Universal Health Coverage: The Only Alternative To Drug Price Control in India?

Aggressive drug pricing is becoming a burning issue in the healthcare space, across the world. The raging debate continues in India too, fueled by many factors.

In this context, it was quite interesting to note, on July 15, 2015, the Supreme Court of India asked the Government to analyze and explain why the controlled price of essential medicines has been fixed at a high level, depriving the poor from getting life-saving drugs at reasonable rates.

Consequently, the Government was compelled to have a relook at the allegedly ‘flawed’ National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 (NPPP 2012) and the subsequent Drug Price Control Order 2013 (DPCO 2013) forming an inter-ministerial committee to work out a more robust alternative.

Even thereafter, on November 03, 2015, the editorial column of a business daily concluded by advocating, “excessive price control may lead to a shortage of crucial medicines and a gray market.” The editorial has not elaborated though, what it means by “excessive price control,” despite the fact, the current span of drug price control is just around 20 percent of the domestic Indian Pharmaceutical Market.

The most intriguing part in this editorial is, to make affordable health care in general and drugs in particular available to all, though it broached on some ideas in a patchy way, did not suggest any comprehensive pan-India solution, as a viable alternative. It just wrote against DPCO, which too seems to be off the cuff, as many believe.

Such blatant advocacy against DPCO, without being overarching solution centric, could jeopardize patients’ health interests in India. This is primarily because, ‘Out of Pocket’ expenditure on drugs is one of the highest in India, even as compared to its neighboring countries, with very low per capita income.

I discussed in this Blog similar subject on July 13, 2015 in my article titled, “India: Tops The GDP Growth, Remains At The Bottom On Health Care”.

Would abolition of DPCO be foolhardy? 

Further, the above editorial comment on the above  business daily that “excessive price control may lead to a shortage of crucial medicines and a gray market,” appears hypothetical and not fact based, as many experts in this field have articulated quite in contrary.

Many believe, the bogey that advocates ‘price control causes drug shortages’ is industry sponsored. Whether it is right or wrong, may be a contentious issue. Nevertheless, there is no robust evidence that price control causes drug shortages.

At the same time, this is also true that some price controlled drugs under DPCO 1995 were discontinued by the respective manufacturers. The key reason for the same is product obsolescence, as those drugs were old and newer alternatives were in the market. Those are really product value and prescription demand related issues. To the best of my knowledge, not a single modern drug, has ever faced permanent shortages due to the price control in India. Moreover, there are robust provisions under DPCO 2013 to deal with such artificial drug shortages, as and when happen.

Moreover, after the announcement of Ceiling Prices of DPCO 2013 products, when wholesaler’s margins were initially revised downwards by a number of manufacturers, some wholesalers agitated and refused to buy those drugs causing some shortages. This dispute was mutually resolved since then, jointly by the drug manufacturers and pharma wholesalers. There have been no reported shortages of DPCO 2013 drugs, thereafter.

Be that as it may, I reckon, advocacy by any responsible entity to abolish DPCO in India without suggesting an effective alternative, such as, putting in place a public funded Universal Health Care (UHC) mechanism, would be foolhardy. We have a large number of functioning examples of UHC, across the world, including the OECD and BRICS countries, which makes a policy mechanism like DPCO almost irrelevant.

What happens when ‘no holds barred’ drug pricing is allowed?  

Recent incidences of ‘no holds barred’ drug pricing in the largest free-market economy of the world – the United States, have started attracting ire of even the more affluent and mostly health insured American citizens too.

As reported by the Boston Globe on October 16, 2015, this is happening in both patented and generic medicines. A few examples, out of many, of some recent jaw dropping aggressive drug pricing are as follows:

  • Average price of a new cancer drug costs around US$ 100,000 a year
  • A new hepatitis C drug costs US$84,000 for a course of 12-week treatment
  • A generic tetracycline price was increased by 70 fold just within a year
  • 5000 percent-plus increase on Turing Pharmaceuticals’ generic Daraprim (pyrimethamine) ant-parasitic tablets

Moreover, on November 6, 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported that three US pharma majors – Eli-Lilly, Merck and Valeant have received inquiries about drug pricing from the Justice Department of the US Government.

Giving an example, the report stated that for the nine months ended September 30, sales of the asthma drug Dulera inhalers (containing a combination of formoterol and mometasone) of Merck, rose 17 percent from the year-earlier period to US$383 million.

Is the dictum ‘competition controls prices of generic drugs’ just a myth?

Besides many other examples, the last two of the above four points on 70 fold and 5000 percent price increase for two old generic drugs – tetracycline and pyrimethamine, respectively, in the world’s largest free-market economy, suggests that ‘competition fails to control even generic drug prices’ for various other reasons. The National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) of India has already termed this phenomenon as ‘market failure’ for medicines. 

Adding to it, Elsevier Clinical Solutions reported recently in a White Paper titled, “The Impact of Rising Generic Drug Prices on the U.S. Drug Supply Chain”, as follows:

“Over the past two years, the pharmacy industry has seen unprecedented increases in the prices of generic drugs, causing unexpected cost increases for payers and consumers, and spurring an investigation by the United States Congress.”

A recent survey:

More recently, in October 2015, ‘Kaiser Health Tracking Poll’ of the ‘Kaiser Family Foundation’ of the United States reported that the affordability of prescription drugs continues to be at the top of the public’s priority list for the President and Congress in America. In this study, 77 percent of Americans identified the increasing prices of prescription drugs as their number one health concern.

The top two priorities by majorities across political parties, were reported as follows:

  • Making sure that high-cost drugs are affordable to those who need them
  • Government action to lower prescription drug prices

Following this report, on November 03, 2015, the ‘Committee on Oversight & Government Reform’ of the U.S. House of Representatives, by a ‘Press Release’, announced that “Top House Democrats Launch Affordable Drug Pricing Task Force.” The members of the newly formed Task Force will suggest meaningful action to combat the skyrocketing costs of pharmaceuticals in the United States, as captured in the survey of the nonpartisan Kaiser Family Foundation.

Does India want to jump into this quagmire? 

If DPCO is abolished India because of intense, both direct and indirect advocacy, would India have no alternative but to jump into this quagmire of allowing free-drug pricing to pharma players?

70 fold and 5000 percent obscene price increase in a year for branded generics may not be possible in India, but for non-schedule drugs, there is no cap on the fixation of the launch price either. Any drug manufacturer can first fix a high launch price and then can go for 10 percent price increase every year, putting public health interest in jeopardy. That’s why inter-brand price difference for the same drug molecule in India varies so much and has attracted the attention of even the NPPA.

The unfinished agenda:

There is no denying of the fact that even DPCO is not a comprehensive mechanism to offer affordable health care to all. It is meant primarily for the essential drugs in the prevailing environment, when the out of pocket drug expenditure hovers around 70 percent, being one of the highest in the world.

To offer a viable mechanism for affordable health care to all, India expressed its interest towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in 2010, when the erstwhile Planning Commission of India convened a High Level Expert Group (HLEG) to work out a road map for UHC under the chairmanship of Dr. K. Srinath Reddy, the physician of international repute. UHC has still remained an unfinished agenda in the health care space of India.

At that time the HLEG made some important recommendations in its report for effective implementation, the key ones being the following: 

  • Increasing public financing from the current 1.2 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to at least 2.5 percent.
  • Outlined an essential health care package for provision through tax funding, supplemented by employer-provided insurance
  • Free provision of essential drugs and diagnostics.
  • Emphasized prioritized funding for primary health care, with efficient links to secondary and tertiary care. 
  • Services were to be delivered jointly by strengthened public facilities and contracted private providers. 
  • Reforms were suggested for improving the health care workforce, strengthening of regulatory systems for quality assurance, and improving governance and accountability. 

Change in Government puts UHC back to square one? 

Meanwhile, the change of national Government in May 2014, gave a new perspective to the debate over UHC. The incumbent Government that had already promised and announced a “National Health Assurance,” released a draft National Health Policy (NHP) in January 2015 for public discourse.

The NHP outlines a broad framework for reform of the health care system in India. The new policy, besides others, clearly recommends the following:

  • Enactment of citizens ‘Right to Health’ through parliamentary legislation
  • Allows states to decide the services that would fall under ‘Right to Health’
  • Both public- and private-sector providers would be engaged to deliver the service package, which would be paid for by government-funded health insurance schemes
  • The states will have greater freedom in designing and delivering health programs

As the union government has already agreed to increase the states’ share of central tax revenues from 32 percent to 42 percent and transferred the responsibility for funding and implementing welfare schemes to the states, it should also identify and assign to them specific responsibilities for effective health care systems against measurable parameters.

Although the final version of the NHP has not yet been made public and adopted just yet, it will need firm political and budgetary commitment for resource allocation both by the Union and the State governments.

