Tag Archives: Tapan

Would e-Marketing Replace Medical Representatives?

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Many people within the pharmaceutical industry cannot simply visualize a drug marketing environment without Medical Representatives (MRs) detailing their products to doctors for ever increasing prescription support. This much traditional sales force, for face to face interaction and transaction with the customers, is considered virtually indispensable and has formed the backbone for organic growth of the global pharma industry since decades.

It has emerged this way because, pharmaceutical industry sells drugs predominantly through doctors’ prescriptions, where MRs play a pivotal role to influence them directly or indirectly in various ways.

Therefore, for greater success through effective increase in customer focus, as compared to competition, pharma companies are engaged in expanding the size of their respective field-forces on an ongoing basis, though in varying numbers. However, over a period of time, this process has become very expensive, costing on an average around 17 to 20 percent, if not more, of the total expenditure of a company.

As a result, many companies have now started experiencing that their business return on ever increasing number of MRs is not commensurate to investments made on them, mainly in terms of productivity growth per headcount.

This overall scenario has now prompted many pharma players, across the world, to take a hard look at the evolving drug marketing scenario and expeditiously address the consequent issues, as I shall deliberate in this article.

MRs historical role:

Most of the pharma players use their MRs to implement predominantly the following time-tested strategic game plans to generate more and more prescriptions for their respective brands:

  • Detailing product features and benefits
  • Distributing free samples and gifts
  • Developing Key Opinion Leaders (KOL) for identified products
  • Arranging product oriented seminars, conferences and Continuing Medical Education (CME) programs
  • Monitoring doctors prescriptions and incentivizing them in various company specific ways
  • Giving necessary feedbacks to their respective companies

Productive ‘doctor calls’ becoming increasingly difficult:

According to an article titled “Are Sales Reps Necessary?” published in ‘The Pharma Marketing News’, the following details, besides others, were captured in the United States:

  • MRs’ average only 2 quality details per day (quality details include discussion of features, benefits, and data).
  • Only 43 percent of MRs ever gets past the receptionist
  • Only 7 percent of pharma rep visits last more than 2 minutes
  • Only 6 percent of physicians think representatives are very fair balanced
  • The physician remembers only 8 percent of MR calls

Optimal MR productivity – the key issues:

The issue of desired MR productivity is thus becoming a cause of great concern globally for the pharma players. This is mainly because, while the number of patients is fast increasing, the doctors are trying to see all these patients within their limited available time. As a result, each patient is getting lesser doctors’ time, even though the doctors are trying to provide optimal patient care in each patient visit.

In tandem, other obligations of various kinds, personal or otherwise, also overcrowd physicians’ time. In a situation like this, increasing number of MRs, which has almost doubled in the past decade, is now fiercely competing with each other to get a share of lesser and lesser available time of the doctors. Added to this, inflow of new doctors not being in line with the increasing inflow of patients, is making the situation even worse.

According to another study of CMI Communication Media Research, about half of physicians restrict visits from MRs in one-way or another. It reported, about half of cancer specialists (oncologists) are now saying that they would interact only on new products with MRs, while 47 percent of them indicated email as a preference to MR calls.

Surveys found that the oncologists are the most restrictive specialists, with only 19 percent allowing MRs without restrictions. Moreover, 20 percent of them would not see MRs at all and another 40 percent either require prior appointments or limit visits to particular hours of the day/week.

Downsizing sales force with e-marketing:

A paper published in the WSJ titled, “Drug Makers Replace Reps With Digital Tools” states that pharmaceutical companies in the United States are downsizing their sales force with increasing usage of iPad apps and other digital tools for interacting with doctors.

Such widespread layoffs do signal to many that digital tools and technology have started replacing the MRs, at least in the United States, may be in a limited way to begin with.

Building relationship:

However, other group of industry watchers believe that eliminating MRs from the pharma marketing process could lead to a serious set back in the doctor-pharma company face to face relationship that is very important for success While rebutting this point, the pro e-marketing proponents  raise a counter question: Does such relationship now exist with most MRs so far as the high value target doctors are concerned?

e-marketing gradually taking roots:

Many fascinating experiments with e-marketing have now started in several places of the world with considerable success, in tandem with germination of even bolder and brighter ideas in this area. However, the above report mentioned the following:

  • AstraZeneca tracks what doctors view on the website and uses that information to tailor marketing content for the doctor during subsequent interactions. The company had reportedly said in 2010, that it plans to eliminate 10,400 jobs by 2014, including thousands of sales positions in Western markets amounting to around 16 percent of its work force. This step was to help the company saving around US$1.9 billion a year by 2014.
  • When German drug maker Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH launched the cardiovascular drug Pradaxa in the US, it reportedly put together a digital-marketing package to target doctors, including organizing webcasts for leading physicians to speak to other physicians about the drug, with considerable success.
  • Novo Nordisk in 2010 launched a website and iPad/iPhone application called ‘Coags Uncomplicated’, which offers tools to help doctors diagnose bleeding disorders. The site and app include a plug for Novo Nordisk’s drug NovoSeven, which helps stop bleeding related to acquired hemophilia. It has several other applications available on iTunes, including one that helps doctors calculating blood-sugar levels.
  • Some other companies offering iPhone and iPad based apps for doctors include among others, Sanofi, Merck, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis and Eli Lilly.

Advantages of e-marketing:

As I had indicated earlier in my blog post, ‘e-marketing’ would help creating customized, more impressive, self-guided by doctors and more focused presentations with significant reduction in the detailing cost/ product with improved productivity.

Moreover, ‘e-marketing’ would:

  • Make expensive printed promotional aids redundant
  • Eliminate time required and cost involved to deliver such material
  • Have the flexibility of change at any time
  • Ordering of just required samples online would help eliminating wastage

Fast increasingly number of doctors using Internet enabled computers/tablets and smart phones for professional purposes, especially in the urban areas, would facilitate this process.

Conclusion:

Keeping in mind this changing scenario, mindset and behavior of the doctors, as lesser and lesser time is available with the high value target customers for interaction with the MRs, the pharma players would require to take afresh a hard look at their own strategic marketing vision and principles to zero-in on the most effective mix. This approach, I reckon, is applicable more to the domestic players in India.

For high value target customers a combo-strategy would probably be more effective now. In this strategic game plan, MRs would continue to remain as the basic fabric of a drug marketing process, though in reduced numbers and augmented by increasing focus on new technologies/applications through iPad, smart phones, various Internet enabled tools, social networking sites and real time analytics. Formidable differential marketing thrust that would be created through skillful execution of this combo-strategy, is expected to be more effective in making both top and bottom line performance of a pharma player sustainably impressive to the stakeholders.

The name of the game is, therefore, impactfully delivering the core tangible and intangible product values to the doctors for desired outcome in their prescriptions decision making process, keeping in pace with the changing demand of time with a long-term ability to innovate.

That said, would e-marketing then replace MRs to a considerable extent in the years ahead?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

The Takeover Magician To Tango Again On A Bold New ‘Sunny’ Tune

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The consolidation process of the Indian pharmaceutical industry continues in its own pace. Most recently, the homegrown pharma takeover magician is all set to tango yet again with a bold ‘Sunny’ tune. The low profile creator of high value ‘Sun Pharmaceuticals’, that he painstakingly built from the scratch facing many turbulent weather over nearly three decades, is ready to go for the gold, yet again.

