According to CDSCO, just 1193 FDCs were approved by the DCGI, since 1961 till November, 2014. Thus, all drug manufacturers should clearly know, which FDC has been approved by the DCGI, and when, leaving no scope for any ambiguity in this area. Thus, there should be no problem in total conformance to the above ‘FDC Policy Guidelines’ by these drug producers.
  • In the same year – 2013, a public notice was also, reportedly, issued, calling all those drug players manufacturing FDCs to apply with the requisite fee, in the prescribed form to the DCGI office, providing the required details.  
  • In 2014, a six-member committee, chaired by Prof. (Dr.) Chandrakant Kokate, Vice Chancellor, KLE University, Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College, Belgaum, Karnataka, was formed to expedite the review process of the applications. 
  • The Kokate Committee has, reportedly, reviewed about 6,600 FDCs, so far, and classified them under four categories – irrational, require further deliberations, rational and require additional data generation. 
  • According to a report, 963 FDCs were found under the irrational category, providing reasons in detail for each. 
  • In 2016, the Government finalized its action, based on the Report of Kokate Committee and also the response received (or still not received despite requests) from the concerned FDC manufacturers.
  • The March 11, 2016 Gazette Notification banned 344 ‘irrational’ FDCs, ruffling many feathers, but understandably to protect patients’ health interest.
  • On March 14, 2016, in response to an appeal against this ban through a writ petition, first by Pfizer, the Delhi High Court reportedly granted the company a stay, pending the next court hearing on March 21, 2016. Subsequently, several such stay orders by the honorable Delhi High Court have been issued with the same date of hearing. 
Adverse health and economic impact on patients:

Besides serious health risks, the patients also suffer from a huge adverse economical impact, in rupee value terms, by consuming much avoidable irrational FDC formulations, which are generally more expensive than single ingredient drugs, if taken separately at times of necessity or convenience.

The ban of 344 FDCs is estimated to cover over 2,500 brands, in different therapy categories, including chronic diseases, where medicines are taken for a long period of time. Thus, a large number of patients were consuming these irrational formulations for a long period of time without any inkling of their necessity and more importantly serious adverse health impact that these irrational FDCs could cause.

To quantify how much have the patients collectively spent on these banned medicines, in the rupee value terms, I shall quote from the estimates of one of the well reputed and much quoted pharma retail audit and market research organization of India – AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd.

According to its report of March 13, 2016, Indian Pharmaceutical Industry would lose Rs. 3,838 Crore (MAT), which is 3.1 percent of the turnover of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM), when calculated based on the retail sales of these FDCs in the last 12-month period.

Paraphrasing the same finding, one can logically conclude that Indian patients withstood an adverse economic impact of Rs. 3,838 Crore in a 12-month period, by spending on these unnecessary and irrational FDCs of dubious value, besides health risks. 

To my surprise, some of the MNC pharma players contribute a major chunk to this avoidable expenditure of the patients, besides associating and avoidable health risks.

Quoting similar credible data, it is also possible to give company-wise break-up in this area, which, in my view, may not be meaningful here.

Two Critical issues to address:

Although, a lot of water has since flown down the bridges, a large number of irrational FDCs are still in the market, exposing patients to possible health hazards and economical hardship.

In this blog, I discussed this core issue in two of my articles, one on July 15, 2013 titled, “FDC Saga: Defiant Manufacturers, Sloppy Regulators and Humongous Inaction”, and the other on May 18, 2015 titled, “Booming Sales Of Unapproved Drugs: Do We Need ‘Safe In India’ Campaign For Medicines?”.

I reckon, the following two would still remain the critical issues, which need to be addressed, expeditiously, once and for all, for patients’ sake: 

  • Stringent compliance with the latest CDSCO requirements by all the manufacturers of FDCs in India must be ensured. Any non-conformance should attract strong punitive measures, through a transparent process.
  • Whether such drugs are being widely misused, creating a grave risk for health and other safety hazards, must be ascertained periodically, based on credible data.
An important example:                         

Just the other day, Reuters reported that one of the largest pharma companies operating in India, was selling a FDC of the antibiotics cefixime and azithromycin, without approval of the DCGI.

Interestingly, this particular FDC has reportedly not received marketing approval in the major global pharma markets, such as, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France or Japan.

After the ban of this irrational FDC, the company was compelled to stop manufacturing and sales of this powerful antibiotic cocktail that poses huge health risk to patients.

This Reuters report also states, the drug ‘had been promoted and administered as a treatment for a broad array of illnesses, including colds, fevers, urinary tract infections, drug-resistant typhoid and sexually transmitted diseases.’ It also found chemists who were selling the drug to prevent post-operative infection and for respiratory problems.

Many doctors and health experts have been saying that the spread and misuse of antibiotic combinations may be contributing to antibiotic resistance in India.

FDC approval must be hard evidence-based:

Since all pharmaceutical products, whether available as a single ingredient, or FDC formulations, are globally considered as ‘Evidence-Based Medicines’. Such evidences are established through robust, stringent and well regulated clinical trials for obtaining marketing approval from the drug regulators, unlike most ‘traditional medicines’.

Following this well-established global norm, and as recommended by even the World Health Organization (WHO), all irrational FDCs must be identified through a transparent and medical science-based process, and banned forthwith by the Government.

Establishing safety and efficacy for all FDCs through clinical trials, just like any other single ingredient drug, introduced for the first time in India, whenever it happens or had happened in the past, inadvertently or otherwise, should be a ‘must happen’ regulatory requirement, for all time to come.

Profit making interest through introduction of a plethora of irrational FDCs, should never be allowed to overshadow patients’ health and economical interest.

The bogey of even ‘25 to 30-year-old FDCs’ now being banned: 

Some section of the industry is also raising this point, vociferously, protesting against the bans of their respective old and top-selling FDC brands, which have now been considered by the Government as irrational, and questioning: ‘why now?’

This point is irrelevant, as not taking action ever, against a wrong doing allowed over a long period time, does not make an irrational FDC formulation a rational one, for all time to come.

Moreover, this recent action of the drug regulator can not be considered as unique either. With the advancement of medical science, in the past years too, the DCGI issued banned notifications, covering many old FDCs, considering those ‘irrational combinations’ at a given point of time, such as, analgin + pitofenone, vitamins B1 + B6 + B12, cyproheptadine + lysine, just to name a few.

Conclusion:

As is known to many, pharmacovigilance is still at a very nascent stage in India. Consequently, ‘Adverse Drug Reactions (ADR)’ or ‘Adverse Drug Events’ reporting are still abysmally poor in the country. No information on ‘Adverse Drug Events’, as claimed by the manufacturers of these irrational FDCs, should, therefore, in no way mean that these drugs are safe and efficacious and beyond any reasonable doubt.

Although the laxity of the drug regulator in this area can’t also be condoned, in any way, the enormity of the risks posed by irrational FDCs to the innocent patients, is indeed mind boggling.

If the manufacturing and sale of all irrational FDCs are not legally stopped, even after a long and rigorous scientific and medical scrutiny by the experts, the patients in the country would, unfairly, continue to remain exposed to huge health and economic risks, without any fault of theirs. This is exactly what happened in 2007 also, when, after the stay order of the ban notification for 294 irrational FDCs by the honorable Madras High Court, all those FDCs continued to be promoted, prescribed and sold to patients across India, unhindered… but at whose cost?

Yet again, the gazette notification of the Government on the recent ban on 344 FDCs, has gone for judicial scrutiny, at least, for some money spinning key brands of the large pharma players.

This time, however, there is one significant difference, the Government seems to be far more assertive and committed to ensure that only safe medicines are available in the market, despite reported intense advocacy by the industry. This commitment on the part of the Government is also evident from the media report that the (DGCI) has again sent a new list of additional 1,200 FDCs for a probe to the panel, which recommended the ban of 344 irrational FDCs in the last week, and that too, after the court stay order on the latest ban.

Further, a senior a senior official in the Health Ministry has, reportedly, reiterated that the Government will stand firm on its decision, and will support the ban with robust data, in the Delhi High Court.

Would history repeat itself, this time now? We, at least, would get a sense of it, as the proceeding of the honorable Delhi High Court commences today, on this issue.

Either way, it will possibly send a clear signal, whether the triumph of commercial profit motive with irrational FDCs would continue, unabated, over patients’ health, safety and economic interests, at least in the foreseeable future. 

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Is Drug Price Control The Key Growth Barrier For Indian Pharma Industry?

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The corollary of the above headline could well be: “Are drug price hikes the key growth driver for the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM)?”

Whenever the first question, as appears in the headline of this article: “Is drug price control a key barrier to growth of the IPM?”, is asked to the pharma players, irrespective of whether they are domestic companies or multinationals (MNCs), the answer in unison would quite expectedly be a full-throated ‘yes’. Various articles published in the media, including some editorials too, also seem to be on the same page, with this specific view. 

