Does ‘Free-Market Economy’ Work For Branded Generic Drugs In India?

On April 20, 2015, a panel of 31 lawmakers of the Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilizers tabled its report in the Indian Parliament. The committee emphasized that patients in India should have access to all medicines, including life saving drugs, at affordable prices. Accordingly, it recommended expansion of the scope of price control to all medicines available in the country.

The Committee wondered why all medicines are still not listed in the ‘National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM)’ and is of the view that drugs of all kinds are essential and are required by the patients for treatment of various disease conditions.

Currently, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) has fixed prices of 509 formulation packs, covering 348 drugs, based on NLEM, as specified in the Drugs Price Control Order (DPCO) 2013. Such price controlled essential drugs currently contribute less than 18 percent of the total pharmaceutical market of India in value terms. Whereas, according to reports, total number of formulation packs in India would be much over 60,000.

The panel noted that the ceiling prices of even all those medicines, which should come under price control under DPCO 2013, are yet to be announced by the NPPA. Accordingly, it advised the Government to expedite the process of notifying ceiling prices for all the remaining medicines featuring in the NLEM, without further delay.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee observed that Rs 17,944 Crore was spent in 2013-14 to import medicinal and pharmaceutical products. It expressed dissatisfaction on the Department of Pharmaceuticals’ (DoP) explanation that imports were made on quality and economic considerations and not necessarily because the products were unavailable at home.

“The Committee is of the strong view that to realize the dream of ‘Make in India’ concept in pharmaceutical sector, the government should boost and incentivize domestic bulk drug industry and discourage Indian pharmaceutical firms from importing”, the report said.

It also observed that to make India self-reliant in this area, revival of sick public sector units was necessary to create capacity of bulk drugs. The Committee urged the DoP to expedite formulation of ‘Make in India’ policy for APIs (active pharmaceutical ingredients) in India.

Indictment against the DoP:

The committee reportedly came down heavily on the DoP for its inability to utilize funds allocated for various purposes, which clearly speaks about “the poor performance of the department in utilization of its plan allocation.”

The report clearly mentions, “The committee therefore feels that department could not achieve its avowed objectives and targets set for various scheme/programs unless the funds are utilized by the department optimally and efficiently.”

Stating that the department “should make earnest efforts for optimum utilization of funds allocated to them”, the committee expressed it would “like to be apprised of the initiatives undertaken by the department in this regard”.

A quick recapitulation:

In may 2012, the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare in its 58th Report also expressed great concern on rampant prescription of irrational and useless drugs by many doctors with ‘ulterior motives’ and expressed the need of inclusion of the essential and lifesaving drugs under strict price regulation.

As it usually takes a very long time to effect any perceptible change in India, the above critical observations, as well, remained virtually unattended, even today.

Does ‘Competition’ impact Branded generic pricing?

I am personally a strong believer of ‘free-market economy’, driven by ‘market competition’, for the industrial sectors in general. It ensures rapid economic progress and growth, creating much needed wealth to cater to the growing needs of various kinds for the citizens of a nation.

However, I would strongly argue that Indian pharma industry is one of the key exceptions in this regard; as it is basically a branded generic market contributing over 90 percent to the total domestic pharmaceutical retail market.

Although, domestic market of branded generic drugs is quite crowded with a large number of respective ‘brands’ of exactly the same off-patent molecule/molecules available at widely different price ranges, patients do not derive any economic benefit out of such intense competition in a ‘free-market economy’. This happens, as the patients have no say or role in the brand selection process of the doctors to choose a price of their likings and affordability, especially when the basic drug/drugs are the same for all those brands.

Examples of huge rice variation in branded generics of the same drug:

A Research Paper published in The Indian Journal of Applied Research’ of May 2014, titled, “Cost Variation Study of Anti-diabetics: Indian Scenario” observed as follows:

“In Single drug therapy, among sulfonylurea group of drugs, Glimepiride (2 mg) shows maximum price variation of 829.72%, while Glipizide (10mg) shows minimum variation. In Meglitinides groups of drugs Repaglinide (0.5mg) shows maximum price variation 194.73% and Nateglinide (120mg) shows Minimum price variation. In Biguanides & Thizolidinediones groups of drugs, Metformin (500 mg) & Pioglitazone (15 mg) show maximum price variation of 384.18% & 600 % respectively. In α-glucosidase inhibitor group of drugs, Voglibose (0.2mg) shows maximum price variation of 387.17%, while Miglitol (25mg) shows minimum price variation.”

“In combination therapies, Glimepiride+Metformin (1+500mg) combination shows the maximum variation up to 475 %. In case of Insulin Premixed 30/70 100IU/ml shows maximum price variation of 1881.24%, while minimum variation is found with short acting 40IU/ml.”

Similar scenario prevails virtually in all therapy categories in India.

No qualms on branding:

It is understandable that generic drugs are branded o create differentiation even within exactly identical drugs. There are no qualms on branding per se, which comes at a reasonably high cost though. However, the question is, who pays for this branding exercise and for what additional tangible value/values?

If no additional tangible value is added to a generic medicine through branding, why should most of the patients sweat to pay significantly extra amount, just to help the pharma companies fighting with each other to increase their respective pies of revenue and profit?

Why drug price control in a ‘Free Market Economy’?

It is indeed a very pertinent question. Equally pertinent answers are also available in a 2014 paper titled, “Competition Issues in the Indian Pharmaceuticals Sector” of Delhi School Economics (DSE). The paper deals with issues related to failure of ‘Free Market Economy’, despite intense competition, especially for branded generic drugs in India.

In an ideally free-market economic model, for each of these brands of identical drugs, having similar regulatory approvals from the Indian drug regulator on efficacy, safety and quality standards, competitive forces should have prompted uniform or at least near uniform prices for all such products.