The cool, composed and the decisive business predator is now in the process of gobbling up, quite unexpectedly, the much ailing prey – Ranbaxy. This acquisition of a distressed asset, would make Sun Pharmaceuticals a pharma behemoth not just in India with a jaw-dropping 9.33 percent share of the Indian Pharma Market (IPM), but also would help catapulting the company to become the 5th largest generic pharmaceutical company globally.

Ranbaxy – A sad example of value destruction:

It is worth recapitulating that in 2008, Daiichi Sankyo paid reportedly US$ 4.6 billion to acquire 63.8 percent stake in Ranbaxy.

After Sun Pharma’s acquisition of Ranbaxy with US$ 3.2 billion in 2014, Daiichi Sankyo will hold just 9 per cent of Sun Pharma, which is currently worth US$ 2 billion. Such an example of value erosion of a pharma giant in a little over 5 year period is not just unique, but very sad indeed.

Keeping the “Sunny” side up”:

It is expected that post acquisition, Sun Pharma would continue to keep its ‘Sunny Side’ up, maintaining the corporate name of the merged entity as ‘Sun Pharma’.

Ranbaxy name, in any case, is not so popular, either inside or outside India after the US-FDA fiasco, casting aspersions on the quality of products that it manufactures.

Moreover, the history indicates that this is exactly what happened when Abbott acquired Piramal Healthcare, Zydus bought over Biochem or even Torrent took control of Elder.

Ranbaxy name could probably exist as a division of Sun pharma in future, if at all.

Post acquisition IPM league table:

According to AIOCD AWACS, extrapolating the post acquisition scenario on the league table (MAT February 2014) of the Top 10 Pharma majors in India, it looks as follows:

Rank Company Value Rs. Crore Market Share % Growth %
1 Sun Pharma Group 6,741 9.33 8.8
2 Abbott Group 4,758 6.59 4.6
3 Cipla 3,493 4.84 8.5
4 Zydus Group 3,116 4.31 9.7
5 GSK 2,727 3.78 -14.7
6 Lupin 2,457 3.40 12.4
7 Alkem Group 2,433 3.37 10.1
8 Mankind 2,257 3.12 7.6
9 Pfizer + Wyeth 2,150 2.98 3.0
10 Emcure Group 2,048 2.83 15.5
Total IPM 72,236 100.00 6.0

(Source: AIOCD AWACS)

Distancing from No. 2 by a mile:

With the above unprecedented chunk of the IPM, Sun Pharma would distance itself from the (would be) second ranking Abbott with a whopping 2.74 percent difference in market share, which would be equivalent to the turnover of the 10th ranking pharma player in the domestic pharma market.

In its pursuit of corporate excellence, Sun Pharma has made 13 acquisitions between 1990s and 2012.  Post merger, the revenue of the combined entity is estimated to be around US$ 4.2 billion with EBITDA of US$ 1.2 billion for the 12-month period that ended on December 31, 2013.

Merger consolidates ‘Domestic Pharma’ market share:

This acquisition would also tilt the balance of ‘Domestic Pharma’ Vs. ‘Pharma MNC’ market share ratio in the IPM very significantly, as follows:

Current Market Share Ratio

Post Acquisition Market Share Ratio

Domestic Pharma Vs. Pharma MNC

73.4 : 26.6

77.2 : 22.8

(Source: AIOCD AWACS)

Further, this trend is also expected to allay the lurking fear of many about the robustness and future growth appetite of the domestic pharma industry, thus becoming an easy prey of pharma MNC predators.  It is believed that such an apprehension was prompted by a series of large ‘Brownfield FDIs’ coming into the Indian pharma industry to acquire a number of important local assets.

The key challenges:
1. Sun Pharma too is under US-FDA radar:
As we know that along with Ranbaxy, Wockhardt and some others, Sun Pharma has also come under the USFDA radar for non-compliance of the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs).

Under the prevailing circumstances, it would indeed be a major challenge for Sun Pharma to place its own house in order first and simultaneously address the similar issues to get US-FDA ‘import bans’ lifted from four manufacturing plants of Ranbaxy in India that export formulations and API to the United States. This is quite a task indeed.

2. Pending Supreme Court case on Ranbaxy:

Prompted by a series of ‘Import Bans’ from US-FDA on product quality grounds, the Supreme Court of India on March 15, 2014 reportedly issued notices to both the Central Government and Ranbaxy against a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking not just cancellation of the manufacturing licenses of the company, but also a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on the allegation of supplying adulterated drugs in the country.

Ranbaxy/ Sun pharma would now require convincing the top court of the country that it manufactures and sells quality medicines for the consumption of patients in India. No doubt, all these issues were factored-in for relatively cheap valuation of Ranbaxy.

3. CCI scrutiny of the deal:

Out of the Top 10 Therapy Areas, the merged company would hold the top ranking in 4 segments namely, Cardiac, Neuro/CNS, Pain management and Gynec and no. 2 ranking in two other segments namely, Vitamins and Gastrointestinal.

Noting the above scenario and possibly many others, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), after intense scrutiny, would require to take a call whether this acquisition would adversely affect market competition in any of those areas. If so, CCI would suggest appropriate measures to be completed by these two concerned companies before the deal could take effect. This would also be a task cut out for the CCI in this area.

4. SEBI queries:

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), has sought information from Sun Pharmaceutical on stock price movement and the deal structure.

According to reports, this is due to “Ranbaxy shares showing good movement on three occasions: first in December, then in January and subsequently in March 2014, just before the deal was announced.” This has already attracted SEBI’s attention and has prompted it to go into the details.

The opportunities:

That said, there are many opportunities for Sun Pharma to reap a rich harvest out of this acquisition. The most lucrative areas are related to Ranbaxy’s missed opportunities for ‘first to launch’ generic versions of two blockbuster drugs – Diovan (Novartis) and Nexium (AstraZeneca).

Diovan (Novartis):

Despite Ranbaxy holding the exclusive rights to market the first generic valsartan (Diovan of Novartis and Actos of Takeda) for 180 days, much to its dismay, even after valsartan patent expired on September 2012, a generic version of the blockbuster antihypertensive is still to see the light of the day. However, Mylan Inc. has, now launched a generic combination formulation of valsartan with hydrochlorothiazide.

Nexium (AstraZeneca):

Ranbaxy had created for itself yet another opportunity to become the first to launch a generic version of the blockbuster anti-peptic ulcerant drug of AstraZeneca – Nexium in the United States, as the drug goes off patent on May 27, 2014. However, due to recent US-FDA import ban from the concerned plant of Ranbaxy, it now seems to be a distant reality. Unless…

Sun Pharma has reportedly 10 manufacturing plants in India and 8 in the US, besides having other production facilities in Israel, Mexico, Hungary, Canada, Bangladesh and Brazil. Post acquisition, the combined entity will have operations in 65 countries with 47 manufacturing facilities spanning across 5 continents, providing a solid platform to market specialty and generic products globally. With all these, the above key issues would perhaps be addressed expeditiously.

Leaving aside those two big opportunities, post merger, Sun Pharma is expected to have around 629 ANDAs waiting for approval, including first-to-file opportunities in the United States, besides the current ongoing businesses of the merged company.

What about cost synergy?

Though Sun pharma promoters have given an indication about the revenue synergy, nothing is known, as yet, about the targeted details of cost synergy after this acquisition.

Conclusion:

I reckon, the consolidation process in the Indian pharmaceutical industry would continue, though with a different pace at different times, involving both the domestic pharma and MNCs as the predators.