Likewise, if the corollary of the above question: “Are drug price hikes the key growth driver for the IPM?”, is put before this same target audience, most of them, if not all, would expectedly reply that ‘in the drug price control regime, this question does not arise at all, as IPM has been primarily a volume driven growth story.’ This answer gives a feel that the the entire or a major part of the IPM is under Government ‘price control’, which in fact is far from reality

Recently, a pharma industry association sponsored ‘Research Study’, conducted by an international market research organization also became quite vocal with similar conclusion on drug price control in India. This study, released on July 2015, categorically highlights ‘price control is neither an effective nor sustainable strategy for improving access to medicines for Indian patients’. The report also underscores: “The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.”

I argued on the fragility of the above report in this Blog on September 7, 2015, in an article titled, “Drug Price Control in India: A Fresh Advocacy With Blunt Edges”.

Nonetheless, in this article, going beyond the above study, I shall try to put across my own perspective on both the questions raised above, primarily based on the last 12 months retail data of well-respected AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd. 

Pharma product categories from ‘Price Control’ perspective:

To put this discussion in right perspective, following AIOCD-AWACS’ monthly pharma retail audit reports, I shall divide the pharma products in India into three broad categories, as follows:

  • Products included under Drug Price Control Order  2013 (DPCO 2013), which are featuring in the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011) 
  • Products not featuring in NLEM 2011, but included in Price Control under Para 19 of DPCO 2013
  • Products outside the ambit of any drug price control and can be priced by the respective drug manufacturers, whatever they deem appropriate

The span of price controlled medicines would currently be around 18 percent of the IPM. Consequently, the drugs falling under free-pricing category would be the balance 82 percent of the total market. Hence, the maximum chunk of the IPM constitutes of those drugs for which there is virtually no price control existing in India.

According to the following table, since, at least the last one-year period, the common key growth driver for all category of drugs, irrespective of whether these are under ‘price control’ or ‘outside price control, is price increase in varying percentages: 

Value vs Volume Growth (October 2014 to September 2015):

Month DPCO Product      Gr% Non-DPCO Products Gr% Non-NLEM Para 19 Gr% IPM
2015 Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume
September 2.8 1.2 10.9 1.1 11.5 9.0 9.9 1.4
August 3.3 (2.7) 14.5 2.4 15.2 13.7 13.0 1.6
July 5.1 (0.6) 14.2 4.1 11.8 9.9 12.9 3.3
June 5.6 (0.1) 16.2 6.2 14.6 11.7 14.8 5.0
May 5.3 (0.3) 12.1 3.4 7.2 4.3 11.0 2.6
April 11.1 5.3 18.4 9.6 11.9 9.6 17.2 8.7
March 17.6 9.5 21.7 13.0 15.6 13.2 20.9 12.2
Feb 13.9 7.6 20.0 10.1 14.4 9.9 18.9 9.6
Jan 6.9 1.8 14.0 3.7 NA NA 12.7 3.3
2014    
December 8.0 0.7 14.8 3.2 NA NA 13.6 2.7
November 3.1 (3.4) 12.6 0.3 NA NA 10.9 (0.4)
October (2.4) (5.7) 6.8 (1.7) NA NA 5.2 (2.6) 

Source: Monthly Retail Audit of AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd 

Does ‘free drug-pricing’ help improving consumption?

I would not reckon so, though the pharma industry association sponsored above study virtually suggests that ‘free pricing’ of drugs would help improve medicine consumption in India, leading to high volume growth.

As stated earlier, the above report of IMS Health highlights, “The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.”

On this finding, very humbly, I would raise a counter question. If only free pricing of drugs could help increasing volume growth through higher consumption, why would then the ‘price-controlled non-NLEM drugs under para 19’, as shown in the above table, have generally recorded higher volume growth than even those drugs, which are outside any ‘price control’? Or in other words, why is the consumption of these types of ‘price controlled’ drugs increasing so significantly, outstripping the same even for drugs with free pricing?

The right answers to these questions lie somewhere else, which I would touch upon now.

Are many NLEM 2011 drugs no longer in supply?

DPCO 2013 came into effect from from May 15, 2013. Much before that, NLEM 2011 was put in place with a promise that all the drugs featuring in that list would come under ‘price control’, as directed earlier by the Supreme Court of India.  Even at that time, it was widely reported by the media that most of the drugs featuring in the NLEM 2011 are either old or may not be in supply when DPCO 2013 would be made effective. The reports also explained its reasons. 

To give an example, a November 6, 2013 media report stated: “While the government is still in the process of fully implementing the new prices fixed for 348 essential medicines, it has realized that most of these are no longer in supply. This is because companies have already started manufacturing many of these drugs with either special delivery mechanism (an improved and fast acting version of the basic formulation) or in combination with other ingredients, circumventing price control.”

Just to give a feel of these changes, the current NLEM 2011 does not cover many Fixed-Dose Combinations (FDC) of drugs. This is important, as close to 60 percent of the total IPM constitutes of FDCs. Currently, FDCs of lots of drugs for tuberculosis, diabetes and hypertension and many other chronic and acute disease conditions, which are not featuring in the NLEM 201, are very frequently being prescribed in the country. Thus, the decision of keeping most of the popular FDCs outside the ambit of NLEM 2011 is rather strange.

Moreover, a 500 mg paracetamol tablet is under price control being in the NLEM 2011, but its 650 mg strength is not. There are many such examples.

These glaring loopholes in the NLEM 2011 pave the way for switching over to non-NLEM formulations of the same molecules, evading DPCO 2013. Many experts articulated, this process began just after the announcement of NLEM 2011 and a lot of ground was covered in this direction before DPCO 2013 was made effective.

Intense sales promotion and marketing of the same molecule/molecules in different Avatars, in a planned manner, have already started making NLEM 2011 much less effective than what was contemplated earlier. 

Some examples:

As I said before, there would be umpteen number of instances of pharmaceutical companies planning to dodge the DPCO 2013 well in advance, commencing immediately after NLEM 2011 was announced. Nevertheless, I would give the following two examples as was reported by media, quoting FDA, Maharashtra:

1. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Consumer Healthcare having launched its new ‘Crocin Advance’ 500 mg with a higher price of Rs 30 for a strip of 15 tablets, planned to gradually withdraw its conventional price controlled Crocin 500 mg brand costing around Rs 14 for a strip of 15 tablets to patients. GSK Consumer Healthcare claimed that Crocin Advance is a new drug and therefore should be outside price control.

According to IMS Health data, ‘Crocin Advance’ achieved the fifth largest brand status among top Paracetamol branded generics, clocking a sales turnover of Rs 10.3 Crore during the last 12 months from its launch ending in February 2014. The issue was reportedly resolved at a later date with assertive intervention of National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA).

2. Some pharmaceutical companies reportedly started selling the anti-lipid drug Atorvastatin in dosage forms of 20 mg and 40 mg, which are outside price control, instead of its price controlled 10 mg dosage form.

Why DPCO 2013 drugs showing low volume growth?

From the above examples, if I put two and two together, the reason for DPCO 2013 drugs showing low volume growth becomes much clearer.

Such alleged manipulations are grossly illegal, as specified in the DPCO 2013 itself. Thus, resorting to illegal acts of making similar drugs available to patients at a much higher price by tweaking formulations, should just not attract specified punitive measures, but may also be construed as acting against health interest of Indian patients…findings of the above ‘research report’, notwithstanding, even if it is accepted on its face value.

In my view, because of such alleged manipulations, and many NLEM 2011 drugs being either old or not in supply, we find in the above table that the volume growth of ‘Price Controlled NLEM drugs’ is much less than ‘Price Controlled non-NLEM Para 19’ drugs. Interestingly, even ‘Out of Price Control’ drugs show lesser volume growth than ‘Price Controlled non-NLEM Para 19 drugs’.

Government decides to revise NLEM 2011:

The wave of general concerns expressed on the relevance of NLEM 2011 reached the law makers of the country too. Questions were also asked in the Parliament on this subject.

Driven by the stark reality and the hard facts, the Union Government decided to revise NLEM 2011. 

For this purpose, a ‘Core Committee of Experts’ under the Chairmanship of Dr. V.M Katoch, Secretary, Department of Health Research & Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), was formed in May 2014.

The minutes of the first and second meetings of the ‘Core Committee of Experts’, held on June 24, 2014 and July 2, 2014, respectively, were also made public. 

On May 5, 2015, the Union Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers Ananth Kumar said in a written reply to the ‘Lok Sabha’ that “The revised NLEM would form the basis of number of medicines which would come under price control.” This revision is taking place in the context of contemporary knowledge of use of therapeutic products, the Minister added.

Would pharma sector grow faster sans ‘price control’?

If ‘drug price control’ is abolished in India, would pharma companies grow at a much faster rate in volume with commensurate increase in consumption, than what they have recorded during ‘limited price control’ regime in the country? This, in my view, is a matter of conjecture and could be a subject of wide speculation. I am saying this primarily due to the fact that India has emerged as one of the fastest growing global pharmaceutical market during uninterrupted ‘drug price control regime’ spanning over the last 45 years.