Current impediment to UHC:

Implementation of UHC calls for increasing public health expenditure significantly, from the current 1.2 percent to around 2.5 percent, may be over a period of five years. However, immediate increases in public financing for UHC may get impeded by the Government priority on fiscal deficit reduction, which is likely to continue in the immediate future too

Possible alternative:

As Dr. Srinath Reddy suggested in a paper titled, “India’s Aspirations for Universal Health Coverage”, published in New England Journal of Medicine, July 2, 2015:

“Health can, however, be positioned prominently in other new, well-funded government schemes such as:

  • The “Clean India” Mission, focused on sanitation and reducing air pollution,
  • The Smart Cities Project, which deploys information technology for urban development and service delivery.

Nevertheless, it may take years for the right mix of political will, financial resources, and health system capacity to deliver on the full promise of Universal Health Care.”

Assuming continuity of this situation in the near term, UHC for India is not visible anywhere near the horizon, not just yet.

Conclusion:

Non availability of affordable health care for all, including drugs, keeps bothering a vast majority of population in the country. Ironically, people feel its absence, mostly when the concerned individual or his/her dependents or any near and dear ones falls sick afflicted by serious ailments such as cancer or any other serious chronic disease.

This serious handicap for the nation has remained a key retarding factor in its attaining much desired sustainable rapid economic growth objectives, primarily for the following reasons:

  • Per capita income is very low compared to the size and other resources of the country
  • Public expenditure for health has still remained one of the lowest in the world
  • Fragile public health care infrastructure and delivery systems
  • No ‘Universal Health Coverage’ in place
  • Just 16% of the Indian population has access to free or partially-free health care
  • Comprehensive private health care is expensive and beyond reach of a vast majority
  • One of the highest ‘Out of Pocket’ expenditure on health, including drugs
  • Market failure for most drugs, where competition does not work
  • In terms of ‘Purchasing Power Parity’ together with ‘Per Capita Income’ drug prices are not low in India, as have been made out to be.

In a situation like this, when in the absence of UHC, total average ‘out of pocket’ expenditure on health is around 65 percent, and around 70 percent of which is on drugs, there does not seem to be any scope to abandon DPCO in India, just yet, for public health interest.

Any possible decision of the Government to abandon DPCO is also unlikely to pass the acid test of intense scrutiny of the Supreme Court either, to uphold public health interest. This makes me believe that a well functioning ‘Universal Health Coverage’ is the only alternative to ‘Drug Price Control’ in India, if at all.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Does ‘Free-Market Economy’ Work For Branded Generic Drugs In India?

On April 20, 2015, a panel of 31 lawmakers of the Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilizers tabled its report in the Indian Parliament. The committee emphasized that patients in India should have access to all medicines, including life saving drugs, at affordable prices. Accordingly, it recommended expansion of the scope of price control to all medicines available in the country.

The Committee wondered why all medicines are still not listed in the ‘National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM)’ and is of the view that drugs of all kinds are essential and are required by the patients for treatment of various disease conditions.

Currently, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) has fixed prices of 509 formulation packs, covering 348 drugs, based on NLEM, as specified in the Drugs Price Control Order (DPCO) 2013. Such price controlled essential drugs currently contribute less than 18 percent of the total pharmaceutical market of India in value terms. Whereas, according to reports, total number of formulation packs in India would be much over 60,000.

The panel noted that the ceiling prices of even all those medicines, which should come under price control under DPCO 2013, are yet to be announced by the NPPA. Accordingly, it advised the Government to expedite the process of notifying ceiling prices for all the remaining medicines featuring in the NLEM, without further delay.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee observed that Rs 17,944 Crore was spent in 2013-14 to import medicinal and pharmaceutical products. It expressed dissatisfaction on the Department of Pharmaceuticals’ (DoP) explanation that imports were made on quality and economic considerations and not necessarily because the products were unavailable at home.

“The Committee is of the strong view that to realize the dream of ‘Make in India’ concept in pharmaceutical sector, the government should boost and incentivize domestic bulk drug industry and discourage Indian pharmaceutical firms from importing”, the report said.

It also observed that to make India self-reliant in this area, revival of sick public sector units was necessary to create capacity of bulk drugs. The Committee urged the DoP to expedite formulation of ‘Make in India’ policy for APIs (active pharmaceutical ingredients) in India.

Indictment against the DoP:

The committee reportedly came down heavily on the DoP for its inability to utilize funds allocated for various purposes, which clearly speaks about “the poor performance of the department in utilization of its plan allocation.”

The report clearly mentions, “The committee therefore feels that department could not achieve its avowed objectives and targets set for various scheme/programs unless the funds are utilized by the department optimally and efficiently.”

Stating that the department “should make earnest efforts for optimum utilization of funds allocated to them”, the committee expressed it would “like to be apprised of the initiatives undertaken by the department in this regard”.

A quick recapitulation:

In may 2012, the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare in its 58th Report also expressed great concern on rampant prescription of irrational and useless drugs by many doctors with ‘ulterior motives’ and expressed the need of inclusion of the essential and lifesaving drugs under strict price regulation.

As it usually takes a very long time to effect any perceptible change in India, the above critical observations, as well, remained virtually unattended, even today.

Does ‘Competition’ impact Branded generic pricing?

I am personally a strong believer of ‘free-market economy’, driven by ‘market competition’, for the industrial sectors in general. It ensures rapid economic progress and growth, creating much needed wealth to cater to the growing needs of various kinds for the citizens of a nation.

However, I would strongly argue that Indian pharma industry is one of the key exceptions in this regard; as it is basically a branded generic market contributing over 90 percent to the total domestic pharmaceutical retail market.

Although, domestic market of branded generic drugs is quite crowded with a large number of respective ‘brands’ of exactly the same off-patent molecule/molecules available at widely different price ranges, patients do not derive any economic benefit out of such intense competition in a ‘free-market economy’. This happens, as the patients have no say or role in the brand selection process of the doctors to choose a price of their likings and affordability, especially when the basic drug/drugs are the same for all those brands.

Examples of huge rice variation in branded generics of the same drug:

A Research Paper published in The Indian Journal of Applied Research’ of May 2014, titled, “Cost Variation Study of Anti-diabetics: Indian Scenario” observed as follows:

“In Single drug therapy, among sulfonylurea group of drugs, Glimepiride (2 mg) shows maximum price variation of 829.72%, while Glipizide (10mg) shows minimum variation. In Meglitinides groups of drugs Repaglinide (0.5mg) shows maximum price variation 194.73% and Nateglinide (120mg) shows Minimum price variation. In Biguanides & Thizolidinediones groups of drugs, Metformin (500 mg) & Pioglitazone (15 mg) show maximum price variation of 384.18% & 600 % respectively. In α-glucosidase inhibitor group of drugs, Voglibose (0.2mg) shows maximum price variation of 387.17%, while Miglitol (25mg) shows minimum price variation.”

“In combination therapies, Glimepiride+Metformin (1+500mg) combination shows the maximum variation up to 475 %. In case of Insulin Premixed 30/70 100IU/ml shows maximum price variation of 1881.24%, while minimum variation is found with short acting 40IU/ml.”

Similar scenario prevails virtually in all therapy categories in India.

No qualms on branding:

It is understandable that generic drugs are branded o create differentiation even within exactly identical drugs. There are no qualms on branding per se, which comes at a reasonably high cost though. However, the question is, who pays for this branding exercise and for what additional tangible value/values?

If no additional tangible value is added to a generic medicine through branding, why should most of the patients sweat to pay significantly extra amount, just to help the pharma companies fighting with each other to increase their respective pies of revenue and profit?

Why drug price control in a ‘Free Market Economy’?

It is indeed a very pertinent question. Equally pertinent answers are also available in a 2014 paper titled, “Competition Issues in the Indian Pharmaceuticals Sector” of Delhi School Economics (DSE). The paper deals with issues related to failure of ‘Free Market Economy’, despite intense competition, especially for branded generic drugs in India.

In an ideally free-market economic model, for each of these brands of identical drugs, having similar regulatory approvals from the Indian drug regulator on efficacy, safety and quality standards, competitive forces should have prompted uniform or at least near uniform prices for all such products.

Any brand of the same drug/drugs charging more, should generally have attracted lesser customers, if consumers would have exercised their purchase decisions directly; efficacy, safety and quality standards being the same, as certified by the drug regulator.

Interestingly, for prescription medicines, the much proven process of consumers exercising their free choice to select a brand, influenced by advertising, does not happen at all.

Branded generics pricing paradox:

In the pharmaceutical market place, the scenario is almost just the reverse of what should happen in a highly competitive ‘free market’ model.

This means, highest priced branded varieties of identical drugs, mostly enjoy highest market share too. This in turn proves that competition within the pharma brands do not bring down the prices, benefiting the consumers/patients.

Branding of generic drugs:

Unlike many developed nations, in India, even the off-patent generic drugs are branded and differentiated on flimsy perception based intangibles to the prescribers, along with other contentious and dubious sales tools, decrying unbranded generics.

This is done in the guise of so-called pharma ‘sales and marketing’ strategies, which are sometimes shrewd and many times equally blatant, if not crude.