Even before ‘The Breaking News’ of this brand new well hyped acquisition came from Reuters, in the ‘Corporate World’ of India, Dilip Shanghvi used to be known as an unassuming and astute self-made business tycoon blessed with a ‘magic wand’ deeply concealed in between his two ears, as it were. Folks say, at an opportune time, wielding this ‘wand’, he confidently turns distressed pharma assets into money-spinners and has proved it time and again with grit, grace and élan in equal measures.

Can he do it again? Well…Why not?

Thus, while acquiring the ailing Ranbaxy with a value for money, the takeover magician, prepares for his best shot ever, wielding the same magic wand yet again, to steer the new company from an arduous, dark and complex path, hopefully, to a bright frontier of sustainable excellence.

Let’s hope for the best, as the ‘Tango’ begins…on a bold new ‘Sunny’ tune.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Is The New ‘Market Based Pricing’ Model Fundamentally Flawed?

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After a long wait of close to two decades, when the Drug Price Control Order 2013 (DPCO 2013) followed the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012) last year, it appeared that the new pharma price control regime is more acceptable to the industry than the previous, resulting in better over all implementation and compliance.

However, just within a year, the reality seems to be quite different. Not only the Ceiling Price (CP) calculation process of the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) based on DPCO 2013 appears to be fundamentally flawed, its misuse and abuse by some pharma players have also been the subject of great concern and consumer aghast.

The eternal ‘Cat and Mouse’ game continues:

Probably there would be many instances of pharmaceutical companies dodging the DPCO 2013. However, FDA, Maharashtra, has unearthed the following two instances, so far:

1. Favorable consumer expectations with well-hyped DPCO 2013 received a body blow for the first time, when the general public came to know through media reports, that too after almost a year, that GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) Consumer Healthcare having launched its new ‘Crocin Advance’ 500 mg with a higher price of Rs 30 for a strip of 15 tablets, has planned to gradually withdraw its conventional price controlled Crocin 500 mg brand costing around Rs 14 for a strip of 15 tablets to the patients . GSK Consumer Healthcare claims that Crocin Advance is a new drug and therefore should be outside price control.

According to IMS Health data, ‘Crocin Advance’ is currently the fifth largest brand among top Paracetamol branded generics, clocking a sales turnover of Rs 10.3 Crore during the last 12 months ending in February 2014.

2. The second instance of evading DPCO 2013 has also been reported by the media. In this case some other pharmaceutical companies have reportedly started selling the anti-lipid drug Atorvastatin in dosage forms of 20 mg and 40 mg, which are outside price control, instead of its price controlled 10 mg dosage form. Quoting the Maharashtra FDA, the report states: “Atorvastatin may face a similar kind of action from the state FDA as other overpriced brands of drugs as this drug has been overpriced five to 10 times more than the DPCO price. This kind of overcharging is a subject for investigation. Atorvastatin of 40 mg dosage is generally recommended for senior citizens.”

Tip of an Iceberg?

All these seem to be just the tip of an iceberg related to evasion of DPCO 2013 by some pharma black ships, raising costs of essential medicines for the patients. Ironically, what is happening now is an exact replica of the same old strategy that many pharma players got involved into to avoid price control under earlier DPCO 1995. Continuation of the same act of deceit with DPCO 2013 confirms that the ‘cat and mouse game’ to avoid price control is eternal in India, in the absence of any strong and exemplary deterrent.

Better late than never:

When Maharashtra FDA brought it to the notice of National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), the later asked GSK to immediately reduce the market price of ‘Crocin Advance’, as there is no proven additional therapeutic efficacy for the product. The price regulator also sought confirmation of the action taken by the company in this regard. Additionally, GSK Consumer Healthcare now faces consequential punitive measures from the NPPA for price overcharging. This action on the part of NPPA, in all probability, would get lost in the quagmire of litigation, as usually happens in India.

Be that as it may, I expect NPPA taking similar action for Atorvastatin too and increasing its vigil for such scant respect on patient-centric laws and policies of the country.

A brief recapitulation:

Just to recapitulate, DPCO 2013 has been fundamentally different from its ‘predecessor’ DPCO 1995, mainly on the following two counts:

1. Methodology of Price Control:

This has changed from earlier ‘Cost Based Pricing (CBP)’ to ‘Market Based Pricing (MBP)’ based on simple average of all products having 1 percent or more market share.

2. Span of Price Control:

In DPCO 1995, all formulations of 74 bulk drugs, selected based on specified criteria, were under cost based price control, covering over 1700 formulations. Whereas, in DPCO 2013 all essential drugs as mentioned in the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011) come under price control applying the above new methodology of MBP. DPCO 2013 brings around 652 formulations of 348 drugs under 27 therapeutic segments of the NLEM 2011, under price control.

Significant benefits of DPCO 2013 to the industry:

DPCO 2013 offers following three key advantages to the industry, both in the short and longer term:

  • MBP methodology in DPCO 2013 is considered by the industry as more transparent and less ‘intrusive’ than CBP methodology.
  • Span of price control with DPCO 2013 came down to 18 percent of the total pharmaceutical market covering around 610 formulations, as against 20 percent in DPCO 1995 covering over 1700 formulations.
  • Opportunity for automatic annual price increase for controlled formulations based on WPI, which was not there in DPCO 1995, is now available to the industry. Thus, in keeping with the relevant provision of DPCO 2013, NPPA has recently allowed the drug companies to increase the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) of the price controlled medicines, contributing 18 percent of the total market, by 6.32 percent effective April 1, 2014, while prices of balance 82 percent of drugs, that are outside price control, can go up by 10 percent every year.

Check on essential drugs going out of market:

Interestingly, DPCO 2013 has tried to prevent any possibility of an essential drug going out of the market without the knowledge of NPPA by incorporating the following provision in the order:

“Any manufacturer of scheduled formulation, intending to discontinue any scheduled formulation from the market shall issue a public notice and also intimate the Government in Form-IV of schedule-II of this order in this regard at least six month prior to the intended date of discontinuation and the Government may, in public interest, direct the manufacturer of the scheduled formulation to continue with required level of production or import for a period not exceeding one year, from the intended date of such discontinuation within a period of sixty days of receipt of such intimation.”

However, it is still not clear, whether or not GSK Consumer Healthcare had followed this stipulated provision for price controlled conventional Crocin formulations. At least, I do not remember having come across any such public notice, as yet.

Key concerns expressed with DPCO 2013:

The MBP methodology seems to be unique to India as CBP is more common in countries that follow drug price control. Hence the following concerns were expressed with DPCO 2013.

  • Reduction in drug prices with market-based pricing methodology is significantly less than the cost based ones. Hence, consumers will be much less benefitted with the new system.
  • Earlier cost based pricing system was not more transparent only because a large section from the industry reportedly did not co-operate with the NPPA in providing cost details, as required by them.
  • Serious apprehensions have been expressed about the quality of outsourced market data lacking adequate confidence level across the board, which now forms the basis of CP calculations.
  • Additionally, outsourced data would provide details only of around 480 out of 652 NLEM formulations. How will the data for remaining products be obtained and with what level of accuracy?

It is, therefore, believed now by many that DPCO 2013 is more of an outcome of a successful lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical industry in India, rather than a robust pricing policy supported by a flawless methodology for CP calculations.

DPCO 2013 faces challenge in the Supreme Court:

As a result of the above apprehensions, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is now pending before the Supreme Court for hearing challenging DPCO 2013.