Nevertheless, going by the retail audit data from the above table, it may not be necessarily so. The data shows that volume growth of ‘out of price control’ drugs is not the highest, by any measure. On the contrary, it is much less than ‘price controlled drugs under para 19 of DPCO 2013′, which are mainly prescribed for non-infectious chronic diseases on a large scale.

I am referring to AIOCD-AWACS data for just the last 12 months, because of space constraint, but have gone through the same for the entire DPCO 2015 period, till September’15. The reason for my zeroing in on DPCO 2015 is for the three simple reasons:

- The span of price control in this regime is the least, even lesser than DPCO 1995, which was 20 percent. 

- It is much more liberal in its methodology of ‘Ceiling Price (CP)’ calculation, over any other previous DPCOs

- It has also a provision, for the first time ever, of automatic price increases every year for price controlled drugs, based on WPI.

A safeguard for patients?

Medicines enjoy the legal status of ‘essential commodities’ in India. Thus, many believe that ‘drug price control’ is a ‘pricing safeguard’ for Indian patients, especially for essential medicines and ‘out of expenses’ for drugs being as high as over 60 percent.

In the prevailing health care environment of India, the situation otherwise could even be possibly nightmarish. The key reason for the same has been attributed to ‘market failure’ by the Government, for most of the pharmaceutical products, where competition does not work. I discussed this issue in my article titled, “Does ‘Free-Market Economy’ Work For Branded Generic Drugs In India?” of April 27, 2015, in this Blog.

In India, ‘drug price control’ has successfully passed the intense scrutiny of the Supreme Court, along with its endorsement and approval. Any attempt of its retraction by any Government, without facing a tough challenge before the Apex Court, seems near impossible.

Conclusion: 

The fundamental reasons for overall low volume growth, or in other words, price-increase driven value growth of the IPM, I reckon, lie somewhere else, which could be a subject matter of a different debate altogether.

As I said in the past, IPM grew at an impressive speed consistently for decades, despite ‘drug price control’, and grumbling of the industry for the same. This high growth came from volume increase, price increase and new product introductions, the volume growth being the highest.

Most of the top 10 Indian pharma players, came into existence and grew so fast during the ‘drug price control’ regime. The  home-grown promoter of the numero-uno of the IPM league table, is now the second richest person of India. These are all generic pharma companies.

Generally speaking, Indian pharma shares even today attract more investors consistently than any other sector for such a long time. Granted that these companies are drug exporters too, but they all gained their critical mass in partly ‘price controlled’ Indian market. The criticality of the need for consistent growth in the domestic market, by the way, still remains absolutely relevant to all the pharma players in India, even today, despite…whatever.

Growth oriented overall Indian pharma scenario remaining quite the same, ‘drug price control’ with a current span of just around 18 percent of the IPM, can’t possibly be a growth barrier. Otherwise, how does one explain the highest volume growth of ‘price controlled non-NLEM drugs’, which is even more than ‘out of price-control drugs’?

Be that as it may, in my view, implementation of public funded ‘Universal Health Care (UHC)’ by the Indian Government, in any form or calling it by any other name, can possibly replace DPCO. Similar measures have been adopted by all the member countries of the ‘Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’ in this area, though following different paths, but nevertheless to attain the same goal.

Lamentably enough, the incumbent Government too has not ‘walked the talk’ on its number of assurances related to this core issue of health care in India.

Still, the hope lingers!

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Drug Price Control in India: A Fresh Advocacy With Blunt Edges

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It is no-brainer that the advocacy initiatives to influence the new Government doing away with the ‘Drug Price Control’ in India has re-started by flooring the gas pedal. A fresh invigorating effort, apparently a pretty expensive one, has been initiated in July 2015 with an interesting study conducted on the subject by an international market research organization, sponsored by a multi-national pharma trade association in India.

Having gone through the report, it appears to me, as if the whole purpose of the study was to rationalize an ‘advance’ conclusion in mind, weaving plethora of data around it for justification.

The report presents an abundance of selective data, apparently to rubbish the very concept of ‘Drug Price Control’ in India. In that process, it reinforced the existence of a deep seated malady in the overall sales and marketing strategic framework of most of the pharma players, rather than failure of ‘Drug Price Control’ in India, meant for the essential drugs.

In this article, I shall dwell on this issue adding my own perspective. Although my views are different, I totally respect the findings and suggestions made in this report.

Drug price control in India:

From 1970, Drug Price Control Orders (DPCO) are being issued in India under the Essential Commodities Act, without any break, so far. The key intent of the DPCO is to provide quality essential medicines at a reasonably affordable price to the consumer. The DPCO has been amended four times since then, the latest one being DPCO 2013.

Unlike the previous ones, the span of price control of DPCO 2013 is restricted to essential medicines, as featured in the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011). The methodology of price control has also now changed to ‘marked-based’ pricing from earlier ‘cost-based’ pricing.

However, for the first time in July 2013, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) extended ‘Drug Price Control’ beyond the Schedule Drugs, when by a notification it announced price fixation of ‘anti-diabetic and cardiovascular drugs in respect of 108 non-scheduled formulation packs under Paragraph 19 of DPCO, 2013’,

Paragraph 19 of DPCO, 2013, authorizes the NPPA in extraordinary circumstances, if it considers it necessary to do so in public interest, to fix the ceiling price or retail price of any drug for such period as it deems fit.

Although the pharma industry initially had supported the switch from ‘cost based’ price control to ‘market based’ price control and only for NLEM 2011 drugs, it took a tougher stand after the above notification. Some trade association reverted to the same good old genre, yet again, trying to establish that ‘Drug Price Control’ does not help at all. The brand new market research report under discussion in this article, appears to be a step in that direction.

‘Market failure in pharma’ where competition does not work:

In its price notification dated July 10, 2014, as mentioned above, the NPPA justified its action by underscoring ‘market failure’ for those anti-diabetic and cardiovascular drugs, where competition does not work. NPPA considered ‘market failure’ as one of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and explained the situation as follows:

  • There exist huge inter-brand price differences in branded-generics, which is indicative of a severe market failure, as different brands of the same drug formulation, which are identical to each other in terms of active ingredient(s), strength, dosage, route of administration, quality, product characteristics, and intended use, vary disproportionately in terms of price
  • It is observed that, the different brands of the drug formulation may sometimes differ in terms of binders, fillers, dyes, preservatives, coating agents, and dissolution agents, but these differences are not significant in terms of therapeutic value.
  • In India the market failure for pharmaceuticals can be attributed to several factors, but the main reason is that the demand for medicines is largely prescription driven and the patient has very little choice in this regard.
  • Market failure alone may not constitute sufficient grounds for government intervention, but when such failure is considered in the context of the essential role of pharmaceuticals play in the area of public health, which is a social right, such intervention becomes necessary, especially when exploitative pricing makes medicines unaffordable and beyond the reach of most and also puts huge financial burden in terms of out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare.

I discussed this subject in my bog post of April 27, 2015 titled, “Does ‘Free-Market Economy’ Work For Branded Generic Drugs In India?”

Are medicines cheapest in India, really?

It is quite often quoted that medicines are cheapest in India. In my view, it would be too simplistic, if we compare the prevailing Indian drug prices in Rupee, against prices of similar drugs in other countries, just by simple conversion of the foreign currencies, such as, US$ and Euro converted into Rupee. To make the comparison realistic and credible, Indian drug prices should be compared against the same in other countries only after applying the following two critical parameters:

  • Purchasing Power Parity and Per Capita Income
  • Quantum of per capita ‘Out of Pocket Expenditure’ on drugs

The Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) with the help of academia and other experts had earlier deliberated on this issue in one of its reports on patented drugs pricing. The report established that post application of the above two parameters, medicines in India are virtually as expensive as in the developed world, causing great inconvenience to majority of patients in the country.

Hence, common patients expectedly look for some kind of critical intervention by the Government, at least, on the prices of essential drugs in India.

A new study on drug price control:

Recently, I came across a ‘brand new’ research report that tries to justify the fresh stance allegedly taken by the pharma industry on the abolition of ‘Drug Price Control’ in India.

This new study of IMS Health released on July 2015, sponsored by a pharma MNC trade association in India, titled “Assessing the Impact of Price Control Measures on Access to Medicines in India”, categorically highlights ‘price control is neither an effective nor sustainable strategy for improving access to medicines for Indian patients’.

The key findings:

The following are the key findings of the report:

  • High income patient populations, rather than the low-income targets are the primary beneficiaries of the DPCO 2013.
  • The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.
  • The DPCO 2013 has resulted in an increase in market concentration and a decrease in competitive intensity.
  • Price control has increased margin pressures for small and mid-sized companies, limiting both employment and investment opportunities in the sector.
  • Price controls negatively impact internal capability-building and expertise-building initiatives, discourage local talent and undermine the government’s ’Make in India’ initiative.