The DSE paper, very clearly says, ‘head to head’ competition between undifferentiated (non-branded) products would certainly cause a precipitous fall in prices.

However, it is generally believed, the prescription demand of branded generic drugs is basically created by influencing the prescribing behavior of the medical practitioners. Not just by personal selling through medical representatives, medical advertising and publicity of different types, but also through a chain of processes that many stakeholders, including the Government and law-makers generally consider as grossly unethical.

In January 2015, the Government directive for implementation of the ‘Uniform Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP)’ by the pharma industry in India, further reinforces the point.

 ‘Dorfman-Steiner’ condition vindicated:

The above paper from the DSE underscores the old and well-established ‘Dorfman-Steiner’ condition that mathematically proves that the price-cost margin is positively related to the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales revenue.

Quoting a practicing surgeon, the DSE article states:

“Sometimes it could be just plain ignorance about the availability of a cheaper alternative that makes doctors continue to prescribe costlier brands. But one cannot ignore the role of what are euphemistically called marketing “incentives”, which basically mean the inappropriate influence pharmaceutical companies exert on doctors. This runs deep. Hospitals choose to stock only certain drugs in their in-house pharmacies and insist that hospitalized patients buy drugs only from the hospital pharmacy. Drug companies sell drugs to hospitals at a price much lower than what the patient is charged, further incentivizing the hospital to stock their products. The cheaper brands often get left out in this game.”

Reasons for success of high-priced branded generics:

Low priced non – branded cheaper generics have been systematically made to perceive as of low quality. In several media reports, including some recent ones even some well-known doctors castigated the low priced non- branded cheaper generics. Pharma industry lobby groups, in tandem, has been strongly resisting various Government initiatives of un-branding the generic drugs.

Over a long time, a common public perception has been painstakingly created that high-priced branded generics are more of high quality; MNC brands are of better quality than their ‘Desi’ counterparts and branded generics are more reliable than their non-branded equivalents.

This perception is fuelled by poor enforcement of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of India that also regulates drug-manufacturing standards in the country, besides the prevailing overall drug regulatory scenario in the country.

The New Government attributes “Market Failure for pharmaceuticals”:

In its price notification dated July 10, 2014, the NPPA has categorically stated the following:

  • There exist huge inter-brand price differences in branded-generics, which is indicative of a severe market failure, as different brands of the same drug formulation, which are identical to each other in terms of active ingredient(s), strength, dosage, route of administration, quality, product characteristics, and intended use, vary disproportionately in terms of price.
  • It is observed that, the different brands of the drug formulation may sometimes differ in terms of binders, fillers, dyes, preservatives, coating agents, and dissolution agents, but these differences are not significant in terms of therapeutic value.
  • In India the market failure for pharmaceuticals can be attributed to several factors, but the main reason is that the demand for medicines is largely prescription driven and the patient has very little choice in this regard.
  • Market failure alone may not constitute sufficient grounds for government intervention, but when such failure is considered in the context of the essential role of pharmaceuticals play in the area of public health, which is a social right, such intervention becomes necessary, especially when exploitative pricing makes medicines unaffordable and beyond the reach of most and also puts huge financial burden in terms of out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare.

Civil Society echoed the same sentiment:

In this context, it is important to note that in a letter dated August 20, 2014 written by seven large Civil Society Organizations to Mr. Ananth Kumar, the present Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers with a copy to Prime Minister Modi, articulated similar view, as follows:

“Limiting all price regulation only to a list of 348 medicines and specified dosages and strengths in the DPCO 2013 goes against the policy objective of making medicines affordable to the public. The National List of Essential Medicines, a list of 348 rational and cost-effective medicines, is not the basis for production, promotion and prescription in India. In reality the most frequently prescribed and consumed medicines are not listed in the NLEM.”

I broached on a similar issue in my blog post of April 6, 2015 titled, “Would Affordable ‘Modicare’ Remain Just A Pipe Dream In India?

An opposite view: ‘Bad Medicine’

On April 23, 2015, an Editorial with the above headline, articulating exactly opposite viewpoint, was published in a leading English business daily.

With all due respect to the concerned editor, it appeared quite funny, if not ‘hilarious’ to me for several reasons. One of which is seemingly total lack of understanding on the issue by the concerned editor.

I am quoting below some of the most obvious ones, just to cite as examples:

A. Quoting the above recommendation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on drug price control the Editorial states:

“Not only will this make investors from other countries look at India with suspicion – Japanese pharma firm Daiichi just exited its disastrous investment in Ranbaxy (later taken over by Sun Pharma) – it will ensure Indian patients are deprived of good quality medicines.”

It is known to everybody that drug price control in India had got nothing to do with the exit of Daiichi. It was primarily due to import bans by the USFDA, caused by alleged falsification of GMP related data in Ranbaxy’s manufacturing plants selling drugs to America.

B. The Editorial continues:

“So much for Make-in-India—the other problem with price controls is that, with little incentive to invest in fraud-prevention, between a fourth and a third of India’s pharmaceuticals production is estimated to be spurious. Also, price caps have resulted in a situation where R&D expenses are very low, and there is little research on drugs of particular relevance to India.”

Again, it is much known fact that over 82 percent of Indian pharmaceutical market is currently outside price control, offering free-pricing opportunity. What does then prevent the drug companies to come out robust ‘fraud-prevention’ measures for all those free-pricing drugs?

C. The Editor stated:

“Since Indian prices are amongst the lowest in the world, it is not clear what exactly the committee had in mind, more so since costs of medicine are not, in any case, the most expensive part of medical treatment.”

Of course, all concerned knows that lowest range of generic drug prices in India, are perhaps the cheapest in the world. However, the point is, should it be considered in isolation? Not in relation to per capita income of the Indians? Not in terms of Purchasing Power Parity? In drug pricing context, one Committee Report of the DoP had shown, when adjusted against these two factors, drug prices in India are as high, if not more, as compared to the developed countries of the world.

I hasten to add that I fully resect all different view points. If I have made any mistakes in understanding this piece of bizarre editorial, I am more than willing to stand corrected with all humility, as this a very serious issue of ‘what is right’ and NOT ‘who is right’.

Conclusion:

India is a market of branded generics, where brand differentiation process involves creation of mostly unsubstantiated perceptions.

As the stakeholders, media and even the Indian Government have alleged, drug companies exert a strong influence in the brand prescription decision of the doctors, even at the cost of patients who cannot afford the same.

Even in a free-market economy with cutthroat competition, patients do not have any means to exercise their price preferences even within identical branded generic drugs. They are compelled to buy high priced brands, as prescribed by their doctors, even where low priced identical equivalents are available.

This condition gives rise into ‘Market Failure’, especially for branded generics in India. The NPPA has unequivocally enunciated it, which I have quoted above.

Being a strong believer and votary of ‘free-market economy’ and ‘market competition’, I find this pharma scenario unique. It is a rare example of failure of otherwise so successful free-market economy model, especially in the branded generic pharma space of India.

Around a decade ago, the ‘Indian Journal of Medical Ethics’ (IJME, January – March 2004 issue) captured the very essence of this deliberation, epitomized in the following sentence:

“If the one who decides, does not pay and the one who pays, does not decide and if the one who decides is ‘paid’, will truths stand any chance?”

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

 

Does Drug Pricing Freedom Benefit Patients in A Free-Market Economy?

A 2010 USFDA update titled ‘Generic Competition and Drug Prices’ highlighted that generic competition is intimately associated with lower drug prices, and the entry of the second generic competitor is associated with the largest price reduction.

The agency found that on an average, the first generic competitor prices its product only slightly lower than the brand-name manufacturer. However, the appearance of a second generic manufacturer reduces the average generic price to nearly half the brand name price. As additional generic manufacturers market the product, the prices continue to fall, but more slowly. For products that attract a large number of generic manufacturers, the average generic price falls to 20 percent of the branded price or even lower.

USFDA came to this conclusion based on an analysis of IMS retail sales data for single-ingredient brand name and generic drug products sold in the United States from 1999 through 2004.

Thus, the scope of any significant price increase, especially under cutthroat competition in the generic space of the US, used to be considered almost impractical until recently.

The ‘Myth’ busted:

Just over four years down the line, a ‘Press Release’ of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shattered this myth, when on October 2, 2014, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Senator Bernard Sanders, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Primary Health and Aging, Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, sent letters to 14 drug manufacturers, which reportedly include India’s Sun Pharma, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and Zydus Cadila, requesting for detail information about the escalating prices for generic drugs that they have started charging.

The letters:

The complete letters written to each of the 14 drug manufactures are linked below:

Actavis plc

Apotex Corp.

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories

Endo International plc

Global Pharmaceuticals

Heritage Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Lannett Company, Inc.

Marathon Pharmaceuticals, LLC

Mylan Inc.

PAR Pharmaceuticals Companies Inc.

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.

West-Ward Pharmaceutical Corp.

Zydus Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.