Ground Zero of the quality of outsourced market data:

While assessing from the ‘Ground Zero’, keeping aside instances of hoodwinking DPCO 2013 with tweaked formulations, the core issue of the quality of outsourced market data forming the bedrock of CP calculation by the NPPA, undoubtedly becomes more fundamental, creating huge discomfort for many pharma players .

Unlike DPCO 1995, where NPPA used to calculate the CP based on its own audits, data provided by the concerned companies and from many other reliable market sources, the calculations to arrive at the CP for DPCO 2013 products are based predominantly on data outsourced from IMS Health, if not solely.

IMS data does not always capture correct brand prices:

As stated above, many leading pharmaceutical companies are now reportedly pointing out repeatedly that the CP fixation by the NPPA is not accurate, as the IMS Health data does not represent the real prices in many cases.

This is not a new issue either. I have been hearing similar complaints since ages in different forum, wearing different hats and also from various other reliable industry sources. Moreover, NPPA and the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) have indicated several times in the past that IMS data do not capture the requisite details as needed for over 100 products featured in NLEM 2011.

According to Pharmabiz of April 2, 2014, some of the companies expressing the above apprehensions are Sun Pharma, Unichem Labs, Panacea Biotec, Win-Medicare, Albert David, Baxter (India), Indi Pharma and Gland Pharma.

Responding to such widespread complaints, the DoP has directed NPPA to revalidate the IMS data, now being used for CP calculations, for all notified medicines. Accordingly, NPPA has sought the relevant details from respective companies. However, till such data validation takes place, pharma players must comply with all CPs, as notified by the NPPA from time to time.

Difficulty in data validation:

In my view, it would not be easy for the NPPA to revalidate the IMS data due to the following reasons:

  • Those companies, whose prices are showing higher than the current ones in the IMS Health data, may not report to NPPA, as that could ultimately affect them adversely.
  • Pharma companies’ response, in general, to requests from NPPA for furnishing cost and price related information has traditionally been much less than encouraging.

The logjam to continue:

With this evolving scenario, I reckon, till the Supreme Court intervenes responding to the PIL on DPCO 2013 related issues, the dissatisfaction of the industry and the constraints of the NPPA would continue, patients being the primary sufferers.

Conclusion:

Despite the reported concern expressed in the 2014 National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report on Foreign Trade Barriers over the Indian drug price control mechanisms as a deterrent to foreign investments, government price control for essential medicines in India is here to stay for a long haul, to uphold the patients’ health interest.

That said, the final verdict of the Supreme Court related to the PIL on the NPPP 2012, based on which DPCO 2013 has been worked out, is yet to come. Any unfavorable decision of the Honorable Court on the subject may push both the NPPP 2012 and DPCO 2013 back to square one, yet again.

In this backdrop, considering the key fundamental flaw in the CP calculation process of DPCO 2013 with associated loud hiccups as evidenced by the GSK Consumer Healthcare episode and others, would a well-considered verdict of the Supreme Court on the subject be more desirable for greater access to more affordable essential drugs by the patients in India?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

 

Playing Hardball, Riding the Horse of ‘Innovation’

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Media reports are now abuzz with various stories related to intense pressure being created by Big Pharma on the United States Government to declare India as a ‘Priority Foreign Country’ for initiating ‘Trade Sanctions’.

As we know, ‘Priority Foreign Country’ is the worst classification given by the United States to “foreign countries” that deny “adequate and effective” protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) or “fair and equitable market access” to the US.

One of the key factors that infuriated Big Pharma is the ‘patentability’ criterion of the Indian Patents Act 2005 captured in its section 3(d).  This denies grant of patent to those inventions, which are mere “discovery” of a “new form” of a “known substance” and do not result in increased efficacy, offering no significant treatment advantages over already existing drugs.

A brief perspective:

The sole requirement for any company to enjoy market monopoly with a medicine, for a specific period, with its associated commercial advantages, is obtaining a valid patent for that new drug substance from a competent authority of the concerned country. Marketing approval process and other requirements for the same of the drug regulators do not come in the way of the market monopoly status granted to patented products.

This is mainly because the drug regulators do not require to be convinced that a new drug is an improvement or more effective than the existing ones. As a consequence of which, there has been no compulsion for the Big Pharma to bring to the market only those New Molecular Entities (NMEs) that would significantly improve efficacy of a disease treatment benefitting the patients.

Choosing the easier path:

Developing any NME that is a breakthrough in the treatment of a disease is not just difficult and time consuming, it is very risky too. For this reason, once a new innovative drug gets well established in the market, many companies decide to produce their own versions of the same and obtain patent rights for the new ‘tweaked’ molecules, as is generally believed by many.

This approach of bringing ‘me-too’ types of so called ‘innovative’ drugs into the market is considered much less risky, takes lot lesser time in the R&D process, not as expensive and most importantly, enjoys all the commercial benefits that a break through NME would otherwise derive out of its invention, especially the market monopoly with free pricing.

In his well-known book titled ‘Bad Pharma’, Ben Goldacre stated that, as very often these ‘me-too’ drugs do not offer any significant therapeutic benefits, many people regard them as wasteful, an unnecessary use of product development money, potentially exposing trial participants to unnecessary harm for individual companies commercial gain, rather than any medical advancement.

‘Innovation’ of ‘me-too’ molecules:

Examples of some of the ‘me-too’ molecules are as follows:

  • Cemetidine – Ranitidine – Famotidine – Nizatidine – Roxatidine (to treat Acid-peptic disease)
  • Simvastatin – Pravastatin – Lovastatin – Pitavastatin – Atorvastatin – Fluvastatin – Rosuvastatin (to treat blood lipid disorder)
  • Captopril – Enalepril – Lisinopril – Fosinopril – Benzapril – Perindopril – Ramipiril – Quinalapril – Zofenopril (Anti-hypertensives)

Goldacre further highlighted in his book that despite this fact, pharma market does not behave accordingly. Unlike usual expectations that multiple competing drugs in the same disease area would bring the prices down, a Swedish data showed that the drugs considered by the US-FDA as showing no advantages over the existing ones, enter the market at the same or even at higher prices than the original ones. Consequently, the outcome of such innovations adversely impacts the patients and the payor including the government, as Big Pharma takes full advantage of market monopoly and free pricing for such drugs in the garb of innovation.

‘Innovation’ of ‘me-gain’ molecules:

Unlike the above ‘me-too’ drugs, which are new molecules, though work in a similar way to the original ones, another kind of patented drugs have now come-up in a dime a dozen.

Goldacre defined those drugs as ‘me-again’ drugs. These are the same molecule re-launched in the same market at the same price with a different patented ‘enantiomer’. Each of a pair of such molecules is a mirror image of each other e.g. esomeprazole (Nexium) is the left-handed version of the omeprazole molecule (Prilosec), which is a mixture of both left and right handed forms.

There is no dramatic difference between omeprazole and esomeprazole in any respect. Moreover, it is worth noting that concerned constituents of Big Pharma come out with ‘me-again’ drugs only at the end of the patent lives of the original ones. What then could be the reason?

Some examples of ‘me-again’ drugs are as follows:

Enantiomer/Brand Medical Condition Original Drug/Brand
Levocetirizine (Vozet) Allergies Cetirizine (Zyrtec)
Escitalopram (Lexapro) Depression Citalopram (Celexa)
Esomeprazole (Nexium) Acid reflux Omeprazole (Prilosec)
Desloratadine (Clarinex) Allergies Loratadine (Claritan)
Pregabalin (Lyrica) Seizures Gabapentin (Neurotonin)

Why do the doctors prescribe such drugs?