Any brand of the same drug/drugs charging more, should generally have attracted lesser customers, if consumers would have exercised their purchase decisions directly; efficacy, safety and quality standards being the same, as certified by the drug regulator.

Interestingly, for prescription medicines, the much proven process of consumers exercising their free choice to select a brand, influenced by advertising, does not happen at all.

Branded generics pricing paradox:

In the pharmaceutical market place, the scenario is almost just the reverse of what should happen in a highly competitive ‘free market’ model.

This means, highest priced branded varieties of identical drugs, mostly enjoy highest market share too. This in turn proves that competition within the pharma brands do not bring down the prices, benefiting the consumers/patients.

Branding of generic drugs:

Unlike many developed nations, in India, even the off-patent generic drugs are branded and differentiated on flimsy perception based intangibles to the prescribers, along with other contentious and dubious sales tools, decrying unbranded generics.

This is done in the guise of so-called pharma ‘sales and marketing’ strategies, which are sometimes shrewd and many times equally blatant, if not crude.

The DSE paper, very clearly says, ‘head to head’ competition between undifferentiated (non-branded) products would certainly cause a precipitous fall in prices.

However, it is generally believed, the prescription demand of branded generic drugs is basically created by influencing the prescribing behavior of the medical practitioners. Not just by personal selling through medical representatives, medical advertising and publicity of different types, but also through a chain of processes that many stakeholders, including the Government and law-makers generally consider as grossly unethical.

In January 2015, the Government directive for implementation of the ‘Uniform Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP)’ by the pharma industry in India, further reinforces the point.

 ‘Dorfman-Steiner’ condition vindicated:

The above paper from the DSE underscores the old and well-established ‘Dorfman-Steiner’ condition that mathematically proves that the price-cost margin is positively related to the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales revenue.

Quoting a practicing surgeon, the DSE article states:

“Sometimes it could be just plain ignorance about the availability of a cheaper alternative that makes doctors continue to prescribe costlier brands. But one cannot ignore the role of what are euphemistically called marketing “incentives”, which basically mean the inappropriate influence pharmaceutical companies exert on doctors. This runs deep. Hospitals choose to stock only certain drugs in their in-house pharmacies and insist that hospitalized patients buy drugs only from the hospital pharmacy. Drug companies sell drugs to hospitals at a price much lower than what the patient is charged, further incentivizing the hospital to stock their products. The cheaper brands often get left out in this game.”

Reasons for success of high-priced branded generics:

Low priced non – branded cheaper generics have been systematically made to perceive as of low quality. In several media reports, including some recent ones even some well-known doctors castigated the low priced non- branded cheaper generics. Pharma industry lobby groups, in tandem, has been strongly resisting various Government initiatives of un-branding the generic drugs.

Over a long time, a common public perception has been painstakingly created that high-priced branded generics are more of high quality; MNC brands are of better quality than their ‘Desi’ counterparts and branded generics are more reliable than their non-branded equivalents.

This perception is fuelled by poor enforcement of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of India that also regulates drug-manufacturing standards in the country, besides the prevailing overall drug regulatory scenario in the country.

The New Government attributes “Market Failure for pharmaceuticals”:

In its price notification dated July 10, 2014, the NPPA has categorically stated the following:

  • There exist huge inter-brand price differences in branded-generics, which is indicative of a severe market failure, as different brands of the same drug formulation, which are identical to each other in terms of active ingredient(s), strength, dosage, route of administration, quality, product characteristics, and intended use, vary disproportionately in terms of price.
  • It is observed that, the different brands of the drug formulation may sometimes differ in terms of binders, fillers, dyes, preservatives, coating agents, and dissolution agents, but these differences are not significant in terms of therapeutic value.
  • In India the market failure for pharmaceuticals can be attributed to several factors, but the main reason is that the demand for medicines is largely prescription driven and the patient has very little choice in this regard.
  • Market failure alone may not constitute sufficient grounds for government intervention, but when such failure is considered in the context of the essential role of pharmaceuticals play in the area of public health, which is a social right, such intervention becomes necessary, especially when exploitative pricing makes medicines unaffordable and beyond the reach of most and also puts huge financial burden in terms of out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare.

Civil Society echoed the same sentiment:

In this context, it is important to note that in a letter dated August 20, 2014 written by seven large Civil Society Organizations to Mr. Ananth Kumar, the present Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers with a copy to Prime Minister Modi, articulated similar view, as follows:

“Limiting all price regulation only to a list of 348 medicines and specified dosages and strengths in the DPCO 2013 goes against the policy objective of making medicines affordable to the public. The National List of Essential Medicines, a list of 348 rational and cost-effective medicines, is not the basis for production, promotion and prescription in India. In reality the most frequently prescribed and consumed medicines are not listed in the NLEM.”

I broached on a similar issue in my blog post of April 6, 2015 titled, “Would Affordable ‘Modicare’ Remain Just A Pipe Dream In India?

An opposite view: ‘Bad Medicine’

On April 23, 2015, an Editorial with the above headline, articulating exactly opposite viewpoint, was published in a leading English business daily.

With all due respect to the concerned editor, it appeared quite funny, if not ‘hilarious’ to me for several reasons. One of which is seemingly total lack of understanding on the issue by the concerned editor.

I am quoting below some of the most obvious ones, just to cite as examples:

A. Quoting the above recommendation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on drug price control the Editorial states:

“Not only will this make investors from other countries look at India with suspicion – Japanese pharma firm Daiichi just exited its disastrous investment in Ranbaxy (later taken over by Sun Pharma) – it will ensure Indian patients are deprived of good quality medicines.”

It is known to everybody that drug price control in India had got nothing to do with the exit of Daiichi. It was primarily due to import bans by the USFDA, caused by alleged falsification of GMP related data in Ranbaxy’s manufacturing plants selling drugs to America.