The suggestions made:

In my view, the report almost repeats the same old suggestions being made by the pharma industry over decades. However, while making recommendations, this new report selectively quotes, without clearly naming them, from the draft National Health Policy 2015 and ‘Jan Aushadhi’ initiative of the DoP. It also attempts to ride on the shoulder of Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Make in India’ campaign. The key recommendations of the study are, as follows:

  • Strengthen healthcare financing and extend universal health coverage across population segments with focus on providing cover for medicines
  • Invest in healthcare infrastructure and capability building
  • Promote joint and bulk procurement mechanisms, e.g. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation
  • Levy a cess on the tobacco and liquor industries to fund the healthcare sector and subsidize essential medicines from taxes
  • Introduce mechanisms to ensure availability of generics at lower prices, to improve affordability for patients i.e. set up dedicated generic medicine stores.

An official of IMS Health was also quoted by the media that sounds to me almost like pontification:

“Price control has limited impact on improving patient access and, furthermore is not aligned with the requirements of a vibrant economy like India” and the “Government’s priority should be on strengthening India’s healthcare infrastructure and extending universal insurance coverage.”

The blunt edges in the report raise more questions than answers:

I wonder, whether another apparently expensive research, such as this, was at all necessary to reinvent the same old advocacy narratives on ‘Drug Price Control’ in India.

As I note, the report highlights, “The consumption of price-controlled drugs in rural areas has decreased by 7 percent over the past two years, while that of non-price controlled products has risen by 5 percent.” If this is true, one should try to fathom:

  • What does it really mean and what are its implications?
  • Can it happen, if it has happened, just because of ‘Drug Price Control’?

I am raising these two questions mainly because, price controlled drugs are prescription medicines. Thus, post DPCO 2013, when it happens to ‘prescription only medicines’, other critical questions that come at the top of mind are as follows:

  • Are the doctors now prescribing less of price controlled drugs? If so, why?
  • Price controlled drugs being essential drugs, are the doctors prescribing less of essential drugs? If so, why?
  • Do the doctors prefer prescribing expensive ‘non-schedule’ drugs to patients against their interest? if so, why?

Further, deliberately causing decline in consumption of these drugs, for margin or whatever may be the reasons, without intimating the NPPA as stipulated in the DPCO 2013, is a serious offense, attracting stringent penal action under the Essential Commodities Act.

Therefore, if the above finding of this study is correct and assuming that NPPA is not aware of such shortages or declining consumption of essential drugs in India, yet another critical question that needs to be answered:

  • By deliberately bringing down the consumption of essential medicines, are the concerned pharma players not taking the law in their own hands?

If yes, the Government would need to act forthwith. If not, the above finding of the report is just not correct.

The DoP, NPPA and other stakeholders would, therefore, need to ferret out, which one of the above two is correct.

Thus, I reckon, to wish away ‘Drug Price Control’ in India, the fresh advocacy initiative of the pharma trade association, keeping in the forefront a new study with blunt edges, raises more questions than answers. I have given just an example here, as above.

More marketing push on ‘free-pricing’ drugs is common:

It is not uncommon that the sales of ‘free-pricing’ drugs are usually more, as their margin is unlimited. Pharma players take increasing interest in those drugs and push them harder, almost totally controlling the ‘push-pull’ effect of drug marketing.

Globally, drug companies take increasing interest in such medicines. India is no exception. Here too ‘out of price control’ non-schedule drugs usually show higher growth, as the doctors are influenced to prescribe more of such drugs, though at the cost of consumer.

This practice may not be acceptable to many, but is a stark reality. This process is expected to continue, at least, till Uniform Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP) is made mandatory with strict enforcement and strong punitive provisions for any violations.

Is the growth of price controlled drugs declining?

If the growth of price controlled medicines drastically comes down post DPCO 2013, that should get reflected on the declining overall sales and growth of those drugs. Similar pattern should also be visible in the growth of those types products marketed by most of the major pharma companies in India.

Let me now present the scenario of that space. The following analysis is based on the monthly retail audit data of AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS.

When I look at the growth of DPCO 2013 products based on NLEM 2011 and other price controlled drugs under ‘Para 19’ from January to July 2015 period in the following table, the scenario does not look as worrying just yet, as the above report has made it out to be.  

Product group-wise market growth (in Value):

Month (2015) DPCO products (%) DPCO  Para 19 Products (%) Non-DPCO Products (%) Total Market Growth (%)
July 5.1 11.8 14.2 12.9
June 5.6 14.6 16.2 14.8
May 5.3 7.2 12.1 11.0
April 11.1 11.9 18.4 17.2
March 1.6 15.6 21.7 20.9
February 13.9 14.4 20.0 18.9
January 6.9 NA 14.0 12.7

(Source: AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS )

Again, in the following table, when I look at the growth of DPCO 2013 products of some the very major pharma players in India, the conclusion still remains the same as above:

DPCO Products Growth (%) by major companies (Jan-July 2015):

Company July June May April March Feb Jan
Ranbaxy 20.5 31.9 29.5 17.3 27.6 20.7 53.7
Pfizer 13.0 17.4 5.7 16.7 25.6 21.1 18.6
Abbott 7.2 11.7 18.5 13.5 15.5 18.3 21.2
GSK -2.1 - 1.8 -1.2 12.2 12.2 NA NA

(Source: AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS )

The blunt edges fail to cut ice:

Quite expectedly, even a month after its release in July 2015, the blunt edges in the report seem to have cut no ice, especially at a very important place that matters most to the industry in this area. This observation gets vindicated by a credible media report.

On August 24, 2015 in an interview to a national business daily, V K Subburaj, the Secretary of the Department of Pharmaceuticals commented, “Price control on drugs a shot in the arm for health care” and “the Government cannot do away with it.”

He argued, “A large section of the population is poor. Suddenly, your system is disturbed if you have to spend more on drugs. Drugs are an important component of health care expenditure.”

Accepting the fact that in India, big and small companies investing in research would need more money, Mr. Subburaj said, “In India, we can’t afford to remove controls as the burden of disease is high.”

Conclusion:

With all due respect to all concerned, the above report appears to me palpably commercial, sans any worthy academic value or intellectual input that could trigger thinking for a change in the Government policy. The report apparently lacks in the required cutting edge to achieve the intended goal. The blunt edges are glaring, suggesting on the contrary, that the real action actually lies with the industry. Let me hasten to add, if any one has a different view on the subject, I would respect that with all humility.

The drug price control in India has been continuing since 1970, without any gap. The retail audit data clearly indicates that the growth of the Indian pharma industry did not get stunted or stifled during the period for this particular reason, as postulated in the above report of IMS Health. On the contrary, despite price control of drugs with all its ‘ill-effects’, as highlighted in the study, the growth of the Indian pharma industry in the last 4 decades has been nothing less than spectacular. This would consequently mean, increasing consumption of drugs, leading to improving access to medicines in India, including its hinterland, though may still not be good enough. I discussed this subject in my blog post of December 13, 2013, titled “Access to Medicine: Losing Track in Cacophony”.

Coincidentally, at the commencement of drug price control regime in India, almost all, if not all, the players in the ‘Top 10’ pharma league table of the country, were multi-national drug companies. Today the situation has just reversed. Out of ‘Top 10’, about 7 are home grown drug companies. Many of these companies were born post 1970. Without M&As by the pharma MNCs, this number could have been even higher today.

When it comes to profitability, it is worth mentioning, the soft-spoken and well-respected owner of the so called ‘low margin’ generic pharma company – Sun Pharma, is the second-richest person of the country. He created his initial wealth from India, despite ostensible ‘growth stunting’ price control – as elaborated in the above report.

By the way, what is the span of drug price control in India really – just around 18 percent of the total domestic pharma market now? More than 80 percent of the local drug market continue to remain in the ‘free-pricing’ and ‘high-profit’ zone. In that case, is the essence of the report not chanting… ‘yeh dil maange more’?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

“Make in India” Image of Pharma Needs An Early Makeover

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“It is never too late to be what you might have been” - George Elliot

The chronicle of events since the last couple of years or so, related to ‘Make in India’ image of the local drug industry, have been instrumental to significantly slowing down the scorching pace of pharma exports growth of the country.

The Union Ministry of Commerce estimates that India’s export of drugs and pharmaceuticals may hardly touch US$16 billion in 2014-15, against US$14.84 billion of last financial year. This would mean that pharma exports growth would just be around 5 percent, against the projected number of 10 percent for the year. This is a significant concern, as pharma exports contribute around 40 percent to the total value turnover of the sector.

Despite this fact and couple of other important reasons, as I shall discuss below, about 45 percent of listed pharma stocks in India have reportedly more than doubled in the past one year. The current tail wind in the domestic pharma market could possibly have contributed to this aberration.