That is indeed a good question, why do the doctors prescribe such costly, avoidable and so called ‘innovative’ drugs? Well, don’t we know that already?

Section (3d) plugs the loophole:

To discourage market entry of high priced and avoidable ‘me-too’ and ‘me-again’ types of drugs that are also an outcome of so called pharma ‘innovations’, the Indian law makers very wisely introduced the section (3d), while amending the Indian Patents Act in 2005. This section, as indicated above, categorically states that inventions that are mere “discovery” of a “new form” of a “known substance” and do not result in increased efficacy of that substance are not patentable. This law has also passed the scrutiny of the Supreme Court of India in the Glivec case of Novartis.

With this Act, India has unambiguously reiterated that it does not support the grant of patents for inventions that are minor modifications of the original ones, effectively blocking the usual path of patents grant as followed by Big Pharma across the world to enjoy monopolistic commercial advantages of ‘frivolous’ innovations, as called by many experts in this area.

Consequent ire of Big Pharma:

This above action of Indian law makers has raised the ire of Big Pharma, as it has a huge commercial interest to protect ‘me-too’ and ‘me-again’ types of innovations in India, even if that comes at the cost of patients’ health interest.

Section (3d) of the Indian Patents Act, therefore, became a major hindrance in meeting the commercial goals of its constituents in India, as such molecules constitute a large majority of the total number of NMEs innovated globally.

As intense power-packed advocacy campaigns of the global pharma companies with the Government of India did not yield any meaningful result to get the section 3(d) amended, it unleashed the might of its well funded lobby groups having free access to the corridors of political power to play hardball with India, riding the horse of innovation and pooh-poohing patients’ interests.

Playing hardball:

The question therefore arises, would India tactfully reciprocate playing hardball or give in to the pressure of trade sanctions under ‘Priority Foreign Country’ categorization of the United States?

I reckon India would not give in. To state more emphatically, India just cannot give in now, under any circumstances.

Come May 16, 2014, the new Union Government of India would almost be ready take its position on the saddle. Thereafter, even if it prefers to give in to intense US political pressure just to avoid trade sanctions, in all practicality that would virtually be a non-starter. This is because, the new Government would unlikely to be in a position to garner enough votes in the Parliament to amend the section (3d), ignoring the general sentiment on this important public health related issue and political compulsions of many of its constituents on the subject.

Would America go to WTO?

Would the United States of America ultimately complain against India in the multilateral forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for alleged violation of the TRIPS Agreement? That is exactly the question that many people are asking today.

In this context it is worth noting, India has reiterated time and again that Indian Patents Act 2005 is in full compliance of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration of 2001.

Since, no country has complained to WTO against India on this issue, as yet, despite so much of posturing and the noise generated the world over, it appears improbable that the US would now do so, though Big Pharma would continue playing hardball raising the same old bogey of protection of ‘innovation’ in a much higher pitch, cleverly camouflaging its hardcore vested commercial interests.

What happens, if WTO decides in favor of India?

In the multilateral forum, if the WTO decides in favor of India, there is much to loose for Big Pharma.

In that scenario, the Indian example would encourage a large number of countries to enact similar model of Patents Act fully complying with the TRIPS agreement, as vetted by the WTO.

Some has termed it as a refreshingly fresh “Alternative Model of Patent Law’, going away from the dominant IP model as is being propagated by the US.

As I had indicated in the past, countries like the Philippines, Brazil and South Africa have either emulated or strongly favoring this alternative model that favors protection of Intellectual Property (IP) and at the same time promotes access to new inventions to a large majority of the global population.

Conclusion:

I reckon, Big Pharma’s playing hardball with India, riding the horse of ‘innovation’, could ultimately boomerang.

The Government of India, irrespective of any political color, lineage or creed, is unlikely to be bullied by Big Pharma constituents any time soon.

More importantly, even in a worse case scenario, the Government would be incapable of getting the section (3d) amended by the Indian Parliament garnering majority of the lawmakers’ support and going against strong political and public voices on this issue.

Nevertheless, Big pharma would continue to wish it to happen… and that drags me to the good old saying:

“If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.”

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Global New Product Launches: Recent Success Trend Unflattering?

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New products are the lifeblood for any company, including the pharmaceutical players. Business performance and sustainable growth of the pharmaceutical industry, as a whole depend on quality of R&D output in terms of ‘New Molecules’, followed by successful development and launch of those new products by the global pharmaceutical innovators.

Post-patent expiry, robust development and ‘just in time’ launch of cheaper generic versions of those innovative products, in a mega scale, usually drive the growth of the generic pharmaceutical industry, globally.

It is worth noting that for the last several years, ‘Patent Cliff’ coupled with progressively drying up R&D pipelines and mostly unflattering new product launches, are taking heavy tolls on the business performance of the global pharmaceutical majors.

The changing dynamics need to be considered:

Echoing this development, a March 2014 report of McKinsey & Company states: “About two-thirds of drug launches don’t meet sales expectations. Improving that record requires pharmaceutical companies to recognize the world has changed and adjust their marketing accordingly.”

To analyze the situation now in perspective, let us start tracking the launches from 2006 and 2007.

10 Big Pharma Sales in 2012 from NMEs approved since 2007 – A comparison

According to a June 2013 report of the ‘FirstWord Pharma’, in 2012 the combined sales of 10 top Big Pharma constituents, as named in the tables below, from the New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by the US-FDA since 2007, were US$ 14.8 billion i.e. 4.9 percent of the total revenue of these 10 companies in that year from the patented drugs.

Individual performance of these 10 companies are as follows:

No. Company Sales US$ Million Sales from NMEs US$ Million As % of 2012 Sales
1. Novartis 32153 3445 10.7
2. J&J 25351 2593 10.3
3. BMS 17621 1495 8.5
4. GSK 28518 1282 4.5
5. Merck 35945 1515 4.2
6. Sanofi 30879 1265 4.1
7. Roche 37578 1238 3.3
8. Eli Lilly 20566 457 2.2
9. Pfizer 47496 1040 2.2
10 AstraZeneca 27925 449 1.6

(Source: FirstWord, June 2013)

The success rate: With 2007 as the base year for NMEs

This table shows that Novartis and Johnson & Johnson were the two most successful companies with the launch of such NMEs in 2012, as they generated 10.7 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively, of their total patented drugs sales from these NMEs, as against an average of 4.9 percent, as mentioned above, during that year.