Summary findings of apparently ‘obscene’ price hike:

The following statements of Rep. Cummings and Senator Sanders capture the core sentiment of the probe:

“When you see how much the prices of these drugs have increased just over the past year, it’s staggering, and we want to know why,” Cummings said.

“Generic drugs were meant to help make medications affordable for the millions of Americans who rely on prescriptions to manage their health needs. We’ve got to get to the bottom of these enormous price increases,” Sanders added.

In the above letters, Cummings and Sanders quoted data from the Healthcare Supply Chain Association on recent purchases of 10 generic drugs by group purchasing organizations over the past two years.  For example:

  • Albuterol Sulfate used to treat asthma and other lung conditions, increased 4,014 percent for a 100’s bottle of 2 mg tablets.
  • Doxycycline Hyclate, an antibiotic used to treat a variety of infections, increased 8,281 percent for a 500’s bottle of 100 mg tablets.
  • Glycopyrrolate, used to prevent irregular heartbeats during surgery, increased 2,728 percent for a box of 10 of 0.2 mg/mL, 20 mL vials.

Click here for a table of price increases for the ten drugs examined.

The information sought by lawmakers:

The Lawmakers requested the companies to provide detail relevant information from 2012 to the present, including:

  • Total gross revenues from sales of the drugs,
  • Prices paid for the drugs,
  • Factors that contributed to decisions to increase prices,
  • The identity of company officials responsible for setting drug prices.

The trigger factor:

This probe by the US lawmakers was triggered by the National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA) 2013 survey of drug prices. Subsequently in 2014, the NCPA had requested the US Senate to investigate into staggering increases of 390 – 8200 percent in the procurement prices of ten generic drugs, in just one year.

Immediate financial impact:

Reacting to this news, in the early afternoon on October 8, 2014, the scrip of Sun Pharma reportedly declined by 3.91 percent to Rs 804.10 and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories slipped by 3.29 percent to Rs 2,996.90 while Cadila Healthcare was down by 1.84 percent to Rs 1,313.85 on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).

It is too early to speculate on the ultimate outcome of this probe. However, it may not be prudent to rule out the possibility of a far-reaching consequence, besides levying of commensurate penalties to the respective drug manufacturers.

India too acted upon, but withdrew hastily:

For products falling outside Drug Price Control Order 2013 (DPCO), which account for around 82 percent of the total Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) and are eligible for free pricing, India has a similar, yet slightly different problem.

The National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) had addressed this issue recently, but was compelled to withdraw its internal guidelines on the subject rather hastily, coincidentally just prior to Prime Minister Modi’s visit to America. Pharma industry and its lobbyists had projected this move of NPPA as a regressive step in the free pricing space.

The above measure of the NPPA was related to arbitrary and wide price variation within the same non-schedule drug molecules, manufactured by different pharma companies. This was important, as unlike many other non-drug products, patients buy medicines based on what the doctors’ prescribe for them. Moreover, patients undergoing medical treatment or their relatives usually have no inkling about the availability of lesser price equivalents of the same molecule/molecules as recommended by their doctors.

For example, Glimeperide, an anti-diabetic drug, sold by the market leader at ₹133 for a pack of 10 tablets, despite other equivalent brands being available at or below ₹40 or the MRP for a pack of 10 tablets (40 mg) of Telmisartan, used to treat hypertension varies from a low of ₹25 to as high as ₹385.

More volume sales of many of these high price drugs, despite availability of their low price equivalents, manufactured by equally well reputed companies, are primarily driven by various differentiated activities of the pharma companies to influence the doctors in favor of their respective products, as believed by many. Such type of free market encouraging free drug pricing, devoid of any possibility for the patients to exercise informed choices on the medicine price, defeats its core purpose.

Thus, absurd price variation within the same formulation of the same product molecules, even after accounting for all imaginable reasons for the price differences, was construed by the NPPA as ‘market failure’, as consumers cannot use their choice in product selection.  In a market situation like this, intervention of the government is warranted for the sake of public health interest.

I hope, the Supreme Court of India would take note of this situation, in its next hearing.

A critical Question:

Based on ‘The New York Times’ report, I twitted (#@tapan_ray) on October 8, 2014 as follows:

“It happens in the US too? Government Demands Reasons For Rising Generic Drugs Costs, Otherwise Industry To Face New Regulation. http://nyti.ms/1vMi4No”

Subsequently, on October 9, 2014, Indian media flashed headlines like:

  • “Sun, Dr Reddy’s, Zydus Cadila named in US Congress price probe” or
  • “Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Dr. Reddy’s face US action on price hikes up to 8,000 percent”

In this scenario, where prices of some generic drugs sky rocket by 390 to 8,200 percent just in a year, the following basic question comes up for all stakeholders to ponder:

Does free pricing of drugs, even in free markets, work at all to protect patients’ health interest?

Conclusion:

In my view, quite unlike most other products, pricing freedom for medicines does not work in a free market due to a number of factors, even where intense competition exists from equivalent products placed in different price bands. This is mainly because, despite availability of lower price equivalents of the same or similar drugs, patients cannot exercise their pricing choice even within the same molecule, in any way, and is totally bound by what is prescribed by the doctors. This happens in India too and in all those countries where product substitution is illegal.

Moreover, it is an open secret that the pharma players heavily influence most of the heavy prescribers in their choice of drugs following various means. As a result, in many cases highest priced products become the category leader too, despite availability of lower price equivalents from equally reputed companies. This scenario makes many people believe that in a stable market situation drug prices skyrocket primarily due to dubious business practices giving rise to gross market manipulation

I reckon, just on drug pricing issue, many pharma players, both global and local, are inviting much avoidable business risks, not just in the developing markets such as India, but also in the largest free market economy of the world – the United States… or wherever opportunities for free drug pricing exist, irrespective of what it means to the patients. This mindset needs an urgent introspection, as the past would possibly not be replicated in the future.

Expectations from the civil society are now high that governments, both in the developing and also in the developed world, would keep a careful vigil to ensure that the process of earning a decent profit by the pharma players does not transgress into a limitless fetish for profiteering under any facade, pushing majority of patients succumb to life threatening ailments without having access to appropriate medicines. This defeats even the very purpose of drug innovation, as its access gets highly restricted mostly to the creamy layer of the society.

Many would consider this situation as grossly devoid of equity, unfair, unjust and in no away be allowed to continue. It is not an issue of taking moral high grounds either or scoring brownie points in a debate, but more importantly a critical ingredient to uphold ethics and values in pharma business, while re-creating its well-deserved public image, as it takes rapid strides towards inclusive growth.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Discretionary ‘Non-Compete Clause’ in Pharma FDI: An Intriguing Decision

As I had commented before, the MNC investors, while acquiring controlling stake in the Indian pharmaceutical companies, henceforth, would not be generally allowed to include any ‘non-compete clause’ in their agreement with the Indian promoters. However, this clause may be allowed only in special circumstances with the discretionary power of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB).

Looking back:

While looking back, the decision to have a relook at pharma Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), was possibly spurred by the following key apprehensions of the ‘Third World Network (TWN)’, following a series of takeovers of important Indian Pharma and Vaccine companies by the MNCs:

1. Takeover of large integrated Indian pharma players would ultimately leave behind mostly the smaller domestic companies operating in the lower end of the pharmaceutical value chain. This may compel India to compromise on need-based R&D and become completely dependent on MNCs for meeting the country’s drug requirements to respond effectively to various urgent needs, over a period of time.

2. Acquisitions of well-integrated domestic companies with technological capabilities by the MNCs could either fully eliminate or restrict the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the country, such as, Compulsory Licensing (CL) and patent challenges. For instance, immediately after its takeover by Daiichi Sankyo, Ranbaxy withdrew all the patent challenges against Pfizer’s blockbuster cholesterol reducing drug Lipitor.

3. Takeovers are easy ways to make effective use of a well-oiled marketing and distribution network established by large domestic companies to substitute low-cost medicines with higher-priced ones, including the patented drugs.

4. MNCs allegedly want to restrict the large Indian companies from entering into the regulated markets with their low-priced generic products of high quality standards, resorting to patent challenges and taking prime initiatives in Para IV filing in the United States. All these are believed to be posing an increasing threat to them over a period of time.

5. These acquisitions could ultimately result in high medicine prices. As quoted by TWN, according to the ‘Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA)’, Abbott increased the prices of medicines produced by Piramal Healthcare immediately after its takeover. The examples given are as follows:

The price of Haemaccel was Rs 99.02 in May 2009; by May 2011 it had gone up to Rs 215 – 117 percent increase in just two years. In another instance, the epilepsy drug Gardenal registered a price hike of 121 percent during the same period.

The new ‘Press Note’ :

Thereafter, much water has flown under the bridge and finally the ‘Press Note’ of DIPP on Wednesday, January 8, 2014 formalized the deliberations of the inter-ministerial group held in November 2013 that existing policy of 100 percent FDI in the brownfield pharmaceutical sector through FIPB approval route will continue, along with the rider of jettisoning the ‘non-compete clause’. Only change in the above ‘Press Note’ is that, the said clause may be allowed only in special circumstances with the discretionary power of the FIPB. 