B. The Editorial continues:

“So much for Make-in-India—the other problem with price controls is that, with little incentive to invest in fraud-prevention, between a fourth and a third of India’s pharmaceuticals production is estimated to be spurious. Also, price caps have resulted in a situation where R&D expenses are very low, and there is little research on drugs of particular relevance to India.”

Again, it is much known fact that over 82 percent of Indian pharmaceutical market is currently outside price control, offering free-pricing opportunity. What does then prevent the drug companies to come out robust ‘fraud-prevention’ measures for all those free-pricing drugs?

C. The Editor stated:

“Since Indian prices are amongst the lowest in the world, it is not clear what exactly the committee had in mind, more so since costs of medicine are not, in any case, the most expensive part of medical treatment.”

Of course, all concerned knows that lowest range of generic drug prices in India, are perhaps the cheapest in the world. However, the point is, should it be considered in isolation? Not in relation to per capita income of the Indians? Not in terms of Purchasing Power Parity? In drug pricing context, one Committee Report of the DoP had shown, when adjusted against these two factors, drug prices in India are as high, if not more, as compared to the developed countries of the world.

I hasten to add that I fully resect all different view points. If I have made any mistakes in understanding this piece of bizarre editorial, I am more than willing to stand corrected with all humility, as this a very serious issue of ‘what is right’ and NOT ‘who is right’.

Conclusion:

India is a market of branded generics, where brand differentiation process involves creation of mostly unsubstantiated perceptions.

As the stakeholders, media and even the Indian Government have alleged, drug companies exert a strong influence in the brand prescription decision of the doctors, even at the cost of patients who cannot afford the same.

Even in a free-market economy with cutthroat competition, patients do not have any means to exercise their price preferences even within identical branded generic drugs. They are compelled to buy high priced brands, as prescribed by their doctors, even where low priced identical equivalents are available.

This condition gives rise into ‘Market Failure’, especially for branded generics in India. The NPPA has unequivocally enunciated it, which I have quoted above.

Being a strong believer and votary of ‘free-market economy’ and ‘market competition’, I find this pharma scenario unique. It is a rare example of failure of otherwise so successful free-market economy model, especially in the branded generic pharma space of India.

Around a decade ago, the ‘Indian Journal of Medical Ethics’ (IJME, January – March 2004 issue) captured the very essence of this deliberation, epitomized in the following sentence:

“If the one who decides, does not pay and the one who pays, does not decide and if the one who decides is ‘paid’, will truths stand any chance?”

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Alarming Incidence of Cancer: Fragile Infrastructure: Escalating Drug Prices

According to the ‘Fact-Sheet 2014′ of the World Health Organization (WHO), cancer cases would rise from 14 million in 2012 to 22 million within the next two decades. It is, therefore, no wonder that cancers figured among the leading causes of over 8.2 million deaths in 2012, worldwide.

A reflection of this scary scenario can also be visualized while analyzing the growth trend of various therapy segments of the global pharmaceutical market.

A recent report of ‘Evaluate Pharma (EP)’ has estimated that the worldwide sales of prescription drugs would reach US$ 1,017 bn by 2020 with a Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 5.1 percent between 2013 and 2020. Interestingly, oncology is set to record the highest sales growth among the major therapy categories with a CAGR of 11.2 percent during this period, accounting for US$ 153.4 bn of the global pharmaceutical sales.

The key growth driver is expected to be an exciting new class of cancer products targeting the programmed death-1 (PD-1) pathway with a collective value of US$ 14 bn in 2020, says the report.

Another recent report from the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics also highlights that global oncology spending touched US$ 91 billion in 2013 growing at 5 percent annually.

Consequently, Oncology would emerge as the biggest therapeutic class, more than twice of the anti-diabetic category, which features next to it.

Key global players:

Roche would continue to remain by far the largest player in the oncology market in 2020 with a 5 percent year-on-year growth between 2013 and 2020 with estimated total sales of over US$ 34bn in 2020 against US$ 25bn in 2013.

In 2020, besides Roche, other key players in the oncology segment would, in all probability, be Bristol-Myers Squibb, Celgene, Novartis, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Astellas Pharma, AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly and Merck & Co, the EP report says.

Escalating costs of cancer drugs:

As IMS Health indicates, the overall cost for cancer treatments per month in the United States has now reached to US$10,000 from US$ 5,000 just a year ago. Thus, cancer drugs are fast becoming too expensive even in the developed markets, leave aside India.

The following table would help fathom how exorbitant are the costs per therapy of the common cancer drugs, though these are from the United States:

Generic                               Diagnosis

 Cost/ Dose (US$)

Cost of     Therapy/    28 days  (US$)

Cost per  Therapy      (US$)

brentuximab Hodgkins lymphoma

14,000

18,667

224,000

Pertuzumab Breast cancer

4,000

5,333

68,000

pegylated interferon Hepatitis C

700

2,800

36,400

Carfilzomib Multiple myeloma

1,658

9,948

129,324

ziv-aflibercept CRC

2,300

4,600

59,800

Omacetaxine CML

560

3,920

50,960

Regorafenib CRC

450

9,446

122,800

Bosutinib CML

278

7,814

101,580

Vemurafenib Melanoma

172

4,840

62,915

Abiraterone Prostate

192

5,391

70,080

Crizotinib NSCLC

498

27,951

363,367

Enzalutamide Prostate

248

6,972

90,637

ado-trastuzumab emtansine Breast – metastatic

8,500

8,115

105,500

Ponatinib Leukemia

319

8,941

116,233

Pomalidomide Multiple myeloma

500

10,500

135,500

(Source: ION Solutions)

Even US researchers concerned about high cancer drugs cost:

It is interesting to note, that in a review article published recently in ‘The Lancet Oncology’, the US researchers Prof. Thomas Smith and Dr. Ronan Kelly identified drug pricing as one area of high costs of cancer care. They are confident that this high cost can be reduced, just as it is possible for end-of-life care and medical imaging – the other two areas of high costs in cancer treatment.

