At the very outset, I pay my homage to the departed soul of our industry colleague respected Amar Lulla, former joint managing director of Cipla, who passed away on Friday, April 22, 2011 after a prolonged battle against cancer.
As we know, “Merger and Acquisition (M&A)” is an inorganic growth tool of any business. In this model growth in business operations arise from value creation through mergers or takeovers of other companies, rather than from increase in the company’s own existing business activities.
On April 13, 2011, quoting a study released by Burrill & Co, a noted life sciences investment firm, ‘Fierce Pharma’ reported that “drug makers’ deal making over the past 10 years has utterly and completely failed to build value in the industry. Big Pharma has actually lost almost $1 trillion in value during the past decade.”
Big Pharmas lost value in the past decade through deal making:
Burrill argued: “The drug industry’s 17 most active buyers had a combined market value of $1.57 trillion at the end of 2000. By the end of 2010, that value had shrunk to $1.04 trillion–notwithstanding the $425 billion in acquisitions these companies made during the decade with a total loss of $955 billion.”
The report commented that global pharma majors could not make up non-delivery of innovative products through these acquisitions.
M&As triggered by in-market blockbuster products, were successful in the past:
It was observed that those M&As, which were triggered by in-market blockbuster products were successful in the past. Like for example:
|Pfizer and Warner Lambert
|Eli Lilly- ImClone
However, when a company was acquired for products in development or R&D pipelines, it was observed that acquirer could not derive full benefits of their respective inorganic growth plans, as many of those projects did not fructify or could not be continued in the long run for various different reasons. I am not trying to go into those details in this article.
It is usually believed that healthcare companies with diversified interests along with pharmaceuticals and biotech business, like, diagnostic, devices and generic pharmaceuticals encountered much lesser growth pangs in the past. I reckon, it is for this reason, companies like, Abbott, J&J, Roche and Novartis registered overall better business performance than their pure pharmaceutical business counterparts like, Merck, Pfizer etc.
Only future will tell us whether high takeover prices, such as US$ 68 bn paid by Pfizer for Wyeth or US$ 46 bn of Roche for Genentech or US$ 41 bn of Merck for Schering-Plough, mainly to acquire the drug pipelines of the respective companies, can ultimately be justified or not. At this stage, it is indeed extremely difficult to quantify the transaction value of phase III drugs that Pfizer, Roche and Merck acquired with these mega deals.
However, about a couple of years ago ‘Forbes’ in its article titled, “Will Pfizer’s Merger Hurt Innovation?” published in January 26, 2009 commented as follows:
“Between 1998 and now, Pfizer has launched only one medicine with annual sales surpassing $1 billion, despite ploughing more than $60 billion into research and development. That drug, the pain med Lyrica, was already in development at Warner-Lambert when Pfizer bought it.”
Other significant global M&A initiatives in 2010 were as follows:
|Value (US $ billion)
|Sepracor by Dainippon Sumitomo
|77% of Alcon (the eye care unit of Nestle) by Novartis
|Millipore by Merck KGA
|OSI Pharma by Astellas
|King Pharma by Pfizer
|BioVex by Amgen
|Ratiopharm by Teva
In addition, work is in progress for some more M&A initiatives, like the hostile bid of US $ 20 billion of Sanofi Aventis for Genzyme in 2011. J&J’s offer of US $2.3 billion for vaccines of Crucell; Valeant’s hostile bid for Cephalon of US $ 5.7 billion, and J&J’s talk with Synthes for an acquisition with US $20 billion.
Emerging markets: the Eldorado:
At the same time, IMS Health reports that emerging markets will register a growth rate of 14% to 17% by 2014, significantly driven by generic pharmaceuticals, when the developed markets will be growing by 3% to 6% during this period. It is forecasted that the global pharmaceutical industry will record a turnover of US$1.1 trillion by this time.
Probably prompted by this overall market scenario, the global pharmaceutical majors are still trying to keep their heads above water through deal making and various collaborative initiatives. India, being one of the fastest growing global pharmaceutical markets, has also started experiencing this consolidation process.
Real consolidation process in India commenced in 2006: The consolidation process in India started gaining momentum from the year 2006 with the acquisition of Matrix Lab by Mylan, although 2009 witnessed the biggest merger in the Pharmaceutical Industry of India, thus far, in value terms, when the third largest drug maker of Japan, Daiichi Sankyo acquired 63.9% stake of Ranbaxy Laboratories of India for US $4.6 billion.
This was widely believed to be a win-win deal for both the companies with Daiichi Sankyo leveraging the cost arbitrage of Ranbaxy effectively, while Ranbaxy benefiting from the innovative products range of Daiichi Sankyo. This deal also established Daiichi Sankyo as one of the leading pharmaceutical generic manufacturers of the world, making the merged company a force to reckon with, in the space of both innovative and generic pharmaceuticals business.
Another mega acquisition soon followed:
In May 2010, the Pharma major in the US Abbott catapulted itself to number one position in the Indian Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) by acquiring the branded generics business of Piramal Healthcare with whopping US$3.72 billion. Abbott acquired Piramal Healthcare at around 9 times of its sales multiple against around 4 times of the same paid by Daiichi Sankyo.
According to Michael Warmuth, senior vice-president, established products of Abbott the sales turnover of Abbott in India, after this acquisition, will grow from its current around US$ 480 million to US$2.5 billion by the next decade.
Was the valuation right for the acquired companies?
Abbott had valued formulations business of Piramal Healthcare at about eight times of sales, which is almost twice of what Japan’s Daiichi Sankyo paid for its US$4.6 billion purchase of a controlling stake in India’s Ranbaxy Laboratories in June 2008.