However, 100 per cent FDI will continue to be allowed through automatic route in the Greenfield pharma projects.

An intriguing decision:

The DIPP ‘Press Note’ appears to be intriguing without understandable explanations and quite inconsistent with the reform measures already announced by the government thus far in many other areas.

More so, as I wrote before, no tangible assessment of impact of all M&As, so far taken place in India, has yet been done in a systematic manner.

The ‘non-compete clause’ being a standard feature, especially in brownfield Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), justifiably restricts the promoters of the acquired companies from getting into the same business for a predetermined period of time.

Absence of this clause is expected to impact the valuation of the target companies significantly. Hence, some large Indian promoters had openly expressed their displeasure against such arbitrary measures and that too in quite specific terms.

More importantly, the absence of the ‘non-compete clause’ does not, in any way, effectively address those apprehensions, as mentioned above.

Conclusion:

Without any tangible evidence, it is a matter of conjecture now, whether the above apprehensions have any merits or not, in any case.

Be that as it may, the clumsy way this issue has been handled by the DIPP, especially since last couple of years, adds today even greater confusion to overall pharma FDI brownfield policy in India.

The issues related competition during any M&A process, as per statute, fall within the purview of the competition watch-dog of the country – the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which is expected to ensure that desired competition does in no way get compromised during M&As, including brand acquisitions, for the sole interest of consumers.

Despite statutory requirement to pass through CCI scrutiny in all mergers and takeover processes in India, the provision for discretionary decision to review the ‘non-compete cause’ by the FIPB, on case-by-case basis, without putting in place a set of fair and transparent guidelines for the same, appears indeed intriguing.

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Pharma FDI: Damning Report of Parliamentary Panel, PM Vetoes…and Avoids Ruffling Feathers?

An interesting situation emerged last week. The Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) on Commerce proposed a blanket ban on all FDI in brownfield pharma sector. Just two days after that, the Prime Minister of India vetoed the joint opposition of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) and the Ministry of Health to clear the way for all pending pharma FDIs under the current policy.

On August 13, 2013, Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce laid on the Table of both the Houses of the Indian Parliament its 154 pages Report on ‘FDI in Pharmaceutical Sector.’

The damning report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee flags several serious concerns over FDI in brownfield pharma sector, which include, among others, the following:

1. Out of 67 FDI investments till September 2011, only one has been in green field, while all the remaining FDI has come in the brown field projects. Moreover, FDI in brown field investments have of late been predominantly used to acquire the domestic pharma companies.

2. Shift of ownership of Indian generic companies to the MNCs also results in significant change of the business model, including the marketing strategy of the acquired entity, which are quite in sync with the same of the acquirer company. In this situation, the acquired entity will not be allowed to use flexibilities such as patent challenges or compulsory license to introduce new affordable generic medicines.

The withdrawal of all patent challenges by Ranbaxy on Pfizer’s blockbuster medicine Lipitor filed in more than eight countries immediately after its acquisition by Daiichi-Sankyo is a case in point.

3. Serial acquisitions of the Indian generic companies by the MNCs will have significant impact on competition, price level and availability. The price difference between Indian ‘generics’ and MNCs’ ‘branded generic’ drugs could  sometimes be as high as 80 to 85 times. A few more larger scale brownfield takeovers may even destroy all the benefits of India’s generics revolution.

4. FDI inflow into Research & Development of the Pharma Industry has been totally unsatisfactory. 

5. FDI flow into brown field projects has not added any significant fresh capacity in manufacturing, distribution network or asset creation. Over last 15 years, MNCs have contributed only 5 per cent of the gross fixed assets creation, that is Rs 3,022 crore against Rs 54,010 crore by the domestic companies. Further, through brownfield acquisitions significant strides have not been made by the MNCs, as yet, for new job creation and technology transfer in the country.

6. Once a foreign company takes over an Indian company, it gets the marketing network of the major Indian companies and, through that network, it changes the product mix and pushes the products, which are more profitable and expensive. There is no legal provision in India to stop any MNC from changing the product mix.

7. Though the drug prices may not have increased significantly after such acquisitions yet, there is still a lurking threat that once India’s highly cost efficient domestic capacity is crushed under the weight of the dominant force of MNCs, the supply of low priced medicines to the people will get circumvented.

8. The ‘decimation’ of the strength of local pharma companies runs contrary to achieving the drug security of the country under any situation, since there would be few or no Indian companies left having necessary wherewithal to manufacture affordable generics once a drug goes off patent or comply with a Compulsory License (CL).

9. Current FIPB approval mechanism for brownfield pharma acquisitions is inadequate and would not be able to measure up to the challenges as mentioned above.

The Committee is also of the opinion that foreign investments per se are not bad. The purpose of liberalizing FDI in pharma was not intended to be just about takeovers or acquisitions of domestic pharma units, but to promote more investments into the pharma industry for greater focus on R&D and high tech manufacturing, ensuring improved availability of affordable essential drugs and greater access to newer medicines, in tandem with creating more competition. 

Based on all these, The Committee felt that FDI in brown field pharma sector has encroached upon the generics base of India and adversely affected Indian pharma industry. Therefore, the considered opinion of the Parliamentary Committee is that the Government must impose a blanket ban on all FDI in brownfield pharma projects.

PM clears pending pharma FDI proposals:

Unmoved by the above report of the Parliamentary Committee, just two days later, on August 16, 2013, the Prime Minister of India, in a meeting of an inter-ministerial group chaired by him, reportedly ruled that the existing FDI policy will apply for approval of all pharmaceutical FDI proposals pending before the Foreign Investments Promotion Board (FIPB). Media reported this decision as, “PM vetoes to clear the way for pharma FDI.”

This veto of the PM includes US $1.6-billion buyout of the injectable facility of Agila Specialties, by US pharma major Mylan, which has already been cleared by the Competition Commission of India (CCI).

This decision was deferred earlier, as the DIPP supported by the Ministry of Health had expressed concerns stating, if MNCs are allowed to acquire existing Indian units, especially those engaged in specialized affordable life-saving drugs, it could possibly lead to lower production of those essential drugs, vaccines and injectibles with consequent price increases. They also expressed the need to protect oncology facilities, manufacturing essential cancer drugs, with assured supply at an affordable price, to protect patients’ interest of the country.

Interestingly, according to Reserve Bank of India, over 96 per cent of FDI in the pharma sector in the last fiscal year came into brownfield projects. FDI in the brownfield projects was US$ 2.02 billion against just US$ 87 million in the green field ventures.

Fresh curb mooted in the PM’s meeting:

In the same August 16, 2013 inter-ministerial group meeting chaired by the Prime Minister, it was also reportedly decided that DIPP  will soon float a discussion paper regarding curbs that could be imposed on foreign takeovers or stake purchases in existing Indian drug companies, after consultations with the ministries concerned.

Arguments allaying apprehensions:

The arguments allaying fears underlying some of the key apprehensions, as raised by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, are as follows:

1. FDI in pharma brownfield will reduce competition creating an oligopolistic market:

Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) has over 23,000 players and around 60,000 brands. Even after, all the recent acquisitions, the top ranked pharmaceutical company of India – Abbott enjoys a market share of just 6.6%. The Top 10 groups of companies (each belonging to the same promoter groups and not the individual companies) contribute just over 40% of the IPM (Source: AIOCD/AWACS – Apr. 2013). Thus, IPM is highly fragmented. No company or group of companies enjoys any clear market domination.

In a scenario like this, the apprehension of oligopolistic market being created through brownfield acquisitions by the MNCs, which could compromise with country’s drug security, needs more informed deliberation.

2. Will limit the power of government to grant Compulsory Licensing (CL):

With more than 20,000 registered pharmaceutical producers in India, there is expected to be enough skilled manufacturers available to make needed medicines during any emergency e.g. during H1N1 influenza pandemic, several local companies stepped forward to supply the required medicine for the patients.

Thus, some argue, the idea of creating a legal barrier by fixing a cap on the FDIs to prevent domestic pharma players from selling their respective companies at a price, which they would consider lucrative otherwise, just from the CL point of view may sound unreasonable, if not protectionist in a globalized economy.

3.  Lesser competition will push up drug prices:

Equity holding of a company is believed by some to have no bearing on pricing or access, especially when medicine prices are controlled by the NPPA guidelines and ‘competitive pressure’.

In an environment like this, any threat to ‘public health interest’ due to irresponsible pricing, is unlikely, especially when the medicine prices in India are cheapest in the world, cheaper than even Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (comment: whatever it means).

India still draws lowest FDI within the BRIC countries: 

A study of the United Nations has indicated that large global companies still consider India as their third most favored destination for FDI, after China and the United States.