Besides many other areas, the authors suggested that reducing the prices of new cancer drugs would immensely help containing cancer costs. Prof. Smith reportedly said, “There are drugs that cost tens of thousands of dollars with an unbalanced relationship between cost and benefit. We need to determine appropriate prices for drugs and inform patients about their costs of care.”

Cancer drug price becoming a key issue all over:

As the targeted therapies have significantly increased their share of global oncology sales, from 11 percent a decade ago to 46 percent last year, increasingly, both the Governments and the payers, almost all over the world, have started feeling quite uncomfortable with the rapidly ascending drug price trend.

In the top cancer markets of the world, such as, the United States and Europe, both the respective governments and also the private insurers have now started playing hardball with the cancer drugs manufacturers.

There are several instances in the developed markets, including the United States, where the stakeholders, such as, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) of the United Kingdom and American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) are expressing their concerns about manufacturers’ charging astronomical prices, even for small improvements in the survival time.

Following examples would give an idea of global sensitivity in this area:

  • After rejecting Roche’s breast cancer drug Kadcyla as too expensive, NICE reportedly articulated in its statement, “A breast cancer treatment that can cost more than US$151,000 per patient is not effective enough to justify the price the NHS is being asked to pay.”
  • In October 2012, three doctors at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center announced in the New York Times that their hospital wouldn’t be using Zaltrap. These oncologists did not consider the drug worth its price. They questioned, why prescribe the far more expensive Zaltrap? Almost immediately thereafter, coming under intense stakeholder pressure, , Sanofi reportedly announced 50 percent off on Zaltrap price.
  • Similarly, ASCO in the United States has reportedly launched an initiative to rate cancer drugs not just on their efficacy and side effects, but prices as well.

India:

  • India has already demonstrated its initial concern on this critical issue by granting Compulsory License (CL) to the local player Natco to formulate the generic version of Bayer’s kidney cancer drug Nexavar and make it available to the patients at a fraction of the originator’s price. As rumors are doing the rounds, probably some more patented cancer drugs would come under Government scrutiny to achieve the same end goal.
  • I indicated in my earlier blog post that the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) of India by its notification dated July 10, 2014 has decided to bring, among others, some anticancer drugs too, not featuring in the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011), under price control.
  • Not too long ago, the Indian government reportedly contemplated to allow production of cheaper generic versions of breast cancer drug Herceptin in India. Roche – the originator of the drug ultimately surrendered its patent rights in 2013, apprehending that it would lose a legal contest in Indian courts, according to media reports. Biocon and Mylan thereafter came out with biosimilar version of Herceptin in the country with around 40 percent lesser price.

Hence, responsible pricing of cancer drugs would continue to remain a key pressure-point  in the days ahead.

Increasing R&D investments coming in oncology:

Considering lucrative business growth opportunities and financial returns from this segment, investments of global pharma players remain relatively high in oncology, accounting for more than 30 percent of all preclinical and phase I clinical product developments, with 21 New Molecular Entities (NMEs) being launched and reaching patients in the past two years alone, according to IMS Health.

However, it is also worth noting that newly launched treatments typically increase the overall incremental survival rate between two and six months.

Opportunities for anti-cancer biosimilars:

With gradual easing out of the regulatory pathways for biosimilar drugs in the developed markets, especially in the US, a new competitive dynamic is evolving in the high priced, over US$ 40 billion, biologics market related to cancer drugs. According to IMS Health, on a global basis, biosimilars are expected to generate US$ 6 to12 billion in oncology sales by 2020, increasing the level of competition but accounting for less than 5 percent of the total biologics market even at that time.

Alarming situation of cancer in India:

A major report, published in ‘The Lancet Oncology’ states that In India, around 1 million new cancer cases are diagnosed each year, which is estimated to reach 1.7 million in 2035.

The report also highlights, though deaths from cancer are currently 600,000 -700,000 annually, it is expected to increase to around 1.2 million during this period.

Such high incidence of cancer in India is attributed to both internal factors such as, poor immune conditions, genetic pre-disposition or hormonal and also external factors such as, industrialization, over growth of population, lifestyle and food habits.

The Lancet Oncology study showed that while incidence of cancer in the Indian population is only about a quarter of that in the United States or Europe, mortality rates among those diagnosed with the disease are much higher.

Experts do indicate that one of the main barriers of cancer care is its high treatment cost, that is out of reach for millions of Indians. They also believe that cancer treatment could be effective and cheaper, if detected early. Conversely, the treatment would be more expensive, often leading to bankruptcy, if detected late and would, at the same time, significantly reduce the chances of survival too.

The fact that cancer is being spotted too late in India and most patients lack access to treatment, would be quite evident from the data that less than even 30 percent of patients suffering from cancer survive for more than five years after diagnosis, while over two-thirds of cancer related deaths occur among people aged 30 to 69.

Unfortunately, according to the data of the Union Ministry of Health, 40 percent of over 300 cancer centers in India do not have adequate facilities for advanced cancer care. It is estimated that the country would need at least 600 additional cancer care centers by 2020 to meet this crying need.

Breast cancer is the most common type of cancer, accounting for over 1 in 5 of all deaths from cancer in women, while 40 percent of cancer cases in the country are attributable to tobacco.

Indian Market and key local players:

Cancer drug market in India was reported to be around Rs 2,000 Crore (US$ 335 million) in 2013 and according to a recent Frost & Sullivan report, is estimated to grow to Rs 3,881 Crore (US$ 650 million) by 2017 with a CAGR of 15.46 percent, throwing immense business growth opportunities to pharma players.