According to AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS, the last financial year started in April 2014 with 7.3 percent domestic retail pharma growth, which accelerated to 20.9 percent in March 2015, as the year ended.

High level of optimism and positive sentiments, thus generated in this process, possibly prompted many to ignore even some of the critical storm signals for the domestic pharma industry in its totality.

Declining pharma exports growth – A key challenge:

In 2014, pharmaceutical exports contributed 39 percent to the sector’s total value turnover. Consistently strong export performance over the last few decades, has catapulted the local drug industry in the not so common trajectory of the net foreign exchange earner for India. It is worth noting, though pharma exports grew at a rate of just 1.2 per cent to reach in 2013-14, it registered a CAGR of 21 percent over the last decade.

Some analysts estimate, the chances of Indian pharma exports touching even US$16 billion in 2014-15 are indeed challenging, especially considering low growth recorded by some of the large Indian pharma companies, including Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and Lupin, especially in the US market.

Mounting pricing pressure:

Consolidation process of pharmacy players in the US market is also affecting the profit margins of the Indian drug exporters.

Some key examples are:

  • Global alliance among three large pharmacy distributors – Walgreen, Alliance Boots and Amerisource –Bergen, in early 2013
  • Joint venture between the second largest US wholesale distributor, Cardinal Health, and CVS Caremark in December 2013
  • US pharmacy McKesson’s announced acquisition of US distributor Celesio in January 2014.
  • On April 9, 2015, Bloomberg reported that Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc.’s acting Chief Executive Officer Stefano Pessina has expressed his intent to do more deals, just months after being on the saddle of the biggest US drugstore chain.

As a result, a few dominant pharmacy players emerged with hard bargaining power, exerting tough pricing pressures on the generic drug companies and that too in a market that has been facing already facing cutthroat generic price competition.

Consequently, according to published reports, the prices of generic drugs, in general, declined by around 20 to 30 per cent over the past 19 months, in the US.

Vulnerability in the key market:

According to IBEF March 2015, the United States (US) has been the prime importer of pharmaceuticals from India, accounting for over 25 per cent of Indian pharmaceutical exports, followed by the European Union and Africa at second and third positions, respectively.

India exports over US$4 billion of pharmaceutical products to the US, out of its annual exports of around $15 billion. Large domestic companies, such as Ranbaxy, Sun Pharma and Lupin account for around US$3 billion of exports to the US and the balance comes from a large number of other Indian pharma players.

Government sites 3 reasons:

According to the Union Ministry of Commerce, there are reportedly three key reasons for the pharma export falling short of target in the financial year 2014-15, namely:

-       Delayed regulatory approvals

-       Consolidation of pharmacy players in North America (discussed above)

-       Steep depreciation of currencies in emerging markets such as, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela

A major controllable concern seems to be out of total control:

While articulating the above three factors, the Union Ministry of Commerce seems to have missed out a very important one that has been instrumental in perpetuating the recent slow down of Indian pharma exports, significantly. It is very much a controllable too, unlike the other three, though appears to be virtually out of total control of the domestic pharma companies.

Fortunately, media kept harping on it. PTI News of January 11, 2015 reported, while Indian pharma exports expected to touch a turnover US$16 billion in 2014-15, many Indian pharmaceutical companies continue to face regulatory action by the USFDA for alleged violation of ‘Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)’ and other irregularities at the respective drug manufacturing facilities in different parts of the country.

This report observed, a number of Indian drug-makers, including Ranbaxy, Sun Pharma, IPCA Labs, Wockhardt and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories faced sanctions of the USFDA over different issues ranging from hygiene levels in the plant and concealment of data on failed tests to even fabrication of records. As a result, in several cases, these companies have been barred from selling their drugs in the US and other countries.

The issue involves the very top:

Sun Pharma, post acquisition of Ranbaxy, tops the pharma league table in India with around 9 percent of domestic market share.

It is much well known though, that the US drug regulator has already imposed a ban on import of medicines into the US, produced at its key constituent Ranbaxy’s India-based factories. Earlier, certain drugs produced at its Dewas plant of Ranbaxy were also barred from export to the entire EU region for non-compliance to GMP norms.

On its own, the acquirer – Sun Pharma has also faced USFDA ban on import of products made at its Karkhadi plant in Gujarat.

Taking all these into consideration, one can probably argue that the ‘Make in India’ issue for Indian pharma is humongous and quite a widespread one. Its adverse impact is very much palpable even at the very top.

The root cause:

The root cause of non-conformance of specified GMP standards probably dwells deep within the mindset of the concerned companies, as comes in the narrative of a whistleblower. In that case, the speed of progress of Indian pharma exports’ revival, alongside the industry image makeover, would possibly face a strong and silent headwind.

Pharma sector needs a health check:

On April 16, 2015, ET Intelligence Group commented that “High-flying pharma sector may be in need of a health check”, further reinforcing the case for re-rating of, especially, the export-oriented pharma sector.

The report underscored, that foreign brokerages Bank of America Merrill Lynch and CLSA have flagged concerns about valuations in pharma priced to perfection leaving little room for error. According to data from Bloomberg, since last week, ‘buy’ recommendations by analysts have dropped in stocks like Sun Pharma, Lupin, Cipla, Ipca Labs, Cadila Healthcare, Aurobindo Pharma and Torrent Pharma.

Smacks of irrational exuberance?

The article emphasized that the pharma growth story has now moved to being one that ‘smacks of irrational exuberance’.

The unprecedented interest in the sector has had the effect of shirking off negatives, like regulatory clamps by US FDA, price control, and currency fluctuations in the emerging markets and delay in drug approvals in the US.

The saga still continues:

Triggered by a whistleblower report and confirmed by a number of different adverse plant audit findings, the USFDA has stepped up scrutiny of India make generic drugs, over the last two years. It is worth noting that Indian generic drug players supply round 40 percent of such medicines sold in the United States.

As we discuss the subject, Indian pharma players continue to receive the warning letters from the USFDA, related to breach of GMP standards.

Lamentably enough, significant parts of the same continue to be the data integrity issues. Even in 2014, some large domestic players including, Sun Pharmaceuticals, Cadila Pharma and Orchid Pharma came under scrutiny of the US drug regulator.

Most recently in March 2015, USFDA banned most imports from the Ipca plants, in Pithampur in Madhya Pradesh and Silvassa in Dadra and Nagar Haveli, for non-compliance of GMP standards. Earlier, in January 2015, the US regulatory agency reportedly banned imports from another Indian manufacturing plant of Ipca.

India tops the list on the US import alerts:

According to USFDA data, from 2013 onwards, over 20 drug manufacturing facilities across India attracted ‘Import Alerts’ as against seven from China, two each from Australian, Canadian and Japanese units and one each from South African and German facilities.

Unfortunately, despite intense local and global furore on this subject, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) of India, very strangely, do not seem to be much concerned on this critical issue, at least noticeably enough, besides making some occasional public statements on its working together with the USFDA in this regard.

I discussed similar subject in my blog post of September 29, 2014 titled “Make in India…Sell Anywhere in The World: An India Pharma Perspective.

Conclusion:

As it appears to me, the USFDA import bans related to breach of GMP standards, including ‘Data Integrity’, are mostly unrelated to knowledge deficiency of any kind – technical or otherwise, in the teams handling large drug manufacturing plants of India.

The details, as listed in the USFDA website, indicate that a large number of such incidents are related to falsification of data in the critical documentation process.

Earlier in this article, I termed the problem as very much controllable with the right kind of mindset to set things right, without probably resorting to cost-saving short cuts.

Prime Minister Modi, even during his very recent trips to France, Germany and Canada, passionate appealed to all, including pharma investors both local and global, to “Make in India” and “Sell Anywhere in The World” (exports). This call deserves to be responded with the right spirit and mindset and not just with lip services.

Failure to effectively address the patients’ safety requirements related issues of the foreign drug regulators, such as USFDA, and any direct or indirect attempt to categorize this plight as international ‘conspiracy’ of any kind, could jeopardize India’s interest in pharma exports, for a much longer while.

There is not even an iota of doubt today that “Make in India” image of Indian pharma has suffered a huge set back, at least in the largest and most valuable pharmaceutical market of the world.

As the well acclaimed English novelist George Elliot once said, “It is never too late to be what you might have been”, Indian pharma industry urgently needs an image makeover in this critical area…through a demonstrable change in mindset for doing things right…in every occasion and situation, always.

This is critical, as loss of credibility and reputation too frequently can push a pharma company virtually out of major international business for good… its current clout, might and financial power, not withstanding.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

The Takeover Magician To Tango Again On A Bold New ‘Sunny’ Tune

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The consolidation process of the Indian pharmaceutical industry continues in its own pace. Most recently, the homegrown pharma takeover magician is all set to tango yet again with a bold ‘Sunny’ tune. The low profile creator of high value ‘Sun Pharmaceuticals’, that he painstakingly built from the scratch facing many turbulent weather over nearly three decades, is ready to go for the gold, yet again.