If we now try to analyze the new product launch success rates of the 10 Big Pharma constituents, based on the contribution of these new products (launched since 2007) to their respective total sales in 2012, the following picture emerges:

  • Good:  More than 10 percent - 2 Companies (20 percent)
  • Average: Between 5 and 10 percent - 1 Company (10 percent)
  • Poor: Less than 5 percent - 7 Companies (70 percent)

The success rate: With 2006 as the base year for NMEs

It is interesting to note from this report that by extending the ‘review period’ to NMEs approved by the US-FDA between 2006 and 2012 (i.e. one additional year), revenues generated by these new drugs in 2012 double to US$ 29 billion – or approximately 10 percent (instead of earlier 4.9 percent) of the total combined branded drug sales of the same 10 Big Pharma constituents in the same year, as follows:

No. Company Sales US$ Million Sales from NMEs US$ Million As % of 2012 Sales
1. Merck 35945 7518 20.9
2. Novartis 32153 5843 18.2
3. J&J 25351 3939 15.5
4. BMS 17621 2514 14.3
5. Roche 37578 2818 7.5
6. Pfizer 47496 2946 6.2
7. GSK 28518 1282 4.5
8. Sanofi 30879 1265 4.1
9. Eli Lilly 20566 457 2.2
10 AstraZeneca 27925 449 1.6

(Source: FirstWord, June 2013)

No significant overall qualitative change:

Here also, though some numbers related to the new product launch success rates of the same 10 Big Pharma constituents, based on the contribution of the NMEs launched since 2006 to their respective total sales in 2012 do change, poor to average performance with the new products still remains quite high, as follows:

  • Good: More than 10 percent - 4 Companies (40 percent)
  • Average: Between 5 and 10 percent - 2 Company (20 percent)
  • Poor: Less than 5 percent - 4 Companies (40 percent)

However, at a company level, the broad success trend with new products does not change very significantly. Just two new products approved by the US-FDA in 2006 were off to flying starts. These were:

  • Januvia of Merck: Generated sales of US$ 5.7 billion in 2012
  • Lucentis of Novartis and Roche: Generated combined sales of US$ 4 billion in 2012

Is it practically ‘The End’ of blockbuster drugs era?

While considering the larger picture on the subject, does it mean that Januvia and Lucentis would mark the end of the golden era of global blockbuster drugs…at least for now?

This picture may get clearer with the following table, prompting possibly an affirmative answer:

Best selling NMEs launched since 2006:

No. Product Company Approval Year 2012 Sales in US$ Million
1. Januvia Merck 2006 5745
2. Lucentis Novartis 2006 2398
3. Lucentis Roche 2006 1580
4. Isentress Merck 2007 1515
5. Invega J&J 2006 1346
6. Sutent Pfizer 2006 1236
7. Gilenya Novartis 2010 1195
8. Stelara J&J 2009 1025
9. Sprycel BMS 2006 1019
10 Tasigna Novartis 2007  998

(Source: FirstWord, June 2013)

Successfully launched most recent product is also on a shaky ground:

The new game-changing hepatitis C drug of Gilead Sciences – Sovaldi, has generated a turnover of around US$ 140 million in less than a month’s time from its market launch. Analysts expect an annual turnover of around US$7 billion from this brand.

However, sustaining the current sales momentum for Sovaldi in the years ahead could indeed be challenging for Gilead, as Bristol-Myers Squibb is preparing to obtain FDA approval for its own hepatitis C treatment daclatasvir, which has already been cleared in Europe. In addition, AbbVie is also progressing fast with its novel three-drug fixed dose combination in the same therapy area.

Moreover, Sovaldi’s unusually high price has reportedly created a furore in the western market. It costs US$ 1,000 a pill, raising huge concern among insurers and state funded healthcare providers in the United States. The report states that three Democratic members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee have already demanded that Gilead Sciences must justify the price of Sovaldi.

Categorization of new drugs:

Analyzing the current situation the above McKinsey report categorizes the types of new products that are now being launched, as follows:

  • Roughly one in four launches involves drugs that are strongly differentiated from competing products.
  • More than half of upcoming launches are of moderately differentiated products in well-established disease areas, and the priority is to find a way to stand out from the crowd. This requires innovative approaches to unveil insights into stakeholder needs and behaviors that competitors do not have.
  • For roughly 15 percent of launches, the priority will be to establish unmet needs effectively to ensure access to a well-differentiated treatment for a targeted population. McKinsey call these launches “category creators.” Gardasil, launched in the un-established human papilloma virus market, is an example.
  • 8 percent of launches face the substantial challenge of launching an undifferentiated product in an un-established disease area.

Broad strategic steps prescribed:

To address this challenge effectively the above report underscores the need for a systematic approach for the pharma players as follows:

  • Establish unmet needs in a disease area,
  • Develop deep customer insight as a basis for a truly differentiated positioning
  • Land the products safely in the market
  • Maximize launch uptake
  • Use early experiences in the market to fine-tune ongoing launch activities

Conclusion:

Considering the prevailing scenario of ‘Patent Cliff’, coupled with progressively drying up R&D pipelines and mostly unflattering success with the new product launches, how would a company work out its new product launch strategy, is becoming increasingly a critical question to answer on priority.

To appropriately tune a new product in its long-term sales and profit growth trajectory, it is imperative to ensure that the product exhibits its winning trends as soon as it is fired from its launch pad.

This is absolutely essential, as it appears from the above study, around one in three launches has been good in meeting the planned expectations. This makes about two-thirds of new product launches falling well short of target.  It is noteworthy that 78 percent of those new products that fell short in their first year target, lagged in their second-year forecasts too. Further, 70 percent of those laggards did not measure up to the organizational expectations even during their third year in the market.

Thus, any inadvertent mistakes in this area could make the grand finale of intense product development and strategizing efforts over a number of years together with expenses of millions of dollars, unflattering, if not catastrophic, both in terms of top and bottom line score-card of the organization, as is happening more frequently during the last several years.

This trend needs to be reversed with the application of innovative minds and charting the uncharted frontiers, sooner the better, for a healthier global pharmaceutical industry, as we move on.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Why Try To Reinvent The Wheel With So Much Of Hullabaloo?

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A recent IMS study, apparently ‘authorized’ (whatever it means) by the Planning Commission of India has reportedly suggested various ‘ways to make drugs affordable in India’.

Though there does not appear to be anything new in the reported suggestions, the well publicized report could manage to snatch an eye-catching media headline: “Patented Drugs Cheaper, but Less Affordable Here”, for whatever may be the reason.

I wish I had an access to the full report for further enlightenment in this area.

Was this ‘authorized’ study necessary at all in the first place?

If the study were related to improving access to medicines in India, several questions would naturally come up, as follows:

  • What does “The study authorized by the Planning Commission” mean? Has the Planning Commission paid from the taxpayers’ money to get this avoidable study done? Or, has the study been done free of cost, as a favor extended to the Planning Commission of India on the issue, in lieu of authorization of the commission for quoting its name in the report?

Following the due process, it would not difficult to unravel whether the Government has made any payment for the study or not.

  • However, assuming that this study was done free of cost, it will be interesting to know what prompted the Planning Commission to even consider to reinvent the wheel with this new IMS study.
  • The reason being, the comprehensive report on the ‘Universal Health Care (UHC)’ dated November 2011 prepared by the ‘High Level Expert Group (HLEG), chaired by the Chief of the ‘Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), Dr. Professor K. Srinath Reddy, is already pending before the Commission for giving shape to it working with all the concerned ministries. It is worth mentioning that the Planning Commission of India also had commissioned the HLEG study.
  • Instead of taking the UHC initiative forward, along with, hopefully, an expedited action of the Department of Pharmaceuticals to put in place a robust mechanism for patented drugs pricing, wasting time by moving in circles on the part of the Planning Commission in search of probably yet another ‘Eureka’ type report, would cost a great deal to the healthcare system of India. On the contrary, from the news report it appears that the findings or suggestions made in the IMS report are rather mundane, far from being anywhere near ‘Eureka’ type by any imaginable yardstick.

HLEG already charted the pathway for UHC in India:

The HLEG report has defined the UHC as follows:

“Ensuring equitable access for all Indian citizens, resident in any part of the country, regardless of income level, social status, gender, caste or religion, to affordable, accountable, appropriate health services of assured quality (promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative) as well as public health services addressing the wider determinants of health delivered to individuals and populations, with the government being the guarantor and enabler, although not necessarily the only provider, of health and related services”.