Dr.Reddy’s Laboratories (DRL) is one of the leading Indian players in oncology. DRL has already developed biosimilar version of Rituxan (Rituximab) of Roche, Filgastrim of Amgen and has also launched the first generic Darbepoetin Alfa and Peg-grafeel.

Other major Indian players in this field are Cipla, Lupin, Glenmark, Emcure, Biocon, Ipca, Natco, Intas, Reliance Life Science, Zydus Cadila and some more. These home grown companies are expected to take a leading role in the fast growing oncology segments of India, together with the major MNC players, as named above.

Analysis of detailed opportunities that would be available to these companies and consequent financial impacts could be a subject of separate discussion.

Conclusion:

Unlike many other developed and developing countries of the world, there is no system yet in place in India to negotiate prices of innovative patented drugs with the respective manufacturers, including those used for cancer. However, NPPA is now moving fast on reducing prices of cancer drugs. It has reportedly pulled up six pharma for not providing pricing data of cancer drugs sold by them.

Further, CL for all patented anti-cancer drugs may not be a sustainable measure for all time to come, either. One robust alternative, therefore, is the intense price negotiation for patented drugs in general, including anti-cancer drugs, as provided in the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012).

This important issue has been under consideration of the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) since 2007. The report produced by the committee formed for this specific purpose, after dilly-dallying for over five years, now hardly has any takers and gathering dusts.

I reckon, much discussed administrative inertia, insensitivity and abject lack of sense of urgency of the previous regime, have desisted the DoP from progressing much on this important subject, beyond of course customary lip services, as on date. Intense lobbying by vested interests from across the world, seems to have further helped pushing this envelope deep inside an inactive terrain.

The new Government would hopefully make the DoP break its deep slumber now to resolve this critical issue decisively, in a time bound manner, assigning clear accountability, without any further delay.

At the same time, shouldn’t both the Honorable Ministers of Health and Chemicals & Fertilizers, taking the State Governments on board, put their collective resources together to create the following, expeditiously:

- A robust national health infrastructure for cancer care

- A transparent mechanism to prevent escalating cancer drug prices and other treatment costs

Hope, the good days would come to the cancer patients of India, at least, sooner than never.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion. 

Cheaper Drugs: Happy Patients: Angry Industry

Recent price reductions of a number of cardiovascular and diabetes drugs falling outside the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011), have attracted fury of the pharma industry . By a notification dated July 10, 2014, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) has invoked Para 19 of the DPCO 2013 for these price changes, the implications of which would indeed be far reaching.

NPPA has now decided to examine inter-brand price variation for single ingredient formulations in eight therapeutic groups, which, besides cardiovascular and diabetic drugs, would include, anti-cancer, HIV/AIDS, anti-TB, anti-malaria, anti-asthmatic and immunological (sera/vaccines). In these therapy areas, the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) of the brand(s) exceeding 25 per cent of the simple average price of all in the same molecular category having 1 percent or above market share, would be capped at the 25 per cent level.

Pharma industry, in general, feels that this ‘unwelcoming decision’ of the NPPA, which allegedly goes beyond the scope and spirit of DPCO 2013, would invite great uncertainty in its business environment.

On the other hand, many consider this price reduction as a ‘Good Omen’ for millions of patients suffering from related life-long ailments. They argue, the purpose of this ‘Bitter Pill” of the NPPA, is to send a clear message to the pharma industry to shape-up with responsible drug pricing.

The new Minister’s recent statement:

It may not be a bad idea to take into consideration the above notification of the NPPA in the light of what the new minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers – Mr. Ananth Kumar said on May 28, 2014. According to media report, the Minister expressed his intent as follows:

“… As far as branded medicines of multinational pharmaceutical companies are concerned, we will talk to all of them and try to bring down prices of essential drugs for poor by 25-40 per cent… The pharmaceutical industry is very important for the health of the country, he added…our main mission will be to ensure the availability of all necessary medicines at affordable prices, especially for poor across the country.”

It is, therefore, quite possible that the NPPA’s decision on price reduction of cardiovascular and diabetes drugs has the Minister’s concurrence.

Industry’s key concern:

This recent decision of the NPPA has reportedly angered the industry, as the Drug Price Control Order 2013 (DPCO 2013) clearly articulates two basic criteria for drug price control in India, as follows:

1. Span of price control:

This was re-defined (from DPCO 1995) on the ‘essentiality criteria’ of the drugs, which in turn is based on the National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011)

2. Methodology of price control:

This was re-defined (from DPCO 1995) with a clear departure from ‘Cost-Based Price Control’ to the ‘Market-Based Price Control’.

The industry alleges violation of these criteria for the recently announced price reduction of a number of diabetic and cardiovascular drugs, as those do not fall under NLEM 2011.

Price variation is of no-use to patients for prescription drugs:

As the prices of non-scheduled formulations are not fixed by the NPPA, which can virtually be launched at any price to the market, there has been a huge variation of prices between the branded generics within the same chemical entity/entities. Following is a quick example:

Molecule Disease MRP of Lowest Price Brand MRP of Highest Price Brand
Telmisartan 10’s Hypertension Rs. 25 Rs. 385
Glimeperide 10’s Diabetes Rs. 40 Rs. 133 (Brand Leader)

From this chart, one may be able to fathom some basis in the NPPA’s argument that similar price variations in many branded-generics are of no-consequence for prescription drugs, as doctors decide the medicines that a patient would take. If doctors were influenced to prescribe high priced medicines, the patients would require paying more for those drugs, further increasing their Out of Pocket (OoP) expenses. It is also not uncommon that highest price brands are category-leaders too, as indicated in the table above.