However, with the attraction of FDI of just US$ 32 billion in 2011, against US$ 124 billion of China, US$ 67 billion of Brazil and US$ 53 billion of Russia during the same period, India still draws the lowest FDI among the BRIC countries.

Commerce Minister concerned on value addition with pharma FDI:

Even after paying heed to all the above arguments, the Commerce Minister of India has been expressing his concerns since quite some time, as follows:

“Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the pharma sector has neither proved to be an additionality in terms of creation of production facilities nor has it strengthened the R&D in the country. These facts make a compelling case for revisiting the FDI policy on brownfield pharma.”

As a consequence of which, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has reportedly been opposing FDI in pharma brownfield projects on the grounds that it is likely to make generic life-saving drugs expensive, given the surge in acquisitions of domestic pharma firms by the MNCs.

Critical Indian pharma assets going to MNCs:

Further, the DIPP and the Ministry of Health reportedly fear that besides large generic companies like Ranbaxy and Piramal, highly specialized state-of-the-art facilities for oncology drugs and injectibles in India are becoming the targets of MNCs and cite some examples as follows:

  • Through the big-ticket Mylan-Agila deal, the country would lose yet another critical cancer drug and vaccine plant.
  • In 2009 Shantha Biotechnics, which was bought over by Sanofi, was the only facility to manufacture the Hepatitis B vaccine in India, which used to supply this vaccine at a fraction of the price as compared to MNCs.
  • Mylan, just before announcing the Agila deal, bought over Hyderabad based SMS Pharma’s manufacturing plants, including some of its advanced oncology units in late 2012.
  • In 2008, German pharma company Fresenius Kabi acquired 73 percent stake in India’s largest anti-cancer drug maker Dabur Pharma.
  • Other major injectable firms acquired by MNCs include taking over of India’s Orchid Chemicals & Pharma by Hospira of the United States.
  • With the US market facing acute shortage of many injectibles, especially cancer therapies in the past few years, companies manufacturing these drugs in India have become lucrative targets for MNCs.

An alternative FDI policy is being mooted:

DIPP reportedly is also working on an alternate policy suggesting:

“It should be made mandatory to invest average profits of last three years in the R&D for the next five years. Further, the foreign entity should continue investing average profit of the last three years in the listed essential drugs for the next five years and report the development to the government.”

Another report indicated, a special group set up by the Department of Economic Affairs suggested the government to consider allowing up to 49 per cent FDI for pharma brownfield investments under the automatic route.However, investments of more than 49 per cent would be referred to the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB).

It now appears, a final decision on the subject would be taken by the Prime Minister after a larger inter-mimisterial consultation, as was decided by him on August 14, 2013.

The cut-off date to ascertain price increases after M&A:

Usually, the cut off point to ascertain any price increases post M&A is taken as the date of acquisition. This process could show false positive results, as no MNC will take the risk of increasing drug prices significantly or changing the product-mix, immediately after acquisition.

Significant price increases could well be initiated even a year before conclusion of M&As and progressed in consultation by both the entities, in tandem with the progress of the deal. Thus, it will be virtually impossible to make out any significant price changes or alteration in the product-mix immediately after M&As.

Some positive fallouts of the current policy:

It is argued that M&As, both in ‘Greenfield’ and ‘Brownfield’ areas, and joint ventures contribute not only to the creation of high-value jobs for Indians but also access to high-tech equipment and capital goods. It cannot be refuted that technology transfer by the MNCs not only stimulates growth in manufacturing and R&D spaces of the domestic industry, but also positively impacts patients’ health with increased access to breakthrough medicines and vaccines. However, examples of technology transfer by the MNCs in India are indeed few and far between.

This school of thought cautions, any restriction to FDI in the pharmaceutical industry could make overseas investments even in the R&D sector of India less inviting.

As listed in the United Nation’s World Investment Report, the pharmaceutical industry offers greater prospects for future FDI relative to other industries.  Thus, restrictive policies on pharmaceutical FDI, some believe, could promote disinvestments and encourage foreign investors to look elsewhere.

Finally, they highlight, while the Government of India is contemplating modification of pharma FDI policy, other countries have stepped forward to attract FDI in pharmaceuticals. Between October 2010 and January 2011, more than 27 countries and economies have adopted policy measures to attract foreign investment.

Need to attract FDI in pharma:

At a time when the Global Companies are sitting on a huge cash pile and waiting for the Euro Zone crisis to melt away before investing overseas, any hasty step by India related to FDI in its pharmaceutical sector may not augur well for the nation.

While India is publicly debating policies to restructure FDI in the ‘Brownfield’ pharma sector, other countries have stepped forward to attract FDI in their respective countries.  Between October 2010 and January 2011, as mentioned earlier, more than 27 countries and economies have adopted policy measures to attract foreign investment.

Thus the moot question is, what type of FDI in the pharma brownfield sector would be good for the country in the longer term and how would the government incentivize such FDIs without jeopardizing the drug security of India in its endeavor to squarely deal with any conceivable  eventualities in future?

Conclusion:

In principle, FDI in the pharma sector, like in any other identified sectors, would indeed benefit India immensely. There is no question about it…but with appropriate checks and balances well in place to protect the national interest, unapologetically.

At the same time, the apprehensions expressed by the Government, other stakeholders and now the honorable members of the Parliament, across the political party lines, in their above report, should not just be wished away by anyone.

This issue calls for an urgent need of a time bound, comprehensive, independent and quantitative assessment of all tangible and intangible gains and losses, along with opportunities and threats to the nation arising out of all the past FDIs in the brownfield pharma sector.

After a well informed debate by experts on these findings, a decision needs to be taken by the law and policy makers, whether or not any change is warranted in the structure of the current pharma FDI policy, especially in the brownfield sector. Loose knots, if any, in its implementation process to achieve the desired national outcome, should be tightened appropriately.

I reckon, it is impractical to expect, come what may, the law and policy makers will keep remaining mere spectators, when Indian Pharma Crown Jewels would be tempted with sacks full of dollars for change in ownerships, jeopardizing presumably long term drug security of the country, created painstakingly over  decades, besides leveraging immense and fast growing drug export potential across the world.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) can only assess any  possible adverse impact of Mergers & Acquisitions on competition, not all the apprehensions, as expressed by the Parliamentary Standing Committee and so is FIPB.

That said, in absence of a comprehensive impact analysis on pharma FDIs just yet, would the proposal of PSC to ban foreign investments in pharma brownfield sector and the PM’s subsequent one time veto to clear all pending FDI proposals under the current policy, be construed as irreconcilable internal differences…Or a clever attempt to create a win-win situation without ruffling MNC feathers?

By: Tapan J. Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Credible role of CCI and NPPA should allay fear of possible ill effects of FDI in Pharmaceuticals

On August 3, 2011, ‘The Hindu Business Line’ reported, “Domestic drug-makers worried by side-effects of MNC buyouts.” It opined, “Acquisitions in the pharma industry came in for sharp focus, after several domestic drug-makers sold their operations partially or entirely to overseas companies – raising concerns of, among other things, increase in medicine prices.”

However, on August 4, 2011 the same business daily retorted, “MNC drug-makers allay fears of rise in prices.” It asserted, “Multinational drug-makers have stressed that they are committed to achieving the country’s healthcare goals”.

March 18, 2011 issue of  ‘Export Import News’ wrote, “FDI in pharma sector comes down during current financial year as debate on ‘Take-Overs’ rages on”.

The Union Health Minister Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad is reportedly arguing in favor of putting a cap on the FDI limit for pharmaceuticals in India. This is based on an apprehension that such FDI would have an overall adverse impact on the health care scenario of the country, especially, on pricing and availability of medicines to the common man.

It has also been reported that the Commerce Ministry is in favor of reviewing the situation after taking into consideration of the report to be submitted to them by an international consulting firm. This seems to have been prompted by the request of the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) based on the recent takeovers of Indian companies by the Multi National Pharmaceutical Corporations. It appears that the recommendations of the Ministry of commerce, prepared in consultation with the DoP, will then be forwarded to the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister for a final direction on the much hyped and talked about issue.

Views of the Planning Commission of India:

Meanwhile, most of the daily business papers of India reported that on July 12, 2011, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia commented, “I don’t think there is any move anywhere to prevent the expansion of existing 100% foreign owned pharmaceutical companies or to prevent green field investment by foreign companies.”

A reasonable comment:

This comment of Mr. Ahluwalia seems quite reasonable, considering the fact that full control of powers on Mergers and Acquisitions of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) effective June 1, 2011, has already been notified.

CCI to address all possible adverse impact on competition due to M&A:

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) will now carefully scrutinize the possibilities of the market being less competitive due to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) of companies across the industry in the country. This concern becomes even greater, especially, in the horizontal mergers and acquisitions between the comparable competitors in the same products or geographic markets, as we have been witnessing also in the pharmaceutical sector of India, over a period of time.

However, the country is yet to notice any quantifiable ill effects of such horizontal or vertical M&A. Neither is there any major case pending with the CCI in this regard for the pharmaceutical sector.