Ten principles for UHC in India:

Following are the ‘Ten Principles’, which guided the HLEG to formulate its recommendations for the UHC in India:

  • Universality
  • Equity
  • Non-exclusion and non-discrimination
  • Comprehensive care that is rational and of good quality
  • Financial protection
  • Protection of patients’ rights that guarantee appropriateness of care, patient choice, portability and continuity of care
  • Consolidated and strengthened public health provisioning
  • Accountability and transparency
  • Community participation
  • Putting health in people’s hands

HLEG study guarantees access to essential free health services for all:

Because of the uniqueness of India, HLEG proposed a hybrid system that draws on the lessons learned from within India as well as other developed and developing countries of the world.

UHC will ensure guaranteed access to essential health services for every citizen of India, including cashless in-patient and out-patient treatment for primary, secondary and tertiary care. All these services will be available to the patients absolutely free of any cost.

Under UHC all citizens of India will be free to choose between Public sector facilities and ‘contracted-in’ private providers for healthcare services.

It is envisaged that people would be free to supplement the free of cost healthcare services offered under UHC by opting to pay ‘out of pocket’ or going for private health insurance schemes 

Another Planning Commission commissioned report on procurement and distribution of medicines:

Another working group of the Planning Commission on health, constituted for the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-2017) headed by the then Secretary of Health and Family Welfare Mr. K. Chandramouli, had also submitted its report to the Commission.

The Part II of the report titled, “Provisions of ’free medicines for all in public health facilities …” recommends that health being a state subject, all the state governments of the country should adopt the successful and well proven Tamil Nadu model of healthcare procurement.

Tamil Nadu government through Tamil Nadu Medical Supplies Corporation (TNMSC) reportedly makes bulk purchases of drugs and pharmaceuticals directly from the manufacturers through a transparent bidding process, which reduces the cost of medicines to 1/10th and even to 1/15th of the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) of the respective product packs.

As per this report, the total running cost of procurement and distribution for the ‘Free Medicines for All’ project during the 12th plan period would be Rs. 28,675 Crore and an additional allocation of Rs. 1,293 Crore will be required as one time capital costs. The contribution of the Central Government at 85 percent of the total cost would be around Rs 25,667 Crore for the entire Plan period.

Conclusion:

In July 2012, while talking on the above K Srinath Reddy Committee report on UHC, which suggests universal health insurance coverage, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia had reportedly said that the health sector of India would anyway receive a major shot in the arm in the 12th five-year plan with a budgetary allocation of 2 percent of GDP during the plan period. He also articulated that the country’s focus would be on cost-effective treatment and healthcare. For this, there would be a huge demand for human resources in the medical sector.

In the above backdrop, when two such excellent recent reports, commissioned earlier by the Planning Commission itself on improving access to affordable healthcare in India, are still pending before it for initiation of meaningful action with public knowledge, it is difficult to fathom what prompted the necessity for yet another Planning Commission ‘authorized’ study on similar area, with no seemingly earthshaking findings, as detailed in the media report.

This brings me back to where I started from, why is this particular attempt by the Planning commission to ‘Reinvent The Wheel’, yet again, and that too with so much of a hullabaloo, instead of diligently acting on the well crafted pending ones?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Loss of Ranbaxy, Gain of Big Pharma…And Two Intriguing Coincidences

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In March 2014, the largest pharma player of India by market capitalization, Sun Pharma, became the latest of the large Indian pharma exporters facing the US-FDA ‘Import Ban’ for drugs manufactured at its Gujarat-based plant. This news came as a shocking surprise to many, including the stock market, as the home grown company has now attained an international stature being governed by a professional management team and steered by a Board that is chaired by a well-regarded non-Indian with decades of experience in the global pharmaceutical industry.

Just before that in January 2014, being slapped with the US-FDA drug ‘Import Ban’ of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) manufactured in its Toansa Plant of Punjab, the pharmaceutical business of Ranbaxy in the United States, with the products manufactured in its approved manufacturing facilities in India, came to a screeching halt.

It is worth noting that similar ‘Import Bans’ are already in place for the same company’s Dewas, Paonta Sahib, and Mohali production facilities. The combined impact of these bans now makes Ohm Laboratories plant of Ranbaxy, located in New Jersey, its sole generic drug manufacturing facility for the US market.

Considering that the US sales of Ranbaxy reportedly used to be around 57 percent of its total global turnover even in 2012, these import bans are undoubtedly a huge blow to the company, both financially as well as in terms of its business reputation.

Thus, the top priority of Ranbaxy under this situation is effectively addressing all the issues as raised by the US-FDA, especially in the area of documentation, as in the buyers’ market sellers cannot be the choosers.

A ‘Double Whammy’:

Meanwhile, prompted by theses ‘Import Bans’ on product quality ground and adding further woes to the company, the Supreme Court of India on March 15, 2014 reportedly issued notices to both the Central Government and Ranbaxy on a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking not just cancellation of the manufacturing licenses of the company, but also a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on the allegation of supplying adulterated drugs in the country.

Thus, it is a double whammy for Ranbaxy. The company would now require convincing the top court of the country that it manufactures and sells quality medicines for consumption of the patients in India.

However, Ranbaxy reportedly insisted that the drugs sold by it in the Indian market are safe and effective and that the company complies with all regulations of the country.

Could the situation now get even murkier?

During the process of judicial scrutiny, if the Supreme Court gets convinced with the above reply of Ranbaxy on this issue, the question that could possibly emerge is, how come the same company produces high quality drugs for the patients in India and allegedly substandard quality drugs for the patients of the United States? This could make the subject more complicated, if not murkier, internationally.

Two intriguing coincidences:

In the midst of all these, while connecting various similar looking and important dots, emerged during the last few years, a couple of clear coincidences comes to the fore, as follows:

1. Is the drug quality issue in India for exports limited only to US-FDA?

This brings us to the first interesting coincidence of drug ‘Import Bans’, involving large Indian drug exporters, coming mostly, if not only, from the US-FDA, although there are so   many other drug importing countries, including rest of the developed world.

Moreover, none of the Indian domestic companies had ever faced similar number of USFDA ‘Import Bans’ in the past, though they have been exporting to the United States from their FDA approved and inspected plants since quite a while. Therefore, it is worth figuring out why has it started happening now, that too repeatedly, and involving some of the largest global generic drug manufacturers from India.

Ranbaxy too is a large global player for generic pharmaceutical products. Besides India and the United States, the company markets its products both in East and West Europe, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions. Interestingly, though its saga related to US-FDA cGMP conformance in the four plants, culminating into drug ‘Import Bans’ in the United States, commenced as early as 2008, the company does not seem to have any issue with any other drug regulator anywhere in the world, not just yet.

According to the media report, UK and Australian drug regulators had commented that they are assessing the impact of the US action on Ranbaxy products sold in their countries. However, as on date Ranbaxy’s drug export to all those countries continue to remain as normal as before.

If over a period of time, it is proved that other foreign drug regulators do not have any similar quality related issues with Ranbaxy manufactured products, a serious joint evaluation of the entire chain of events related to Ranbaxy and others by the global regulatory experts would perhaps be warranted to provide a lasting solution on the subject.