Key lacunae in DPCO 2013:

  •  NLEM 2011 does not cover many combinations of TB drugs, a large number of important drugs for diabetes and hypertension, which I shall deliberate in just a bit.
  • Many other critical life saving medicines, such as, anti-cancer drugs, expensive antibiotics and products needed for organ transplantation have been left out of price control. In fact, the prices of a number of these drugs have reportedly gone up after the notification of DPCO 2013.
  • The government has now reportedly admitted in an affidavit filed before the Supreme Court that the market value and share of medicines covered by new DPCO 2013, as ‘Essential Drugs’, is a meager 18 per cent of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM).
  • As a result, DPCO 2013 based on NLEM 2011 undermines the entire objective of making essential drugs affordable to all.
  • All these lacunae in the current DPCO 2013 calls for a major revision of NLEM 2011. The Union Health Ministry has reportedly initiated steps to revise the list considering the existing market conditions and usage of drugs by the patients.

Invocation of a ‘Safeguard Provision’ in DPCO 2013:

Probably anticipating this scenario, a key safeguard provision was included in Para 19 of DPCO 2013, which reads as follows:

Fixation of ceiling price of a drug under certain circumstances:

Notwithstanding anything contained in this order, the Government may, in case of extra-ordinary circumstances, if it considers necessary so to do in public interest, fix the ceiling price or retail price of any Drug for such period, as it may deem fit and where the ceiling price or retail price of the drug is already fixed and notified, the Government may allow an increase or decrease in the ceiling price or the retail price, as the case may be, irrespective of annual wholesale price index for that year.”

It now appears, NPPA could realize the key limitations of DPCO 2013, which was put in place rather hastily, in course of its implementation for over one year. Consequently, the patients’ long standing plight with high drug costs for many common life style diseases that are not featuring in NLEM 2011, prompted the the drug regulator in its above notification to bring 108 non-scheduled formulation packs of diabetic, cardiac and other drugs under Para 19 of DPCO 2013, catalyzing an outcry within the pharmaceutical industry in India. Out of these 108 formulation packs, 50 come under anti-diabetic and cardiovascular medicines.

Many important drugs are outside NLEM 2011:

Following is an example of the important cardiovascular and anti-diabetic drugs, which are not featuring in the NLEM 2011 and have now been brought under Para 19 of DPCO 2013:

Sitagliptin, Voglibose, Acarbose, Metformin hcl, Ambrisentan, Amlodipine, Atenolol, Atorvastatin, Bisoprolol, Bosentan,  Gliclazide, Glimepiride, Miglitol, Repaglinide, Pioglitazone, Carvedilol, Clopidogrel, Coumarin, Diltiazem, Dobutamine, Enalapril, Rosuvastatin, Simvastatin, Telmisartan, Terazosin, Torasemide, Trimetazidine and Valsartan, Enoxaparin, Eplerenone, Esatenolol, Fenofibrate, Heparin, Indapamide, Irbesartan, Isosorbide, Ivabradine, Labetalol, Levocarnitine, Lisinopril, Metolazone, Metoprolol, Nebivolol, Nicorandil, Nitroglycerin, Olmesartan, Prasugrel, Prazosin, Propranolol, Ramipril.

More reasons for industry outcry:

As reported in the media, the industry outcry reportedly highlights, besides what I have cited above, the following:

  • The price control order under Para 19 has been notified without any prior consultation with the industry.
  • The manner and method in which this unilateral decision has been taken is untenable.
  • The NPPA’s reasoning, about exploitative pricing by the industry as the reason for such a move, is incorrect given that every product category (in consideration) has approximately 30-70 brand options across price ranges for physicians and patients to choose from. The premise that products are not accessible due to affordability is misplaced. (The above table explains this point).
  • Disease environment was same when the government had cleared the policy and no “extraordinary circumstance” has emerged since then for the regulator to invoke Para 19 in public interest.
  • NPPA has exceeded its brief and gone into policy-making.

NPPA’s rationale for invoking Para 19 of DPCO 2013:

On the other hand, following reasons were cited by the NPPA for taking this decision:

  • The aim of DPCO 2013 is to ensure that essential drugs are available to all at affordable prices. The Supreme Court of India vide its Order dated November 12, 2002 in SLP no. 3668/2003 have directed the Government to ensure that essential and life saving drugs do not fall outside the ambit of price control, which has the force of law.
  • The Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers has delegated the powers in respect of specified paragraphs of the DPCO 2013, including paragraph 19, to be exercised by the NPPA on behalf of the Central Government in public interest.
  • There exist huge inter-brand price differences in branded-generics, which is indicative of a severe market failure as different brands of the same drug formulation identical to each other vary disproportionately in terms of price.
  • The different brands of the same drug formulation may sometimes differ in terms of binders, fillers, dyes, preservatives, coating agents, and dissolution agents, but these differences are not significant in terms of therapeutic value.
  • The main reason for market failure is that the demand for medicines is largely prescription driven and the patient has very little choice in this regard.
  • Market failure alone may not constitute sufficient grounds for Government intervention, but when such failure is considered in the context of the essential role that pharmaceuticals play in the area of public health, such intervention becomes necessary. This assumes greater significance, especially when exploitative pricing makes medicines unaffordable and beyond the reach of most, putting huge financial burden in terms of out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare.
  • There is very high incidence of diabetes in the country, which affects around 61 million persons and the figure is expected to cross 100 million by 2030 as per the projection of the International Diabetes Federation; and it is estimated that every year nearly 1 million people in the country die due to diabetes and hypertension.
  • The drug regulator categorically mentions that In accordance with the guidelines issued by the NPPA, after approval of the ‘Competent Authority’, these price fixations of non-scheduled formulations under Para 19 of DPCO 2013 have been made.

Constituents of the same Ministry with conflicting view points:

Though both NPPA and the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) come under Mr. Ananth Kumar, the new Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers, both these constituents seem to have conflicting views on this important issue.

