The New Government To Ponder: Is “Market Based Drug Pricing Policy” An ill Conceived One?

According to a recent media report, Mr. Ananth Kumar, the new minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers has recently made a statement, as follows:

“… As far as branded medicines of multinational pharmaceutical companies are concerned, we will talk to all of them and try to bring down prices of essential drugs for poor by 25-40 per cent… The pharmaceutical industry is very important for the health of the country, he added…our main mission will be to ensure the availability of all necessary medicines at affordable prices, especially for poor across the country.”

This statement assumes great significance for the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry and simultaneously rekindles hope for many patients, as the minister expressed intent that the new government wants to revisit the current drug price control system of India.

However, why did the minister in his above statement single out MNCs for discussion, is not very clear, just yet. Most probably, this is due to much published reports that branded generics from MNCs, which are outside price control, usually cost more than others, for whatever may be the reasons. Anyway, that could be the topic of another discussion in this blog.

The backdrop of DPCO 2013:

After a protracted negotiation and lobbying by the Indian Pharma Industry and others with the then UPA II Government, a well sought after paradigm shift took place in the drug price control regime of India.

In the new “National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012”, the span of price control was changed from bulk-drug based to all drug formulations falling under the ‘National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011)’. The methodology of price control was also radically modified from the cost-based to market based one. Accordingly the new Drug Price Control Order (DPCO 2013) was notified on May 15, 2013.

The decision to have new drug policy was taken as a last minute sprint, as it were, primarily driven by the immense pressure generated by the Supreme Court on the UPA II Government for pussyfooting this important issue over almost a decade.

Hurried action after prolonged inaction:

The last Drug Policy of India was announced in 2002, which was subsequently challenged by a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Karnataka High Court on the ground of being inflationary in nature. The Honorable Court by its order dated November 12, 2002 issued a stay on the implementation of the Policy.

This judgment was challenged by the Government in the Supreme Court, which vacated the stay vide its order dated March 10, 2003 and ordered as follows:

“We suspend the operation of the order to the extent it directs that the Policy dated February 15, 2002 shall not be implemented. However we direct that the petitioner shall consider and formulate appropriate criteria for ensuring essential and lifesaving drugs not to fall out of the price control and further directed to review drugs, which are essential and lifesaving in nature till 2nd May, 2003”.

As a result, DPCO 1995 continued to remain in operation pending formulation of a new drug policy as directed by the honorable court, since then.

Unfortunately, the then government did not show any urgency to come out with a new drug policy, even thereafter, for about a decade.

Fortunately, in the recent years, coming under intense judicial scrutiny and pressure due to a PIL on the subject before the Supreme Court of India, the then Government was compelled to come out with the New National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012), rather hurriedly, effective December 7, 2012.

That was the ‘grand beginning’ of a new paradigm of ‘market-based’ drug price control regime in India.

Hype and rapid disillusionment:

Many stakeholders, barring some NGOs, felt at that time that DPCO 2013 could be a win-win strategy for both the industry and patients, as it would apparently be less intrusive for the pharma players.

Along side, through ‘Public Relations’ overdrive, hype was created by vested interests to generate a feeling that the drug prices are coming down by 30-40 percent, as a result of the new market-based price control regime.

That could well be true for a handful of drugs, but the fact is that the industry was adversely impacted by around 2.3 percent and the span of price control came down from 20 percent of the just pervious DPCO 1995 to 18 percent in DPCO 2013, not impacting the industry as much as it was hyped before.

Realization of these facts was just enough for the public disillusionment to set in.

Questions started popping-up almost immediately:

Unfortunately, many key questions started popping-up just at the very onset of its implementation process. Besides many others, some basic questions raised on DPCO 2013, a good number of which went into litigations and/or departmental reviews, are as follows:

  • Implementability of new ‘Ceiling Prices (CP)’ for market stocks within 45 days of notification by the respective companies.
  • Criteria of calculation of 1 percent market share for brands.
  • How would already existing different drug delivery systems of the same drug substance be considered to work out a common CP?
  • How reliable is the IMS Data, based on which CP calculation would be done by the NPPA?
  • What will happen to those NLEM 2011 drugs for which IMS does not provide any information?

Erstwhile Finance Ministry wanted to continue with cost plus formula:

When the new draft National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy (NPPP) had gone for comments from various ministries of UPA II Government, the key recommendations of the then Ministry of Finance were reportedly as follows:

  • The proposal to limit the NPPP to control prices of only formulations leaving aside bulk drugs is not supported.
  • Top priced brands in many therapy areas are also the brand leaders. As a result, high prices of such drugs while calculating the ceiling prices would push up prices of many low priced drugs significantly.
  • The current system, which is a cost plus system is adequate to cover all legitimate costs for a manufacturer, particularly when the costing is being done annually and should be continued.
  • The same cost plus system should also apply to other formulations where additional therapeutic elements will be added. Related incremental cost in those cases can be considered to determine the ceiling price of combination formulations.
  • The Maximum Retail Prices (MRP) for all NLEM 2011 drugs may be fixed by the NPPA accordingly and the pharmaceutical companies would be free to price these NLEM products at any level below the MRP.
  • Annual indexation of price with WPI is not supported. The cost analysis should determine the quantum of increase.
  • Data related to prices and market shares should be collected from sources other than IMS even for drugs covered by them. The methodology to be followed by NPPA for evaluating IMS data and for collecting the data for medicines from other sources should be included in the NPPP.
  • A phased movement towards 100 percent generic manufacturing, as recommended by the Ministry of Health (MoH), for all drugs under the NLEM should be considered.