Competition related scrutiny is nothing new in the developed markets:

Competition related scrutiny during M&A is nothing new in the developed markets of the world and is already being followed in the USA, the countries within the European Union (EU) and elsewhere.

Key concerns with M&A in pharmaceuticals:

Many believe that M&A even in the oligopolistic nature of pharmaceutical market in any country, if not abused will not do any harm to competition.  Possibly for this reason, it will be rather difficult to cite many examples, the world over, where companies have been stopped from merging by the regulators because of anti-competitive reasons.

Another school of thought, however, believes that large M&A could ultimately lead to oligopolistic nature of the pharmaceutical industry with adverse impact on competition. Thus M&A regulations are very important for this sector.

Moreover, we need to remember that competition no longer depends only on the number of players in any given field. To explain this point many people cite the example of two large global players in the field of brown liquid beverages, Coke and Pepsi, where despite being limited competition, consumers derive immense value added economic benefits due to cut throat competition between these two large players.

It goes without saying, CCI must ensure that in any M&A process, even within the pharmaceutical industry of India, such rivalry does not give way to an absolute monopoly, directly or indirectly.

M&A activity in India:

In India, the consolidation process within the Pharmaceutical Industry started gaining momentum way back in 2006 with the acquisition of Matrix Lab by Mylan. 2008 witnessed one of the biggest mergers in the Pharmaceutical Industry of India, when the third largest drug maker of Japan, Daiichi Sankyo acquired 63.9% stake of Ranbaxy Laboratories of India with US $4.6 billion.

Last year, in May 2010, Chicago based Abbott Laboratories acquired the branded generics business of Piramal Healthcare with US$3.72 billion. This was soon followed by the acquisition of Paras Pharma by Reckit Benkiser.

The ground realities:

In India, if we look at the ground reality, we find that the market competition is extremely fierce with each branded generic/generic drug (constituting over 99% of the Indian Pharmaceutical Market, IPM) having not less than 50 to 80 competitors within the same chemical compound. Moreover, 100% of the IPM is price regulated by the government, 20% under cost based price control and the balance 80% is under stringent price monitoring mechanism.

In an environment like this, the apprehension of threat to ‘public health interest’ due to irresponsible pricing will be rather imaginary. More so, when the medicine prices in India are the cheapest in the world, cheaper than even our next door neighbors like, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

CCI and NPPA will play a critical role:

One of the key concerns of the stakeholders in India is that M&A will allow the companies to come together to fix prices and resort to other anti competitive measures. However, in the pharmaceutical industry of the country this seems to be highly unlikely because of effective presence of the strong price regulator, National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), as mentioned above.

Thus even after almost three years of acquisition, the product prices of Ranbaxy have remained stable, some in fact even declined. As per IMS MAT June data, prices of Ranbaxy products grew only by 0.6% in 2009 and actually fell by 1% in 2010. Similarly post acquisition of Piramal Healthcare by Abbott USA and Shantha Biotech by Sanofi of France, average product price increases of these two Indian subsidiaries were reported to be just around 2% and 0%, respectively.

However, even if there is any remote possibility of M&A having adverse effect on competition, it will now be taken care of effectively by the CCI, as it happens in many countries of the world,  Israel being a recent example involving an Indian company.

‘Competition Commission’ does intervene:

In the process of the acquisition of Taro Pharma of Israel by Sun Pharma of India in 2008, being concerned with the possibility of price increases due to less competitive environment in three generic carbamazepine formulations, the Competition Commission in Israel intervened, as happened in many other countries.  As a result, Sun Pharma was directed by the regulator to divest its rights to develop, manufacture and market of all these three formulations to Torrent Pharma or another Commission approved buyer.

There are many such examples, across the world, of Competition Commission playing a key role to negate any possible ill effect of M&A.

Will the new Competition Law delay the M&A process?

Some apprehensions have been expressed that the new competition law could delay the process of a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) . However, it is worth noting, in case the CCI will require raising any objection after the voluntary notification has been served, they will have to do so within 90 working days, otherwise the M&A process will deem to be solemnized.

Conclusion:

I reckon, in the M&A process, the entire Pharmaceutical Industry in India would continue to act responsibly with demonstrable commitment to help achieving the healthcare objectives of the nation.

Global players will keep on searching for their suitable targets in the emerging markets like India, just as Indian players are searching for the same in the global markets. This is a process of consolidation in any industry and will continue to take place across the world.

Adverse impact of M&A on competition, if any, will now be effectively taken care of by the CCI. In addition, the apprehension for any unreasonable price increases post M&A will be addressed by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA).

Thus, there are enough checks and balances already being in place to avoid any possible adverse impact due to M&A activities in India.In this evolving scenario, it is indeed difficult to understand, why the FDI issue related to M&A in the Pharmaceutical space of India is still catching headlines of both in the national and international media.

Be that as it may, it goes without saying that as we move on, the role of CCI in all M&A activities within the Pharmaceutical Industry of India will be keenly watched by all concerned, mainly to ensure that the vibrant competitive environment is kept alive within this sector.

Disclaimer:The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

A time to keep our nose to the Grindstone – Competition Act will take care of M&As, come June 2011

Full control of powers on Mergers and Acquisitions of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) effective June 1, 2011, has now been notified.

In this evolving scenario, it is indeed difficult to understand, why is the FDI issue on M&A in the Pharmaceutical space of India is still catching headlines of both national and international media. Instead, should we not now keep our nose to the grindstone and take strategic measures to accelerate the inclusive growth of this life-line industry of the nation?

Stipulations for M&As under the Competition Act:

Section 6(1) of the Act prohibits any person or enterprise from entering into a combination which has an “appreciable adverse effect” on competition in India. It also stipulates that any enterprise which intends to enter into such M&A, shall give notice to the CCI furnishing details of the proposed M&A within thirty days of:

(i)  Approval of the merger by the Board of Directors of the concerned enterprise

or

(ii) Execution of any agreement relating to acquisitions referred to in clause 5(a) & (b) of the Act. S.6(2A) provides a period of 210 days to the CCI to complete the investigation relating to such combinations (if the CCI is unable to come to any conclusion within this period then the combination is deemed to be approved)

S.5 of the Act lays down the transactions which will qualify as combinations for the purposes of the Act. The following is the threshold limit for Mergers and Acquisitions:
• Transactions among Indian companies with combined assets of Rs. 1000 Crores or Rs 3000 Crores in turnover of the merged entity
• Cross-border transactions involving both Indian and foreign companies with combined assets of US $500 million or US $1.5 billion in turnover

• Transactions that have a territorial nexus with India, where the acquirer has US $125 million in assets or US $375 million in turnover in India.

Once any transaction reaches the threshold limit as specified in S.5, the enterprise has to take recourse to the procedure as specified in the Competition Act.

A time to keep our nose to the Grindstone:

Last year, though the growth of the Global Pharmaceutical Industry with a turnover of US$ 752 billion significantly slowed down to just 6.7% due to various contributing factors, the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry continued to maintain a robust of growth of 19% with a turnover of US$ 10.1 billion (IMS October, 2010).

R&D will fuel future growth:

However, on a longer term perspective, the domestic industry growth will be significantly driven by the newer products, which will be the outcome of painstaking innovative research and development initiatives. Keeping this point in mind, the fact that today India accounts less than one per cent of over US$130 billion of the worldwide spending on research and development for pharmaceuticals, despite its known strength in process chemistry and abundant talent pool, has started attracting attention of the government.

Government taking appropriate measures:

It is encouraging to note that the Department of Pharmaceuticals of the Government of India through its ‘Vision 2020’ initiatives is planning to create a new echo-system in the country to promote new drug discovery platforms. This is expected to catapult the country as one of the top five global pharmaceutical hubs, by 2020 attracting additional investments of around US$ 20 billion to the GDP of the country.

Primary role of the industry:

The Primary role of the Research based Pharmaceutical Industry in India, like in many other countries of the world, is to make significant contribution to the healthcare objectives of the nation by meeting the unmet needs of the ailing patients, with innovative medicines. This role can be fulfilled by developing newer medicines through painstaking, time-consuming, risky and expensive basic research initiatives. The research based Pharmaceutical Industry in India is committed to its prime function of discovering and developing new medicines not only for the patients in India but all over the world.

Encouraging innovation will be critical:

Despite immense progress made over the past decades in developing new medicines for numerous acute and chronic illnesses, innovation still remains critically important in the continuous and ever complex battle between disease and good health. Ongoing efforts in Research & Development (R&D) would require a robust national policy environment that would encourage, protect and reward innovation. Improving healthcare environment in partnership with the Government remains a priority for the Research based Pharmaceutical Companies in India, both global and local.

Continuous improvement in ‘Access to Medicines’ is critical:

Therefore, improving access to healthcare in general and medicines in particular should be on the top priority agenda of the policy makers in our country. High incidence of mortality and morbidity burden in a country like ours can only be addressed by improving Access to healthcare through a concerted partnership oriented strategy.