The cool, composed and the decisive business predator is now in the process of gobbling up, quite unexpectedly, the much ailing prey – Ranbaxy. This acquisition of a distressed asset, would make Sun Pharmaceuticals a pharma behemoth not just in India with a jaw-dropping 9.33 percent share of the Indian Pharma Market (IPM), but also would help catapulting the company to become the 5th largest generic pharmaceutical company globally.

Ranbaxy – A sad example of value destruction:

It is worth recapitulating that in 2008, Daiichi Sankyo paid reportedly US$ 4.6 billion to acquire 63.8 percent stake in Ranbaxy.

After Sun Pharma’s acquisition of Ranbaxy with US$ 3.2 billion in 2014, Daiichi Sankyo will hold just 9 per cent of Sun Pharma, which is currently worth US$ 2 billion. Such an example of value erosion of a pharma giant in a little over 5 year period is not just unique, but very sad indeed.

Keeping the “Sunny” side up”:

It is expected that post acquisition, Sun Pharma would continue to keep its ‘Sunny Side’ up, maintaining the corporate name of the merged entity as ‘Sun Pharma’.

Ranbaxy name, in any case, is not so popular, either inside or outside India after the US-FDA fiasco, casting aspersions on the quality of products that it manufactures.

Moreover, the history indicates that this is exactly what happened when Abbott acquired Piramal Healthcare, Zydus bought over Biochem or even Torrent took control of Elder.

Ranbaxy name could probably exist as a division of Sun pharma in future, if at all.

Post acquisition IPM league table:

According to AIOCD AWACS, extrapolating the post acquisition scenario on the league table (MAT February 2014) of the Top 10 Pharma majors in India, it looks as follows:

Rank Company Value Rs. Crore Market Share % Growth %
1 Sun Pharma Group 6,741 9.33 8.8
2 Abbott Group 4,758 6.59 4.6
3 Cipla 3,493 4.84 8.5
4 Zydus Group 3,116 4.31 9.7
5 GSK 2,727 3.78 -14.7
6 Lupin 2,457 3.40 12.4
7 Alkem Group 2,433 3.37 10.1
8 Mankind 2,257 3.12 7.6
9 Pfizer + Wyeth 2,150 2.98 3.0
10 Emcure Group 2,048 2.83 15.5
Total IPM 72,236 100.00 6.0

(Source: AIOCD AWACS)

Distancing from No. 2 by a mile:

With the above unprecedented chunk of the IPM, Sun Pharma would distance itself from the (would be) second ranking Abbott with a whopping 2.74 percent difference in market share, which would be equivalent to the turnover of the 10th ranking pharma player in the domestic pharma market.

In its pursuit of corporate excellence, Sun Pharma has made 13 acquisitions between 1990s and 2012.  Post merger, the revenue of the combined entity is estimated to be around US$ 4.2 billion with EBITDA of US$ 1.2 billion for the 12-month period that ended on December 31, 2013.

Merger consolidates ‘Domestic Pharma’ market share:

This acquisition would also tilt the balance of ‘Domestic Pharma’ Vs. ‘Pharma MNC’ market share ratio in the IPM very significantly, as follows:

Current Market Share Ratio

Post Acquisition Market Share Ratio

Domestic Pharma Vs. Pharma MNC

73.4 : 26.6

77.2 : 22.8

(Source: AIOCD AWACS)

Further, this trend is also expected to allay the lurking fear of many about the robustness and future growth appetite of the domestic pharma industry, thus becoming an easy prey of pharma MNC predators.  It is believed that such an apprehension was prompted by a series of large ‘Brownfield FDIs’ coming into the Indian pharma industry to acquire a number of important local assets.

The key challenges:
1. Sun Pharma too is under US-FDA radar:
As we know that along with Ranbaxy, Wockhardt and some others, Sun Pharma has also come under the USFDA radar for non-compliance of the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs).

Under the prevailing circumstances, it would indeed be a major challenge for Sun Pharma to place its own house in order first and simultaneously address the similar issues to get US-FDA ‘import bans’ lifted from four manufacturing plants of Ranbaxy in India that export formulations and API to the United States. This is quite a task indeed.

2. Pending Supreme Court case on Ranbaxy:

Prompted by a series of ‘Import Bans’ from US-FDA on product quality grounds, the Supreme Court of India on March 15, 2014 reportedly issued notices to both the Central Government and Ranbaxy against a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking not just cancellation of the manufacturing licenses of the company, but also a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on the allegation of supplying adulterated drugs in the country.

Ranbaxy/ Sun pharma would now require convincing the top court of the country that it manufactures and sells quality medicines for the consumption of patients in India. No doubt, all these issues were factored-in for relatively cheap valuation of Ranbaxy.

3. CCI scrutiny of the deal:

Out of the Top 10 Therapy Areas, the merged company would hold the top ranking in 4 segments namely, Cardiac, Neuro/CNS, Pain management and Gynec and no. 2 ranking in two other segments namely, Vitamins and Gastrointestinal.

Noting the above scenario and possibly many others, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), after intense scrutiny, would require to take a call whether this acquisition would adversely affect market competition in any of those areas. If so, CCI would suggest appropriate measures to be completed by these two concerned companies before the deal could take effect. This would also be a task cut out for the CCI in this area.

4. SEBI queries:

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), has sought information from Sun Pharmaceutical on stock price movement and the deal structure.

According to reports, this is due to “Ranbaxy shares showing good movement on three occasions: first in December, then in January and subsequently in March 2014, just before the deal was announced.” This has already attracted SEBI’s attention and has prompted it to go into the details.

The opportunities:

That said, there are many opportunities for Sun Pharma to reap a rich harvest out of this acquisition. The most lucrative areas are related to Ranbaxy’s missed opportunities for ‘first to launch’ generic versions of two blockbuster drugs – Diovan (Novartis) and Nexium (AstraZeneca).

Diovan (Novartis):

Despite Ranbaxy holding the exclusive rights to market the first generic valsartan (Diovan of Novartis and Actos of Takeda) for 180 days, much to its dismay, even after valsartan patent expired on September 2012, a generic version of the blockbuster antihypertensive is still to see the light of the day. However, Mylan Inc. has, now launched a generic combination formulation of valsartan with hydrochlorothiazide.

Nexium (AstraZeneca):

Ranbaxy had created for itself yet another opportunity to become the first to launch a generic version of the blockbuster anti-peptic ulcerant drug of AstraZeneca – Nexium in the United States, as the drug goes off patent on May 27, 2014. However, due to recent US-FDA import ban from the concerned plant of Ranbaxy, it now seems to be a distant reality. Unless…

Sun Pharma has reportedly 10 manufacturing plants in India and 8 in the US, besides having other production facilities in Israel, Mexico, Hungary, Canada, Bangladesh and Brazil. Post acquisition, the combined entity will have operations in 65 countries with 47 manufacturing facilities spanning across 5 continents, providing a solid platform to market specialty and generic products globally. With all these, the above key issues would perhaps be addressed expeditiously.

Leaving aside those two big opportunities, post merger, Sun Pharma is expected to have around 629 ANDAs waiting for approval, including first-to-file opportunities in the United States, besides the current ongoing businesses of the merged company.

What about cost synergy?

Though Sun pharma promoters have given an indication about the revenue synergy, nothing is known, as yet, about the targeted details of cost synergy after this acquisition.

Conclusion:

I reckon, the consolidation process in the Indian pharmaceutical industry would continue, though with a different pace at different times, involving both the domestic pharma and MNCs as the predators.

Even before ‘The Breaking News’ of this brand new well hyped acquisition came from Reuters, in the ‘Corporate World’ of India, Dilip Shanghvi used to be known as an unassuming and astute self-made business tycoon blessed with a ‘magic wand’ deeply concealed in between his two ears, as it were. Folks say, at an opportune time, wielding this ‘wand’, he confidently turns distressed pharma assets into money-spinners and has proved it time and again with grit, grace and élan in equal measures.

Can he do it again? Well…Why not?

Thus, while acquiring the ailing Ranbaxy with a value for money, the takeover magician, prepares for his best shot ever, wielding the same magic wand yet again, to steer the new company from an arduous, dark and complex path, hopefully, to a bright frontier of sustainable excellence.

Let’s hope for the best, as the ‘Tango’ begins…on a bold new ‘Sunny’ tune.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Indian Pharmaceutical Market in February 2014 – A Snap Shot

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According to the Retail Audit dated March 2014 of well reputed AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd, in the month of February 2014, the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) registered a turnover of 5902 Crore (around US$ 980 million) growing at 4.5 percent against Rs. 6,227 Crore (around US$1 billion) in January 2014 with a growth of 8.5 percent.

The growth break-up for the month is as follows:

  • -0.2 percent from existing products
  • 3.2 percent from new launches
  • 1.5 percent from price increases

However, the volume growth of 2.6 percent during Dec’13 to Feb’14 quarter has been better than the same for the corresponding period of the previous year, which was 0.2 percent.