2. Missed opportunities for ‘first to launch’ generic versions of blockbuster drugs:

The second coincidence is related to a series of missed opportunities, especially for Ranbaxy, related to ‘first to launch’ generic versions of several patent expired blockbuster drugs in the United States.

When the emerging dots associated with such lost opportunities for drugs like, Lipitor (Pfizer), Diovan (Novartis) and Nexium (AstraZeneca) are connected, a clear pattern emerges favoring Big Pharma and obviously adversely affecting companies like Ranbaxy.

Saga started with uncertainty over Lipitor generic Launch:

Like many other large Indian players, ‘first to launch’ strategy with new generic drugs has been the key focus of Ranbaxy since long, much before its serious trouble with the US-FDA begun in 2008. ‘Import Bans’ on two of its manufacturing facilities by the US regulator in that year created huge uncertainty in its launch of a generic version of Pfizer’s anti-lipid blockbuster drug Lipitor in 2011. On time launch of a generic version of Lipitor was estimated to have generated a turnover of around US $ 600 million for Ranbaxy in the first six months.

Despite its neck deep trouble with the US-FDA at that time, Ranbaxy ultimately did manage to launch generic Lipitor, after partnering with Teva Pharmaceutical of Israel.

The story continued with indefinite delay of Diovan generic launch:

Lipitor story was just the beginning of Ranbaxy’s trouble of not being able to translate its ‘first to launch’ advantage of patent-expired blockbuster drugs into commercial success, thus allowing the Big Pharma constituents to enjoy the market monopoly with their respective blockbuster drugs even after patent expiry.

Despite Ranbaxy holding the exclusive rights to market the first generic valsartan (Diovan of Novartis and Actos of Takeda) for 180 days, much to its dismay, even after valsartan patent expiry in September 2012, a generic version of the blockbuster antihypertensive is yet to see the light of the day. However, Mylan Inc. has, now launched a generic combination formulation of valsartan with hydrochlorothiazide.

US-FDA drug ‘Import Ban’ from the concerned manufacturing facility of Ranbaxy gave rise to this hurdle favoring the Big Pharma, as discussed above.

As a result, Novartis in July 2013 reportedly raised its guidance announcing that the company now expects full-year sales to grow at a low single-digit rate, where it had earlier predicted net sales to turn up flat. It also guided for core earnings to decline in the low single digits, revising guidance for a mid-single-digit drop.

Would it also delay the launch Nexium generic?

Ranbaxy had earlier created for itself yet another opportunity to become the first to launch a generic version of the blockbuster anti-peptic ulcerant drug of AstraZeneca – Nexium in the United States, as the drug goes off patent on May 27, 2014. However, due to another recent US-FDA import ban from the concerned plant of Ranbaxy, it now seems to be a distant reality.

That said, it has now been reported that Ranbaxy is in talks with at least two companies on sourcing ingredients for the generic version of Nexium to be able to launch its generic formulations in the United States immediately after the patent expiry.

In this context, any delay in the launch of generic Nexium, which incidentally is the second-biggest seller of AstraZeneca, would have a big impact on the company’s profit.

With the global sales of Nexium at US$ 3.87 billion and US sales at US$ 2.12 billion in 2013, retaining its monopoly status in the all-important US market beyond the end of May would not only limit a forecast decline in AstraZeneca’s 2014 earnings, but would also protect bonuses for top management of the British pharma giant, the above report says.

No Machiavellian Hypothesis:

By highlighting these coincidences, I have no intention to even attempting to postulate something like a ‘Machiavellian Hypothesis’. I just want to establish that intriguing coincidences do exist whatever may be the reasons.

Probably an in-depth study by independent experts in this field would be able to ferret out the real reasons behind these coincidences, including, why are the cGMP issues repeatedly arising only with the US-FDA?

Conclusion:

Be that as it may, delayed generic launches of Nexium (AstraZeneca) with US sales of US$ 2.12 billion, together with the same for Actos (Takeda) and Diovan (Novartis) recording a combined sales for US$ 8.55 billion, have indeed created almost a wind-fall gain for the respective ‘Big Pharma’ constituents and consequent huge losses for Ranbaxy. The first-to-file bonus on Actos alone was estimated to be more than US$ 200 million.

Though the US-FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg has reportedly clarified that the United States is ‘not targeting’ Indian pharma companies but just following a strict quality control regime for all products being imported into America, the following critical questions still float at the top of mind:

- Are all these missed opportunities of Ranbaxy, which favored Big Pharma immensely, just sheer coincidences of clash in timings between USFDA ‘Import Bans’ from four of its manufacturing facilities and the respective launch dates in the United States for the first generic versions of the three blockbuster drugs?

- When Indian generic drug manufacturers continue to export across the world without any problem thus far, why is a series of unprecedented ‘Import Bans’ on quality grounds now coming from the US-FDA in a quick succession decimating the image of Indian generic drug manufacturers?

At the end of the narrative, some wise men could well say that I am trying to connect the dots that do not exist at all. These are all imaginary or at best, sheer coincidences. It could well be just that, who knows? But…

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Indian Pharmaceutical Market in February 2014 – A Snap Shot

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According to the Retail Audit dated March 2014 of well reputed AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd, in the month of February 2014, the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) registered a turnover of 5902 Crore (around US$ 980 million) growing at 4.5 percent against Rs. 6,227 Crore (around US$1 billion) in January 2014 with a growth of 8.5 percent.

The growth break-up for the month is as follows:

  • -0.2 percent from existing products
  • 3.2 percent from new launches
  • 1.5 percent from price increases

However, the volume growth of 2.6 percent during Dec’13 to Feb’14 quarter has been better than the same for the corresponding period of the previous year, which was 0.2 percent.

February 2014: Impact of DPCO 2013:

  • The products covered under DPCO 2013 de-grew by (-13.6) percent, whereas rest of the products grew by 7.4 percent resulting an overall growth of 4.5 percent for the month
  • The DPCO 2013 portfolio for GSK de-grew by (-30.7) percent and the same for Ranbaxy registered a negative growth of (-25.2) percent, whereas Sun Pharma had the least impact with its DPCO 2013 portfolio de-growing at -6.8 percent.

Top performers in growth within ‘Top 10 Companies’: 

  • Sun Pharma at 18.1 percent
  • Lupin at 9.3 percent
  • Alkem at 6.7 percent

 Monthly growth of Indian Companies against MNCs:

  • Indian companies at 6.9 percent
  • MNCs at (- 1.7) percent

Top growing MNCs for the month:

  • MSD at 17.3 percent
  • AstraZeneca at 15.3 percent
  • Merck Serono at 5.1 percent

Top 5 growing therapy areas for the month:

  • Anti-diabetic at 13.3 percent
  • Dermatological at 12.5 percent
  • Respiratory at 6.2 percent
  • Cardiological at 5.9 percent
  • Gastrointestinal at 5.1 percent

It is worth noting that Anti-infective market de-grew by 0.9 percent during the month.

Top growing brands:

  • Lantus (Sanofi) at 25 percent
  • Monocef (Aristo) at 23 percent (despite de-growth of the therapy area)
  • Glycomet-GP (USV) at 23 percent
  • Skinlite (Zydus Cadila) at 19 percent
  • Aciloc (Cadila Pharmaceuticals) at 15 percent

New Launches:

Total 107 Brands (generic formulations) were launched in February 2014, which justifies why new launches contributed 3.2 percent of the total growth of 4.5 percent for the month.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Kind Courtesy: AIOCD Pharmasofttech AWACS Pvt. Ltd.