On the valuation, Warmuth of Abbott has reportedly commented “If you want the best companies you will pay a premium; however, we feel it was the right price.”
This is not surprising at all, as we all remember Daiichi Sankyo commented that the valuation was right for Ranbaxy, even when they wrote off US$3.5 billion on its acquisition.
In my opinion, considering the fact that not too many attractive acquisition targets are available within the domestic pharmaceutical industry, the valuation of any well performed Indian Pharmaceutical Company will continue to remain high, at least in the short to medium term… and why not, when the domestic pharmaceutical industry is growing so well, consistently?
M&As in India from 2006 to 2010:
Collaborative deals in India from 2009 to 2011:
|Dr. Reddy’s Lab
The Key driver for acquisition of large Indian companies:
Such strategies highlight the intent of the global players to quickly grab sizeable share of the highly fragmented IPM – the second fastest growing and one of the most important emerging markets of the world.
If there is one most important key driver for such consolidation process in India, I reckon it will undoubtedly be the strategic intent of the global companies to dig their heel deep into the fast growing Indian branded generic market, contributing over 99% of the IPM. The same process is being witnessed in other fast growing emerging pharmaceutical markets, as well, the growth of which is basically driven by the branded generic business.
Important characteristics to target the branded generic companies:
To a global acquirer the following seem to be important requirements while shortlisting its target companies:
• Current sales and profit volume of the domestic branded generic business • Level of market penetration and the rate of growth of this business • Strength, spread and depth of the product portfolio • Quality of the sales and marketing teams • Valuation of the business
Faster speed of consolidation process could slow down the speed of evolution of the ‘generics pharmaceutical industry’ in India: Though quite unlikely, if the moderate valuation of large Indian companies starts attracting more and more global pharmaceutical majors, the speed of evolution of the ‘local generic pharmaceutical industry’ in the country could slow down, despite entry of newer smaller players in the market.
The global companies will then acquire a cutting edge on both sides of the pharmaceutical business, discovering and developing innovative patented medicines while maintaining a dominant presence in the fast growing emerging branded generics market across the world.
An alarm bell in the Indian Market for a different reason:
It has been reported that being alarmed by these developments, some industry insiders feel, “Lack of available funding is the main reason for the recent spurt in the sale of stakes in domestic companies”.
They have reportedly urged the Government to adequately fund the research and development (R&D) initiatives of the local Pharmaceutical Companies to ensure a safeguard against further acquisition of large Indian generic players by the global pharmaceutical majors. It is a fact that the domestic Indian companies do not have adequate capital to fund cost-intensive R&D projects in India even after having a significant cost arbitrage.
Will such consolidation process now gain momentum in India?
In my view, it will take some more time for acquisitions of large domestic Indian pharmaceutical companies by the Global Pharma majors to gain momentum in the country. In the near future, we shall rather witness more strategic collaborations between Indian and Global pharmaceutical companies, especially in the generic space, as indicated above.
The number of high profile M&As of Indian pharma companies will significantly increase, as I mentioned earlier, when the valuation of the domestic companies appears quite attractive to the global pharma majors. This could happen, as the local players face more cut-throat competition both in Indian and international markets, squeezing their profit margin.
It won’t be a cake walk either…not just yet:
Be that as it may, establishing dominance in the highly fragmented and fiercely competitive IPM will not be a ‘cakewalk’ for any company, not even for the global pharmaceutical majors. Many Indian branded generic players are good marketers too. Companies like, Cipla, Sun Pharma, Alkem, Mankind, Dr.Reddy’s Laboratories (DRL) have proven it time and again, over a period of so many years.
The acquisition of Ranbaxy by Daiichi Sankyo did not change anything in the competition front. Currently the market share of Abbott, post M&A, including Solvay and Piramal Healthcare, comes to just around 6.2% followed by Cipla at 5.5% (Source: AIOCD). This situation in no way signifies domination by Abbott in the IPM, far from creating any oligopolistic pharmaceutical market in India.
Thus the pharmaceutical market in the country will continue to remain fragmented with cut-throat competition from the existing and the newer tough minded, innovative and determined local branded generic players having cost arbitrage, cerebral power and untiring spirit of competitiveness with a burning desire to win.
Simultaneously, some of the domestic pharmaceutical companies are in the process of creating a sizeable Contract Research and Manufacturing Services (CRAMS) sector to service the global pharmaceutical market.
In my view, it does not make long term business sense to pay such unusually high prices for the branded generics business of any Indian company. Besides the report of Burrill & Co., we also have with us examples of some of the Indian pharmaceutical acquisitions in the overseas market are not working satisfactorily as the regulatory requirements for the low cost generics drugs were changed in those countries.
Most glaring example is the acquisition of the German generic company Betapharm by DRL for US$ 570 million in 2006. It was reported that like Piramals, a significant part of the valuation of Betapharm was for its trained sales team. However, being caught in a regulatory quagmire, the ultimate outcome of this deal turned sour for DRL.
Could similar situation arise in India, as well? Who knows? What happens then to such expensive acquisitions, if for example, prescriptions by generic names are made mandatory by the Government within the country, despite intensive lobbying efforts?
Be that as it may, in India also, a study like, ‘Burrill Report” could be quite useful to ascertain whether or not the deal making of global and local drug majors in the country over a ten year period commencing from 2006 onwards, has succeeded to create desired stakeholder value.
By: Tapan J Ray
Disclaimer: The views/opinions expressed in this article are entirely my own, written in my individual and personal capacity. I do not represent any other person or organization for this opinion.