The pharma industry reportedly has sought the DoP’s intervention in this matter. The DoP, in turn, is learnt to have requested for the opinion of the Ministry of Law on using ‘Para 19′ provision in favor of public interest by the NPPA, invoking the power assigned to the drug regulator.

Another route for the industry is to legally challenge the said notification of the NPPA. However, one should keep in mind that a PIL is still pending before the Supreme Court questioning the validity DPCO 2013.

The arguments for and against:

Taking all the above points into consideration, the following two important areas of debate have now emerged on this NPPA notification, both in favor and also against:

A. Nothing has materially changed since DPCO 2013 was put in place:

Industry sources highlight that he following two points, that triggered NPPA’s invoking Para 19, have been there for a long time, including the period when the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012) was formulated:

-       Huge price differences among various branded generics of the same molecule

-       Cardiovascular ailments and diabetes have assumed endemic proportion

The other group counters that, if mistakes were made while formulating the NPPP 2012 because of intense pressure from vested interests in the erstwhile regime, why corrective actions can’t be taken now?

B. NPPA has exceeded its brief:

Industry sources question, how could NPPA possibly issue such notification of price reduction for non-scheduled formulations, as it is not a policy maker?

Others counter with equal zest: Of course NPPA is not a policy maker, it is a drug price regulator… And as a price regulator, it has implemented Para 19 of DPCO 2013 in the right earnest with the requisite powers conferred on it.

The impact:

According to published data, after the latest price revisions of diabetic and cardiovascular drugs, around 21 per cent of the anti-diabetic drug market faces the ceiling price, while the total market of cardiovascular medicines under price control is now estimated at around 58 per cent, with an overall adverse impact of reportedly Rs 550 Crore on the Indian Pharmaceutical Market. Overall price reduction for these two categories would range between 5 and 35 per cent, the average being around 12 per cent.

MNCs seem to have been hit harder:

An additional bad news for the MNCs is that the scope of Para 19 has now gone beyond the generic space and included even patented product.

For the first time a patented product Sitagliptin has been brought under the purview of Drug price Control order. This decision could give an unprecedented handle to the NPPA to regulate prices of even patented drugs through invocation of Para 19 of DPCO 2013 in future.  Moreover, many high-priced branded generics of MNCs are brand leaders too. Thus, in a relative yardstick, invocation of Para 19 would hit the MNCs harder, creating an uncertainty in their business environment.

Conclusion:

Drug prices are cheapest in India in dollar terms, claims the pharma industry. Does this claim hold much water? May be not, because it should be realistically seen in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Per Capita Income in India. In that sense many would argue that drug prices in India, on the contrary, are not cheaper at all.

Moreover, it is important to take into cognizance the huge inter-brand price differences in branded-generics due to a flawed system, as patients have no role to play in choosing a drug (within the same molecule) that they would need to buy. It is the doctor who is the sole prescription decision maker, where price, per se, may not play a very significant role.

In a situation like this, despite the anger of the industry, many would ponder whether or not NPPA’s engagement and reasoning, on behalf of the Government, to bring some sense in the madness of drug pricing in India be just wished away?

Cheaper medicines in general and generic drugs in particular, would always make the patients and the payor happy, leaving the industry mostly angry.

Keenly observing the recent series of events and taking note of a number of highly credible viewpoints, besides a couple of seemingly spoon-fed, ill-informed and run-of-the mill type editorials, this is about time for the stakeholders to judge without any bias what is right for the country, its people and of course the business to work out a win-win solution, dousing the likes of ‘Fire in The Blood‘, once and for all.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion. 

The New Government To Ponder: Is “Market Based Drug Pricing Policy” An ill Conceived One?

According to a recent media report, Mr. Ananth Kumar, the new minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers has recently made a statement, as follows:

“… As far as branded medicines of multinational pharmaceutical companies are concerned, we will talk to all of them and try to bring down prices of essential drugs for poor by 25-40 per cent… The pharmaceutical industry is very important for the health of the country, he added…our main mission will be to ensure the availability of all necessary medicines at affordable prices, especially for poor across the country.”

This statement assumes great significance for the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry and simultaneously rekindles hope for many patients, as the minister expressed intent that the new government wants to revisit the current drug price control system of India.

However, why did the minister in his above statement single out MNCs for discussion, is not very clear, just yet. Most probably, this is due to much published reports that branded generics from MNCs, which are outside price control, usually cost more than others, for whatever may be the reasons. Anyway, that could be the topic of another discussion in this blog.

The backdrop of DPCO 2013:

After a protracted negotiation and lobbying by the Indian Pharma Industry and others with the then UPA II Government, a well sought after paradigm shift took place in the drug price control regime of India.

In the new “National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012”, the span of price control was changed from bulk-drug based to all drug formulations falling under the ‘National List of Essential Medicines 2011 (NLEM 2011)’. The methodology of price control was also radically modified from the cost-based to market based one. Accordingly the new Drug Price Control Order (DPCO 2013) was notified on May 15, 2013.

The decision to have new drug policy was taken as a last minute sprint, as it were, primarily driven by the immense pressure generated by the Supreme Court on the UPA II Government for pussyfooting this important issue over almost a decade.

Hurried action after prolonged inaction:

The last Drug Policy of India was announced in 2002, which was subsequently challenged by a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Karnataka High Court on the ground of being inflationary in nature. The Honorable Court by its order dated November 12, 2002 issued a stay on the implementation of the Policy.

This judgment was challenged by the Government in the Supreme Court, which vacated the stay vide its order dated March 10, 2003 and ordered as follows:

“We suspend the operation of the order to the extent it directs that the Policy dated February 15, 2002 shall not be implemented. However we direct that the petitioner shall consider and formulate appropriate criteria for ensuring essential and lifesaving drugs not to fall out of the price control and further directed to review drugs, which are essential and lifesaving in nature till 2nd May, 2003”.