Current imbroglio over ceiling price fixation:

A recent media report highlighted that even almost 15 months after the announcement of DPCO 2013, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) fails to fix prices of 111 scheduled formulations due to scanty available information.

According to this report, though NPPA has revised prices of over 400 formulations out of around 652 as per DPCO 2013, it has now come out with a list of 103 formulations for which prices could not be fixed due to insufficient information. Besides, it could not fix the prices of eight more formulations, as the NLEM 2011 did not provide required information, such as, strength, route of administration and dosage form.

Thus, it appears that required price control of essential drugs as per DPCO 2013 is in a limbo today because of serious implementability issues, over and above its other (de)merits, as discussed above.

The fundamental question:

The fundamental question that is now being raised by many is, whether from patients point of new there was any need to change from ‘Cost Based Price Control (CBPC)’ to the new ‘Market Based Price Control (MBPC)’ system?

As a result, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is still pending before the Supreme Court challenging DPCO 2013.

This judicial scrutiny could put the MBPC concept in jeopardy, placing the pharma price control system back to CBPC mode, unless the new government takes a pre-emptive strategic move well before hand.

The New Minister’s recent statement rekindles hope for action:

There are now more reasons to justify why the new Minister Mr. Ananth Kumar should revisit MBPC mechanism, sooner. As I wrote in one of my earlier blog post that “The New ‘Market Based Pricing Model’ is Fundamentally Flawed”.

Conclusion:

From the statements of the new Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers herein, and also the new Health Minister, as quoted in my last blog post, it appears that the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) would continue to remain with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, at least for some more time. This is quite contrary to the general expectations that DoP would be a part of the Ministry of Health in the new regime.

That said, besides full implementability of DPCO 2013 for all essential drugs, the Ceiling Price (CP) calculation methodology also appears to be fundamentally flawed, its misuse and abuse by some pharma players, as highlighted in my earlier blog post, have also been a subject of great concern and consumer aghast.

With this rapidly evolving scenario, unless the new minister Ananth Kumar steps in to sort out the conundrum with deft handling, unlike his almost defunct predecessor in UPA II, or till the Supreme Court intervenes responding to the PIL on DPCO 2013 related issues, the growing dissatisfaction of the affected section of stakeholders and the constraints of the NPPA would continue to linger, poor patients being the ultimate sufferers.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Credible role of CCI and NPPA should allay fear of possible ill effects of FDI in Pharmaceuticals

On August 3, 2011, ‘The Hindu Business Line’ reported, “Domestic drug-makers worried by side-effects of MNC buyouts.” It opined, “Acquisitions in the pharma industry came in for sharp focus, after several domestic drug-makers sold their operations partially or entirely to overseas companies – raising concerns of, among other things, increase in medicine prices.”

However, on August 4, 2011 the same business daily retorted, “MNC drug-makers allay fears of rise in prices.” It asserted, “Multinational drug-makers have stressed that they are committed to achieving the country’s healthcare goals”.

March 18, 2011 issue of  ‘Export Import News’ wrote, “FDI in pharma sector comes down during current financial year as debate on ‘Take-Overs’ rages on”.

The Union Health Minister Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad is reportedly arguing in favor of putting a cap on the FDI limit for pharmaceuticals in India. This is based on an apprehension that such FDI would have an overall adverse impact on the health care scenario of the country, especially, on pricing and availability of medicines to the common man.

It has also been reported that the Commerce Ministry is in favor of reviewing the situation after taking into consideration of the report to be submitted to them by an international consulting firm. This seems to have been prompted by the request of the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) based on the recent takeovers of Indian companies by the Multi National Pharmaceutical Corporations. It appears that the recommendations of the Ministry of commerce, prepared in consultation with the DoP, will then be forwarded to the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister for a final direction on the much hyped and talked about issue.

Views of the Planning Commission of India:

Meanwhile, most of the daily business papers of India reported that on July 12, 2011, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia commented, “I don’t think there is any move anywhere to prevent the expansion of existing 100% foreign owned pharmaceutical companies or to prevent green field investment by foreign companies.”

A reasonable comment:

This comment of Mr. Ahluwalia seems quite reasonable, considering the fact that full control of powers on Mergers and Acquisitions of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) effective June 1, 2011, has already been notified.

CCI to address all possible adverse impact on competition due to M&A:

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) will now carefully scrutinize the possibilities of the market being less competitive due to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) of companies across the industry in the country. This concern becomes even greater, especially, in the horizontal mergers and acquisitions between the comparable competitors in the same products or geographic markets, as we have been witnessing also in the pharmaceutical sector of India, over a period of time.