February 2014: Impact of DPCO 2013:

  • The products covered under DPCO 2013 de-grew by (-13.6) percent, whereas rest of the products grew by 7.4 percent resulting an overall growth of 4.5 percent for the month
  • The DPCO 2013 portfolio for GSK de-grew by (-30.7) percent and the same for Ranbaxy registered a negative growth of (-25.2) percent, whereas Sun Pharma had the least impact with its DPCO 2013 portfolio de-growing at -6.8 percent.

Top performers in growth within ‘Top 10 Companies’: 

  • Sun Pharma at 18.1 percent
  • Lupin at 9.3 percent
  • Alkem at 6.7 percent

 Monthly growth of Indian Companies against MNCs:

  • Indian companies at 6.9 percent
  • MNCs at (- 1.7) percent

Top growing MNCs for the month:

  • MSD at 17.3 percent
  • AstraZeneca at 15.3 percent
  • Merck Serono at 5.1 percent

Top 5 growing therapy areas for the month:

  • Anti-diabetic at 13.3 percent
  • Dermatological at 12.5 percent
  • Respiratory at 6.2 percent
  • Cardiological at 5.9 percent
  • Gastrointestinal at 5.1 percent

It is worth noting that Anti-infective market de-grew by 0.9 percent during the month.

Top growing brands:

  • Lantus (Sanofi) at 25 percent
  • Monocef (Aristo) at 23 percent (despite de-growth of the therapy area)
  • Glycomet-GP (USV) at 23 percent
  • Skinlite (Zydus Cadila) at 19 percent
  • Aciloc (Cadila Pharmaceuticals) at 15 percent

New Launches:

Total 107 Brands (generic formulations) were launched in February 2014, which justifies why new launches contributed 3.2 percent of the total growth of 4.5 percent for the month.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Kind Courtesy: AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd.

 

New Drug Price Control Order of India: Is it Directionally Right Improving Access to Medicines?

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The last Drug Policy of India was announced in 2002, which was subsequently challenged by a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Karnataka High Court on the ground of being inflationary in nature. The Honorable Court by its order dated November 12, 2002 issued a stay on the implementation of the Policy.

This judgment was challenged by the Government in the Supreme Court, which vacated the stay vide its order dated March 10, 2003 and ordered as follows:

“We suspend the operation of the order to the extent it directs that the Policy dated February 15, 2002 shall not be implemented. However we direct that the petitioner shall consider and formulate appropriate criteria for ensuring essential and lifesaving drugs not to fall out of the price control and further directed to review drugs, which are essential and lifesaving in nature till 2nd May, 2003”.

As a result DPCO 1995 continued to remain in operation, pending formulation of a new drug policy as directed by the honorable court.

In the recent years, following a series of protracted judicial and executive activities, the New National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012) came into effect on December 7, 2012. In the new policy the span of price control was changed to all drugs falling under the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011) and the price control methodology was modified from the cost-based to market based one. Accordingly the new Drug Price Control Order (DPCO 2013) was notified on May 15, 2013.

However, the matter is still subjudice, as the new policy would require to pass the judicial scrutiny.

In this article, I shall try to explore whether the new DPCO 2013 is directionally right in improving access to medicines for a vast majority of population in the country .

An overview:

As stated above, the new DPCO 2013 has just been notified after an agonizing wait of about 18 years, bringing all 652 formulations under 27 therapeutic segments of the National List of Essential Medicines under price control.

As prescribed in the Drug Policy 2012, in the new DPCO the cost based pricing mechanism has been replaced with a market-based one, where simple average price of all brands with a market share above 1% in their respective segments will be considered.

Only decrease in price and no immediate increase:

Companies selling medicines above the new Ceiling Prices (CP), as will be notified by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) soon, would have to slash prices to conform to the new CP level. However, those selling these scheduled drugs below the ceiling price will not be allowed to raise prices, resulting in significant price reduction of most essential drugs with price increases in none. Prices of all these formulations will be frozen for a year. Although a silver lining is that manufacturers will be permitted an annual increase in the CPs in line with the Wholesale Price Index (WPI).

The span:

The span of DPCO 2013 will cover approximately 18% of US$ 13.6 billion domestic pharmaceutical market. However, the total coverage will increase to around 30%, for a year, after coupling it with existing price controlled medicines, as these will continue with the current prices for a year.

No change in retail margin:

DPCO 2013 continues with the provision of DPCO 1995, fixing margin for the Retailers at 16% of Ceiling Price, excluding Taxes.

Benefit to consumers:

Indian consumers will undoubtedly be the biggest beneficiaries of the new DPCO, as ceiling prices will now be based on roughly 91% of the pharmaceutical market by value, resulting upto 20% price reduction in 60% of the NLEM medicines. The prices of some drugs will fall by even upto 70%.

Overall impact:

In the short-term, Indian pharma market may shrink by around 2.3 per cent on implementation of the new policy, according to an analysis by market research firm AIOCD AWACS. The impact could be more pronounced for multinationals, given their premium pricing strategy for key brands. For the patients, anti-infective, cardio-vascular, gastro-intestinal, dermatology and painkillers would witness relatively steeper drop in prices.

However, despite initial adverse impact, higher volume growth over the next few years may help the pharmaceutical companies to recover and pick-up the growth momentum.

More transparent and less discretionary:

Moreover, the industry reportedly feels that the shift in the methodology of price control from virtually opaque and highly discretionary cost based system to relatively more transparent market based one, is directionally right and more prudent. They point out, even WHO in its feedback to the Department of Pharmaceuticals welcomed the intent to move away from cost-based pricing as it has been abandoned elsewhere.

The drafting of DPCO 2013 also appears to have reduced the discretionary criteria for the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) to bare minimum.

Check on any essential drug going out of market:

DPCO 2013 has tried to prevent any possibility of an essential drug going out of the market without the knowledge of NPPA by incorporating the following provision in the order:

“Any manufacturer of scheduled formulation, intending to discontinue any scheduled formulation from the market shall issue a public notice and also intimate the Government in Form-IV of schedule-II of this order in this regard at least six month prior to the intended date of discontinuation and the Government may, in public interest, direct the manufacturer of the scheduled formulation to continue with required level of production or import for a period not exceeding one year, from the intended date of such discontinuation within a period of sixty days of receipt of such intimation.” 

Patented Products:

DPCO 2013 does not include pricing of patented products, as the Department of pharmaceuticals (DoP) has already circulated the report of an internal committee, specially constituted to address this issue, for stakeholders’ comments.

Encourages innovation:

The new DPCO encourages innovation and pharmaceutical R&D offering significant pricing freedom. It states all locally developed new drugs, new drug delivery systems and new manufacturing processes will remain exempted from any price control for a five-year period.

Implementation:

Interestingly, the changes in prices will be effective after 45 days (15 days in the earlier DPCO 1995) from the date of  respective CP notifications. This increased number of days is expected to allow the trade to liquidate stocks with existing prices.

However, the industry feels that its hundred percent implementation at the retail level, even within extended 45 days, for previously sold residual stocks lying in remote locations, could pose a practical problem.

The Government reportedly answers to this apprehension by saying, the provisions and wordings for implementation of new CPs in DPCO 2013 are exactly the same as DPCO 1995. Only change is that the time limit for implementation has been extended from 15 days to 45 days in favor of the industry. Hence, those who implemented DPCO 1995, on the contrary, should find effecting DPCO 2013 changes in the CPs much easier.

Opposite views:

  • Reduction in drug prices with market-based pricing methodology is significantly less than the cost based ones. Hence, consumers will be much less benefitted with the new system.
  • A large section in the industry reportedly does not co-operate with the NPPA in providing details, as required by them, to make the cost based system more transparent.
  • Serious apprehensions have been expressed about the quality of outsourced market data, which will form the basis of CP calculations.

Key challenges:

I reckon, there will be some key challenges in the implementation of DPCO 2013. These are as follows:

  • Accuracy of the outsourced market data based on which Ceiling Prices will be calculated by the NPPA.
  • In case of any gross mistakes, the disputes may get dragged into protracted litigation.
  • Outsourced data will provide details only of around 480 out of 652 NLEM formulations. How will the data for remaining products be obtained and with what level of accuracy?
  • The final verdict of the Supreme Court related to the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) on the NPPP 2012, based on which DPCO 2013 has been worked out, is yet to come. Any unfavorable decision of the Honorable Court on the subject may push the NPPP  2012 and DPCO 2013 back to square one.

Conclusion:

Thus, DPCO 2013 should achieve the objectives of the Government in ensuring essential medicines are available to those who need them most by managing prices in the retail market and balancing industry growth on a longer term perspective. Interestingly, it also encourages indigenous innovation and R&D.

Thus, DPCO 2013, at long last, seems to be a well balanced one.