Some concerns still linger:

However, in the new paradigm, which has been designed to foster innovation in the country, there are still some loose knots to be tightened up to achieve the set objectives for the inclusive growth of the nation, in the longer term perspective.

These measures, in turn, will help improving the competitiveness of India vis-à-vis countries like China to attract appreciable investments towards R&D related to pharmaceutical and bio-pharmaceutical products. The Government has already initiated measures to expand the capacity of Indian judiciary and setting- up of fast-track specialized courts that can more effectively enforce Pharmaceutical patents with requisite technical expertise.

Industry should set examples in ‘Good Corporate Governance’ and ‘Global Good Manufacturing Practices’:

Another area of focus should be on corporate good governance. This encompasses adherence to high ethical standards in clinical trials, regulatory and legal compliance, working to prevent corrupt practices, high ethical standard in promotion of medicines and addressing all other issues that support good healthcare policies of the Government. In addition, Pharmaceutical Industry should take active measures to involve all concerned to fight the growing menace of counterfeit and spurious medicines, which significantly affect the lives of the ailing patients, all over the country.

All stakeholders should work in tandem:

It is obvious that the Pharmaceutical Industry alone will have a limited role to address key healthcare issues of our nation, especially when around 400 million Below the Poverty Line (BPL) population will not be able to afford any expenses towards healthcare, at all. All stakeholders like the government, corporate and the civil society in general, must work together according to their respective abilities, obligations and enlightened societal interests to effectively address such pressing issues.

Let us move ahead from ‘Price Control’ to ‘Price Monitoring’:

Despite Medicine Prices in India being one of the lowest in the world, mainly because of stiff competition within the industry and watchful eye of an effective price regulator, 100% of the Pharmaceutical market in the country is currently being price regulated by the Government even with the growth restrictive and ‘draconian’ ‘Third Schedule’ of the DPCO 95.

To enable the Industry to be globally competitive in all aspects of its operations, the government should move ahead from ‘Price Control’ to effective ‘Price monitoring’ mechanism and scrap the growth restrictive measures like, ‘third schedule’ of the current DPCO.

Transaction costs of medicines are too high:

Current transaction costs (all taxes) on medicines in India including trade margins is as high as over 50% of the ex-factory cost of a product.

This cost has been further increased in 2011-12 Union Budget proposal. The government should reduce exorbitantly high transaction costs to make medicines even more economical to the common man.

Conclusion:

I am confident, the entire Pharmaceutical Industry in India would continue to act responsibly with demonstrable commitment to help achieving the healthcare objectives of the nation.

Global players will keep on searching for their suitable targets in the emerging markets like India, just as Indian players are searching for the same in the global markets. This is a process of consolidation in any industry and will continue to take place across the world. Adverse impact of M&A on competition, if any, will now be effectively taken care of by the CCI.

So far as the ‘Financial Reform’ process is concerned, India has always been a slow starter, but it never walked backwards. This tradition, I reckon, will continue in the vibrant democracy of the country, in future too.

By: Tapan J Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.

Limiting FDI in Pharma is a protectionist cry: Does not benefit the common man.

“Protectionism is harmful” very aptly commented by Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, the Finance Minister of India, just the other day. This was in context of “recent US moves to hike visa fees and clamp down on outsourcing”.
While almost at the same time, both Indian and the foreign media reports indicate that being concerned by the recent acquisitions of the home grown relatively large pharmaceutical and biotech companies, the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) and the Department of Industrial Policy and promotion (DIPP) of the Government of India are mulling a proposal to do away with the current practice of allowing 100% Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), as applicable to the pharmaceutical industry in India.

Even the Health Minister of India has been expressing this concern since ‘Abbott – Piramal deal’ was inked last year. He expressed the same apprehension, as he read out from his written speech, in an industry function in Mumbai held on January 7, 2011.

Thus the moot question is, will limiting FDI in pharmaceuticals be not considered by the world as a protective measure, just as ‘hiking visa fees and clamping down outsourcing’ from India by other countries?
Is it a mere speculation?
I would reckon so, as at this stage India cannot afford to take any retrograde anti-reformist measure in its endeavor to further accelerate the economic progress of the nation. The Finance Minister of India has also expressed so publicly, in the same context, quite recently.
Still the speculation is quite rife that a new cap of 49% FDI for pharmaceuticals would be able to keep the multinational companies (MNCs) away from having controlling stakes in the Indian companies, which will not jeopardize access to quality medicines at an affordable price to a vast majority of the population.
The key apprehensions:
The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries in its ‘Discussion Paper’ dated August 24, 2010, which was primarily on Compulsory Licensing (CL), also expressed some of the following key apprehensions towards foreign acquisitions of the Indian pharmaceutical companies by the MNCs:
1. Such takeovers could lead to an ‘oligopolistic market’ where a few companies will decide the prices of essential medicines, adversely impacting the ‘Public Health Interest (PHI)’.
2. If large Indian companies having the wherewithal to replicate any patented molecule are taken over by the MNCs, the ‘oligopolistic’ situation thus created and being strengthened by the exclusivity of products through product patent rights, will severely limit the power of the government to face the challenge of PHI by granting CLs.
3. In such a situation MNCs could well decide to sell only the high priced patented and branded generic drugs rather than the cheaper essential drugs, pushing up the drug prices and causing inconvenience to patients.
Addressing the key apprehensions:
Let me now try to address these apprehensions impartially and with as much data as possible.
1. Can Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) be ever oligopolistic? Dictionary defines ‘Oligopolistic market’ as ‘a market condition in which sellers are so few that the actions of any one of them will materially affect price and have a measurable impact on competitors’.
IPM has over 23,000 players and around 60,000 brands (source: IMS 2010). Even after, all the recent acquisition, the top ranked pharmaceutical company of India – Abbott, enjoys a market share of just 6.1% (source: AIOCD/AWACS , November 2010). Even the Top 10 groups of companies (each belonging to the same promoter group though different and not the individual companies) contribute just around 40% of the IPM.
Thus, IPM is highly fragmented. No company or group of companies enjoys any clear market domination. In a scenario like this, the apprehension of an ‘oligopolistic market’ being created through acquisitions by the MNCs is indeed unfounded.
2. The idea of creating a legal barrier in terms of limiting the FDIs to prevent the domestic pharma players from selling their respective companies at a price, which they would consider lucrative, just from the CL point of you, as mentioned in the ‘discussion paper’ of DIPP, sounds bizarre.
3. The market competition is also extremely fierce in India with each branded generic/generic drug (constituting over 99% of the IPM) having not less than 50 to 60 competitors within the same chemical compound. Moreover, 100% of the IPM is price regulated by the government, 20% under cost based price control and the balance 80% is under stringent price monitoring mechanism. In an environment like this, the very thought of any threat to ‘public health interest’ due irresponsible pricing, may be taken as an insult to the government’s own price regulators, who have contributed in making the medicine prices in India cheapest in the world, cheaper than even our next door neighbors like, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Hard facts tell us a different story:
The apprehension that acquisition of Indian drug companies by MNCs will hurt the consumer interest is not based on hard facts. MNCs constitute 19% of the total share of the Indian pharmaceutical market in value terms. Of the 455 companies listed in IMS ORG, 38 are foreign owned (only 8.4%). The fragmented nature of the industry ensures high level of competition that has led to the lowest prices of essential medicines in India.

Ranbaxy was the first major Indian drug company to be acquired by the Japanese MNC Daiichi Sankyo in June 2008. Two years later, the prices of medicines of Ranbaxy have remained stable, some in fact even declined. As per IMS MAT June data, prices of Ranbaxy products grew only by 0.6% in 2009 and actually fell by 1% in 2010.
Access to world class science and technology:
Even the acquisition of Shantha Biotechnique by Sanofi-aventis has enabled the domestic bio-tech company to get world class R&D support and international exposure in partnership with the one of the world’s largest vaccines development company – Sanofi-Pasteur. It is worth noting that none of the prices of locally produced vaccines by Shantha Biotechnique has gone up after this acquisition.
Data also shows that the number of products under price control is now much higher for MNCs in general than the domestic drug companies.
Other positive fall outs of acquisitions/collaborations:
All these acquisitions were absolutely voluntary in every way and brought in for the country large amount of foreign investments as can be seen in the Piramal Healthcare buyout amounting to US $3.72 billion and earlier the Ranbaxy buyout of US $4.2 billion. Such acquisitions also help in shifting investment and R&D focus of the MNCs into India, which offers good science and technology base with a significant cost arbitrage.
Conclusion:
In my opinion, through partnering with MNCs, local drug companies have begun to gain access to international expertise, resources and good manufacturing practices. A number of local companies have already entered into alliances with MNCs to leverage these opportunities.
Thus limiting FDI in the pharmaceutical industry at this stage, when the government in fact is debating to open up the retail and the insurance sectors to foreign investments will indeed be a retrograde step for the country.

By: Tapan J Ray

Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.