As a result, DPCO 1995 continued to remain in operation pending formulation of a new drug policy as directed by the honorable court, since then.

Unfortunately, the then government did not show any urgency to come out with a new drug policy, even thereafter, for about a decade.

Fortunately, in the recent years, coming under intense judicial scrutiny and pressure due to a PIL on the subject before the Supreme Court of India, the then Government was compelled to come out with the New National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012), rather hurriedly, effective December 7, 2012.

That was the ‘grand beginning’ of a new paradigm of ‘market-based’ drug price control regime in India.

Hype and rapid disillusionment:

Many stakeholders, barring some NGOs, felt at that time that DPCO 2013 could be a win-win strategy for both the industry and patients, as it would apparently be less intrusive for the pharma players.

Along side, through ‘Public Relations’ overdrive, hype was created by vested interests to generate a feeling that the drug prices are coming down by 30-40 percent, as a result of the new market-based price control regime.

That could well be true for a handful of drugs, but the fact is that the industry was adversely impacted by around 2.3 percent and the span of price control came down from 20 percent of the just pervious DPCO 1995 to 18 percent in DPCO 2013, not impacting the industry as much as it was hyped before.

Realization of these facts was just enough for the public disillusionment to set in.

Questions started popping-up almost immediately:

Unfortunately, many key questions started popping-up just at the very onset of its implementation process. Besides many others, some basic questions raised on DPCO 2013, a good number of which went into litigations and/or departmental reviews, are as follows:

  • Implementability of new ‘Ceiling Prices (CP)’ for market stocks within 45 days of notification by the respective companies.
  • Criteria of calculation of 1 percent market share for brands.
  • How would already existing different drug delivery systems of the same drug substance be considered to work out a common CP?
  • How reliable is the IMS Data, based on which CP calculation would be done by the NPPA?
  • What will happen to those NLEM 2011 drugs for which IMS does not provide any information?

Erstwhile Finance Ministry wanted to continue with cost plus formula:

When the new draft National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy (NPPP) had gone for comments from various ministries of UPA II Government, the key recommendations of the then Ministry of Finance were reportedly as follows:

  • The proposal to limit the NPPP to control prices of only formulations leaving aside bulk drugs is not supported.
  • Top priced brands in many therapy areas are also the brand leaders. As a result, high prices of such drugs while calculating the ceiling prices would push up prices of many low priced drugs significantly.
  • The current system, which is a cost plus system is adequate to cover all legitimate costs for a manufacturer, particularly when the costing is being done annually and should be continued.
  • The same cost plus system should also apply to other formulations where additional therapeutic elements will be added. Related incremental cost in those cases can be considered to determine the ceiling price of combination formulations.
  • The Maximum Retail Prices (MRP) for all NLEM 2011 drugs may be fixed by the NPPA accordingly and the pharmaceutical companies would be free to price these NLEM products at any level below the MRP.
  • Annual indexation of price with WPI is not supported. The cost analysis should determine the quantum of increase.
  • Data related to prices and market shares should be collected from sources other than IMS even for drugs covered by them. The methodology to be followed by NPPA for evaluating IMS data and for collecting the data for medicines from other sources should be included in the NPPP.
  • A phased movement towards 100 percent generic manufacturing, as recommended by the Ministry of Health (MoH), for all drugs under the NLEM should be considered.

Current imbroglio over ceiling price fixation:

A recent media report highlighted that even almost 15 months after the announcement of DPCO 2013, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) fails to fix prices of 111 scheduled formulations due to scanty available information.

According to this report, though NPPA has revised prices of over 400 formulations out of around 652 as per DPCO 2013, it has now come out with a list of 103 formulations for which prices could not be fixed due to insufficient information. Besides, it could not fix the prices of eight more formulations, as the NLEM 2011 did not provide required information, such as, strength, route of administration and dosage form.

Thus, it appears that required price control of essential drugs as per DPCO 2013 is in a limbo today because of serious implementability issues, over and above its other (de)merits, as discussed above.

The fundamental question:

The fundamental question that is now being raised by many is, whether from patients point of new there was any need to change from ‘Cost Based Price Control (CBPC)’ to the new ‘Market Based Price Control (MBPC)’ system?

As a result, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is still pending before the Supreme Court challenging DPCO 2013.

This judicial scrutiny could put the MBPC concept in jeopardy, placing the pharma price control system back to CBPC mode, unless the new government takes a pre-emptive strategic move well before hand.

The New Minister’s recent statement rekindles hope for action:

There are now more reasons to justify why the new Minister Mr. Ananth Kumar should revisit MBPC mechanism, sooner. As I wrote in one of my earlier blog post that “The New ‘Market Based Pricing Model’ is Fundamentally Flawed”.

Conclusion:

From the statements of the new Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers herein, and also the new Health Minister, as quoted in my last blog post, it appears that the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) would continue to remain with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, at least for some more time. This is quite contrary to the general expectations that DoP would be a part of the Ministry of Health in the new regime.

That said, besides full implementability of DPCO 2013 for all essential drugs, the Ceiling Price (CP) calculation methodology also appears to be fundamentally flawed, its misuse and abuse by some pharma players, as highlighted in my earlier blog post, have also been a subject of great concern and consumer aghast.

With this rapidly evolving scenario, unless the new minister Ananth Kumar steps in to sort out the conundrum with deft handling, unlike his almost defunct predecessor in UPA II, or till the Supreme Court intervenes responding to the PIL on DPCO 2013 related issues, the growing dissatisfaction of the affected section of stakeholders and the constraints of the NPPA would continue to linger, poor patients being the ultimate sufferers.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.