That said, making drug prices affordable to majority of population in the country is one of most important variables to improve access to medicines. This is an universally accepted fact today, though not an end by itself.

It is worth noting, price control of medicines since the last four decades have certainly been able to make the drug prices in India one of the lowest in the world coupled with intense cut-throat market competition. Unfortunately, this solitary measure is not good enough to improve desirable access to modern medicines for the common man due to various other critical reasons, which we hardly discuss and deliberate upon with as much passion and gusto as price control.

Therefore, industry questions, why despite so many DPCOs and rigorous price control over the last four decades, 47% of hospitalization in rural area and 31% of the same in urban areas are still financed by private loans and selling of assets by individuals?

Others reply with equal zest by saying, the situation could have been even worse without price control of medicines.

By: Tapan J. Ray 

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

 

 

Reaping rich harvest with less moaning and bagful of creative ideas from emerging Rural Markets of India

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About 72 percent of the population and 135 million households of India live in the rural areas of the country. Many of them are poor.

Definition of ‘Rural’:

Agencies of the Government of India like, National Council of Applied Economic (NCAER) and Insurance Regulatory and Development Agency (IRDA) have defined the terminology ‘rural’ as “villages with a population of less than 5000 with 75 percent population engaged in agriculture…”

Rural India is no longer an agrarian economy:

A recent study by ‘Credit Suisse’ indicates that rural India is no longer a pure agrarian economy, depending mostly on the quality of rain falls during monsoon season. This has been corroborated by the fact that the contribution of agriculture to the total GDP of rural India has come down from 50 percent, as registered during the turn of this century, to its current level of about 25 percent.

This transition of rural India from agriculture to industry and services, is now taking place at a much faster pace than ever before, as the rural economy is getting increasingly attuned to the national economic cycle, creating more and more non-agrarian jobs in those areas. Most of the incremental job creation is taking place in manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade and also in the community services.

Currently, 55% of India’s GDP from manufacturing comes from rural India as the ‘Credit Suisse’ report highlights. As a result, since April 2000, per capita GDP in rural India has grown at a much faster pace than in urban India.

This welcoming change, in turn, is expected to play a key role in significantly improving the consumption of reasonably affordable healthcare, besides many other products and services, in the rural India.

Rural share of GDP growing faster:

Since last several years with various rural reform initiatives of the Government, the hinterlands of India have started growing faster than ever before.

A National Council of Applied Economic (NCAER) Research survey, indicating rural share of India’s GDP improved from 40 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 2010, vindicates this point. At the same time, aggregate rural consumption (US$ Bn) increased from 94 in 1985 to 203 in 2005 and is expected to reach 350 in 2015. (Source: National Statistical Offices, UN, Euro Monitor International, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India).

A new growth opportunity:

According to McKinsey Report, rural India currently accounts for 21 percent of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM). It is interesting to note from the NCAER report that both urban and rural India spend 5% of their total income on health.

Rural growth drivers:

McKinsey estimates that by 2015, upcoming smaller towns and the rural markets will contribute as much to the growth of IPM as the metros and top tier towns.

The following factors are expected to drive the growth of the pharmaceutical industry in the rural India:

  • Large patient base
  • Increasing overall income (over 1 percent of the total population coming above the poverty line every year)
  • Increasing number of middle class in rural areas
  • Disease pattern gradually shifting to chronic ailments
  • Improving healthcare infrastructure with increasing Government spend on the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM)
  • Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), which is the National Health Insurance Scheme for Below Poverty Line (BPL) families, will provide health cover to increasing number of BPL households
  • New initiatives of the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) like, “Janaushadhi”  scheme will provide low cost quality medicines to boost the uptake

Rural market size:

The rural markets contribute about 21 percent of U.S$ 12.5 billion pharmaceutical market in India (AIOCD-AWACS, February, 2012). As reported in ‘India Pharma 2015’ of McKinsey, by 2015 rural pharma market size is expected to reach U.S$ 4.8 billion from U.S$1.2 billion in 2005.

Currently, rural markets are dominated by ailments related to various types of infections. As stated above, this disease pattern is expected to change by the next decade to non-infectious chronic illnesses, like diabetes, cardiac, cancer, hypertension etc.

Increasing Pharmaceutical growth trend in the rural markets:

In 2011 the rural markets of India registered a growth of around 23 percent over the previous year. This decent pace of growth is expected to continue in the next decades.

MAT Dec 2011 (INR M)

MAT Dec 2011 (Saliency)

Growth %
Indian Pharma Market

538,028

100.00

14.92
CLASS I TOWNS

168,339

31.29

12.12
METROS

164,625

30.60

16.33
CLASS II TO VI

102,536

19.06

9.93
RURAL

102,528

19.06

23.19

(Source: IMS Town Class Data – Dec MAT 2011)

Moreover, McKinsey Report forecasts that rural markets will contribute around 27 percent of the total consumption of India by 2020 and by 2015, rural India will account for over 24 percent of the domestic pharmaceutical market from its current level of 21 percent.

Charting the uncharted frontier:

It has been reported that growth rate of the rural markets of many companies have more than doubled due to their rural marketing focus. Possibly as a testimony to this new business opportunity, one can now see:

1. Novartis with its “Arygoya Parivar” initiative is rolling out a tailor-made program for rural areas of seven states of India, to start with. They have developed special packs of essential medicines with special prices to reach out to the rural population. To create disease awareness within the target population and also for disease prevention and treatment, Novartis has deployed health educators for this project.

2. Sanofi has initiated a dedicated rural marketing initiative called ‘Prayas’.  The initiative is aimed at ‘bridging the diagnosis‐treatment gap through a structured continuing education program for rural doctors across India’.

The Company says, “through ‘Prayas’, specialists from semi‐urban areas will share latest medical knowledge and clinical experience with general practitioners based in smaller towns and villages in the interiors of India”. Their second strategy, reportedly, is for improving healthcare access by making quality medicines available at affordable prices for the rural patients.

3. Novo Nordisk is currently engaged in screening patients for diabetes in the rural areas of Goa with mobile clinics. This initiative is expected to create widespread awareness about diabetes and early detection of the disease, so as to prevent early onset of the disease related complications.

4. Eli Lilly developed a program along with the Self-Employed Women’s Association in Ahmedabad to educate and encourage rural patients suffering from tuberculosis to go for treatment.

5. Elder pharmaceuticals created a dedicated 750 strong rural marketing sales force called Elvista.

6. Cadila Pharma has set up a dedicated rural marketing arm called ‘Explora’.

7. Alembic Chemicals created a rural business unit called ‘Maxis’.

These are just a few illustrations and not an exhaustive list. However, the issue is whether the rural marketing initiative will continue to remain an experimental one to the pharmaceutical companies in India or will get translated into a decent long term strategic business move.

“The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid”:

The iconic management guru C K Prahalad in his well-known book titled, “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” wrote:

“If we stop thinking of the poor as victims or as a burden and start recognizing them as resilient and creative consumers, a whole new world of opportunity will open up.” I am not sure whether the above profound observation is encouraging the pharmaceutical companies to explore the rural India with the wings of courage, where majority of the Indian populations live and most of them are poor.

A ‘Pot of Gold’ in the rural markets?

Currently around 20 million middle class households live in over 6,00,000 villages of India. This is almost the same as the number of middle class households residing in urban India and holds the key to significant increase of healthcare spending in rural India.

Rural market-entry strategy:

Instead of transplanting the urban marketing strategy into rural India, some companies, as mentioned above, have taken the community-welfare route to make the rural population aware of particular disease segments like, tuberculosis, diabetes, cardiovascular, waterborne diseases etc. together with the treatments available for such ailments.

These value added marketing strategies offer benefits to both the patients and the company concerned. The local medical practitioners, in turn, are also benefited as they get increasing number of patients in their clinics through such disease awareness community program by the pharmaceutical companies.

Key challenges:

There are some key challenges for effective rural penetration by the Indian pharmaceutical industry, as follows:

• Inadequate basic healthcare infrastructure. Only 20 percent of total healthcare infrastructure of the country is in rural areas where over 72 percent population of the country lives. • Density of doctors per 10,000 populations in India is just 6. A large number of villages in India do not have any doctor. As per AC Nielson study, an average rural Indian has to travel about 6 km to visit a doctor. A Medical Representative will require traveling about 250 to 300 km every day just to meet about 10 doctors and 4 dealers. • Many villages are not well connected by proper all season roads. • Lack of appropriate supply chain network and logistics support.

Conclusion:

With increasing infrastructural support and tailor made innovative marketing strategies for rural India, simultaneously delivering both preventive and curative therapies under one umbrella, it may not be difficult for the Indian pharmaceutical companies to discover ‘The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid’ – a win-win situation indeed for both the ‘haves’ and a vast majority of ‘have-nots’ living in an amazing country called India.

The name of the game is less moaning and a bagful of implementable creative ideas.

By: Tapan J Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.