However, the country is yet to notice any quantifiable ill effects of such horizontal or vertical M&A. Neither is there any major case pending with the CCI in this regard for the pharmaceutical sector.

Competition related scrutiny is nothing new in the developed markets:

Competition related scrutiny during M&A is nothing new in the developed markets of the world and is already being followed in the USA, the countries within the European Union (EU) and elsewhere.

Key concerns with M&A in pharmaceuticals:

Many believe that M&A even in the oligopolistic nature of pharmaceutical market in any country, if not abused will not do any harm to competition.  Possibly for this reason, it will be rather difficult to cite many examples, the world over, where companies have been stopped from merging by the regulators because of anti-competitive reasons.

Another school of thought, however, believes that large M&A could ultimately lead to oligopolistic nature of the pharmaceutical industry with adverse impact on competition. Thus M&A regulations are very important for this sector.

Moreover, we need to remember that competition no longer depends only on the number of players in any given field. To explain this point many people cite the example of two large global players in the field of brown liquid beverages, Coke and Pepsi, where despite being limited competition, consumers derive immense value added economic benefits due to cut throat competition between these two large players.

It goes without saying, CCI must ensure that in any M&A process, even within the pharmaceutical industry of India, such rivalry does not give way to an absolute monopoly, directly or indirectly.

M&A activity in India:

In India, the consolidation process within the Pharmaceutical Industry started gaining momentum way back in 2006 with the acquisition of Matrix Lab by Mylan. 2008 witnessed one of the biggest mergers in the Pharmaceutical Industry of India, when the third largest drug maker of Japan, Daiichi Sankyo acquired 63.9% stake of Ranbaxy Laboratories of India with US $4.6 billion.

Last year, in May 2010, Chicago based Abbott Laboratories acquired the branded generics business of Piramal Healthcare with US$3.72 billion. This was soon followed by the acquisition of Paras Pharma by Reckit Benkiser.

The ground realities:

In India, if we look at the ground reality, we find that the market competition is extremely fierce with each branded generic/generic drug (constituting over 99% of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market, IPM) having not less than 50 to 80 competitors within the same chemical compound. Moreover, 100% of the IPM is price regulated by the government, 20% under cost based price control and the balance 80% is under stringent price monitoring mechanism.

In an environment like this, the apprehension of threat to ‘public health interest’ due to irresponsible pricing will be rather imaginary. More so, when the medicine prices in India are the cheapest in the world, cheaper than even our next door neighbors like, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

CCI and NPPA will play a critical role:

One of the key concerns of the stakeholders in India is that M&A will allow the companies to come together to fix prices and resort to other anti competitive measures. However, in the pharmaceutical industry of the country this seems to be highly unlikely because of effective presence of the strong price regulator, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), as mentioned above.

Thus even after almost three years of acquisition, the product prices of Ranbaxy have remained stable, some in fact even declined. As per IMS MAT June data, prices of Ranbaxy products grew only by 0.6% in 2009 and actually fell by 1% in 2010. Similarly post acquisition of Piramal Healthcare by Abbott USA and Shantha Biotech by Sanofi of France, average product price increases of these two Indian subsidiaries were reported to be just around 2% and 0%, respectively.

However, even if there is any remote possibility of M&A having adverse effect on competition, it will now be taken care of effectively by the CCI, as it happens in many countries of the world,  Israel being a recent example involving an Indian company.

‘Competition Commission’ does intervene:

In the process of the acquisition of Taro Pharma of Israel by Sun Pharma of India in 2008, being concerned with the possibility of price increases due to less competitive environment in three generic carbamazepine formulations, the Competition Commission in Israel intervened, as happened in many other countries.  As a result, Sun Pharma was directed by the regulator to divest its rights to develop, manufacture and market of all these three formulations to Torrent Pharma or another Commission approved buyer.

There are many such examples, across the world, of Competition Commission playing a key role to negate any possible ill effect of M&A.

Will the new Competition Law delay the M&A process?

Some apprehensions have been expressed that the new competition law could delay the process of a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) . However, it is worth noting, in case the CCI will require raising any objection after the voluntary notification has been served, they will have to do so within 90 working days, otherwise the M&A process will deem to be solemnized.

Conclusion:

I reckon, in the M&A process, the entire Pharmaceutical Industry in India would continue to act responsibly with demonstrable commitment to help achieving the healthcare objectives of the nation.

Global players will keep on searching for their suitable targets in the emerging markets like India, just as Indian players are searching for the same in the global markets. This is a process of consolidation in any industry and will continue to take place across the world.

Adverse impact of M&A on competition, if any, will now be effectively taken care of by the CCI. In addition, the apprehension for any unreasonable price increases post M&A will be addressed by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA).

Thus, there are enough checks and balances already being in place to avoid any possible adverse impact due to M&A activities in India.In this evolving scenario, it is indeed difficult to understand, why the FDI issue related to M&A in the Pharmaceutical space of India is still catching headlines of both in the national and international media.

Be that as it may, it goes without saying that as we move on, the role of CCI in all M&A activities within the Pharmaceutical Industry of India will be keenly watched by all concerned, mainly to ensure that the vibrant competitive environment is kept alive within this sector.

Disclaimer:The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.